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ABSTRACT 
 
The topic of my thesis is the notion of existence as an encounter, as 
developed in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995). What this 
denotes is a critical stance towards a major current in Western 
philosophical tradition which Deleuze nominates as representational 
thinking. Such thinking strives to provide a stable ground for 
identities by appealing to transcendent structures “behind” the 
apparent reality and explaining the manifest diversity of the given by 
such notions as essence, idea, God, or totality of the world. In 
contrast to this, Deleuze states that abstractions such as these do not 
explain anything, but rather that they need to be explained.  
Yet, Deleuze does not appeal merely to the given. He sees that 
one must posit a genetic element that accounts for experience, and 
this element must not be “naïvely” traced from the empirical. Deleuze 
nominates his philosophy as “transcendental empiricism” and he 
seeks to bring together the approaches of both empiricism and 
transcendental philosophy. In chapter one I look into the motivations 
of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and analyse it as an encounter 
between Deleuze’s readings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. 
This encounter regards, first of all, the question of subjectivity. 
Deleuze takes from Hume an orientation towards the specificity of 
empirical sensibility, while Kant provides Deleuze a basic framework 
for an account of the emergence of the empirical. The conditions of 
experience must be situated within the immanence of the world and, 
accordingly, understood as changing.  
What this amounts to is a conception of identity as non-
essential process. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the 
nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this 
point of view, the process of individualization must become the 
central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze’s concept of the 
affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of 
Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis develops a 
morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process. In analysing such a 
process of individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of 
great value, being an open, indeterminate “charge” of potentiality. 
As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of 
actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field 
  
of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the 
temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The 
work of Bergson regarding the nature of time is especially important 
to Deleuze. As “pure” time is heterogeneous, the essentially temporal 
process of subjectification results in a conception of the subject as 
composition: an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art 
and aesthetic experience is valued by Deleuze because they disclose 
the construct-like nature of subjectivity in the sensations they 
produce. 
Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed 
in the network of affectivity that is the material diversity of the world. 
Chapter four addresses a phenomenon displaying this diversified 
indentity: the simulacrum. Both Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard use the 
concept in order to emphasise an identity that is not grounded in an 
essence. However, I see a decisive difference between them. 
Developed on the basis of the simulacrum, a theory of identity as 
assemblage emerges in chapter five. As the problematic of simulacra 
concerns perhaps foremost the artistic presentation, I shall look into 
the identity of a work of art as assemblage. To take an example of a 
concrete artistic practice and to remain within the problematic of the 
simulacrum, I shall finally address the question of reproduction – 
particularly in the case recorded music – and its identity regarding the 
work of art. In conclusion, I propose that by overturning its initial 
representational schema, phonographic music addresses its own medium 
and turns it into an inscription of difference, exposing the listener to 
an encounter with the virtual. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) was one of the central thinkers in the 
upsurge of contemporary French philosophy, beginning from the 
1960s onward. Among colleagues such as Jacques Derrida, Jean-
François Lyotard, Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva, he can be 
characterised as an exponent of poststructuralism, an intellectual 
movement reacting to then-prevailing structuralist theories in 
linguistics, psychology and anthropology, as well as to the 
philosophical tradition of phenomenology. The effect of 
poststructuralism can be summarised in very general terms as 
destabilisation of previous theoretical foundations of knowledge: 
experience in itself for phenomenology, structures which enable 
experience for structuralism. A general tendency of thinkers labelled 
as poststructuralist is, in turn, to insist on the impossibility of 
achieving any kind of “transparent” medium able to procure us a 
connection to truth or reality. If the structuralist project was to secure 
knowledge by providing an account of the differential structures 
behind every phenomenon, poststructuralism earned its “post“ prefix 
by criticising this security. For instance, instead of observing the 
systematicism inherent in cultural practices, as a structuralist would 
do, the poststructuralist would address the deviances from any 
systematic phenomena. Therein lie the limits of current knowledge 
and  it  is  this  limit  as  “pure”  difference  that  we  must  examine.  This  
approach changes the focus from the structure to its limit as a critical 
site for knowledge. We cannot begin evaluating the world from a pre-
given understanding of truth, knowledge, good or rationality, but must 
instead seek the boundaries of these concepts in order to understand 
how they are determined. In short, the focus of poststructuralism 
shifts from structure to difference.  
Accordingly, poststructuralist thinkers addressed the 
genealogical constitution of notions of deviance such as madness or 
delinquency (Foucault), the internal limits of language (Derrida) or the 
limits of sensation in experiences of the sublime (Lyotard). Deleuze’s 
project can be seen as parallel to these. He works within the tradition 
of philosophy, but from a critical position. Granted, philosophy is in 
general a critical inquiry, but Deleuze identifies two different 
orientations for this criticism. The first, major current of philosophy is 
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concerned with separating the false from the true, in order to unearth 
a stable foundation for true knowledge and morality. The second, 
more  radical  type  of  criticism  addresses  the  notion  of  truth  itself.  It  
criticises the dominant “image of thought”, that is, challenges the 
assumption of what it means to think and what constitutes the notion 
of truth.1 Deleuze’s own work belongs decidedly to the latter category 
of critical thought. 
As Deleuze’s critical thinking emphasises the limits of pre-given 
assumptions of rationality and knowledge, it leads to many 
approaches. Consequently, when producing a study considering the 
philosophy of Deleuze, one is at once faced with the question “Which 
Deleuze?”, for there seem to be many. Deleuze himself produced 
works under many guises: studies on historic philosophical figures, 
books and articles on works of art and aesthetic questions, 
collaborative writings with Félix Guattari and Claire Parnet,2 journal 
and newspaper interviews, open letters and proclamations of a 
political nature, as well as weighty and technical philosophical 
monographs. This diversity of texts presents a challenge to a scholar 
working on Deleuze’s thought. Deleuze does not write systematically, 
in the sense of the author building up a continuous development of 
arguments from work to work, but instead he tends to vary his 
approaches depending on the question at hand. This variation 
includes the historical and contemporary frame of reference, writing 
style and even the conceptual apparatus and vocabulary. Still, one gets 
a sense of coherence in the gradual formation of the œuvre. Despite 
changing concepts and references, some common concerns and 
systematisation begin to appear for the patient reader. For instance, 
Véronique Bergen provides a chart of the development of Deleuze’s 
conceptual apparatus in her L’Ontologie de Gilles Deleuze.3 Deleuze’s 
studies on history of philosophy, for example, seem to be highly 
selective and serve a certain purpose. As Deleuze has commented, 
when writing about somewhat marginalised or forgotten philosophers 
                                               
1 Gilles Deleuze, ”On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought” in Deleuze, Desert Islands and 
Other Texts 1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext[e], 2002), p. 138. 
2 As Deleuze has written extensively both alone and with Guattari, I will therefore distinguish 
between the respective writings by applying “Deleuze and Guattari” whenever I am referring 
to text written jointly by both authors. Otherwise, I will use “Deleuze”. 
3 Véronique Bergen, L’Ontologie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), pp. 545–549. 
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such as Baruch Spinoza or Henri Bergson, he wanted to uncover a 
secret lineage in philosophy by focusing on those thinkers he 
considered critiquing rationalism and rejecting transcendence in 
thought.4 Likewise, Deleuze’s works on more established 
philosophers, such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant or Friedrich 
Nietzsche, highlight those features that are relevant to Deleuze’s own 
intuition and interests. 
By familiarising oneself with Deleuze’s works, one can begin to 
fathom certain perpetual points of reference or problems. Throughout 
his whole career Deleuze was striving to produce an immanent 
ontology capable of addressing processes and events not as static 
beings but in their constant unfolding as becoming. For this he 
employed a great number of conceptualisations, applied when 
necessary and then switched to new ones as the particular questions 
changed. In addition to discourse on philosophical concepts and 
figures, Deleuze takes in terminology and theories from wide-ranging 
fields such as biology, geology, mathematics and physics, as well as 
work by literary authors, painters and musicians. All this amounts to 
quite an assortment of concepts. In fact, Deleuze and Foucault 
describe theory as “toolbox” when talking about their own work 
situated between theory and praxis.5 By this they mean the pragmatic 
side of philosophy: thought must be utilisable, the question in 
addressing a problem is not so much about explication but rather 
application. This is a decidedly inclusive, populist statement, and 
undoubtedly applies more to the “pop-philosophy” Deleuze produced 
with Guattari than to the complex philosophic argumentation of 
Difference and Repetition or The Logic of Sense. Still, the statement gives 
guidelines to a student of Deleuze, as well. The question for anyone 
doing theory will be “Where to begin?” One productive, Deleuzean 
answer to that would be: “Begin where you find your own problems”. 
This amounts to not just repeating the polemic and gestures of 
Deleuze but rather locating such a problematic where a Deleuzian 
theoretical framework might be useful.  
This is the initial orientation of my study, and, as such, its aim is 
twofold: application and explication. Firstly, the “final” objective is an 
                                               
4 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), p. 6. 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power” in Deleuze, Desert Islands, p. 
208.  
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application of a mainly Deleuzean theoretical frame to a question 
based on concrete cultural practice: the use of recorded media. In the 
ultimate chapter of this study my objective is to produce a theoretical 
apparatus capable of conceptualising the ontological independence of 
forms of art based on mediated content, such as music, film and video 
art. To focus the question further, I wish to address the role of sound 
recordings and their relation to music. Is a recording inevitably a 
derivative instance of some “higher” level of music? That is, does a 
recording retain the status of a copy in the dialectic of resemblance 
and representation, or is there rather a way to approach recordings as 
products in themselves, without a primary reference to a transcendent 
level of existence? In a wider context, this question leads me also to 
address art’s particular significance among other types of production, 
human and non-human, and thus to introduce considerations about 
the medium of art and why art matters as art. 
Secondly, in order to meet this goal, I will need to fashion a 
theoretical background and for this end I devote a major part of the 
study to the explication of Deleuze’s ontology. In chapter one I start 
with the question of subjectivity in Deleuze. In a way reflecting 
Deleuze’s own starting point with a book on Hume, I consider 
Deleuze’s “empiricism” and its central concern of problematising the 
given. The relation between experience and that which remains 
transcendental to the given is a central question for Deleuze. As I see 
it, to approach this problem Deleuze begins his published career by 
staging an encounter between Hume and Kant as regards the question 
of subjectivity. Deleuze takes from Hume an orientation towards the 
specificity of empirical sensibility, but cannot concede that it provides 
a genetic factor of experience. There remains something 
transcendental to the given, and Kant provides Deleuze a basic 
framework for an account of the emergence of the empirical. Yet, the 
Kantian transcendental conditions of experience are posited as 
unchanging and law-like. Deleuze, in turn, tries to provide an account 
of the genesis of experience by appealing to transcendental 
conditioning that is not transcendent. The conditions of experience 
must be situated within the immanence of the world and, accordingly, 
understood as changing.  
What this amounts to is a conception of identity as non-essential 
process. There is no transcendent ground upon which identities can 
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be founded. A pre-given concept of identity does not explain the 
nature of things, but the concept itself must be explained. From this 
point of view, the process of individualisation must become the 
central concern. In chapter two I discuss Deleuze’s concept of the 
affect as the basis of identity and his affiliation with the theories of 
Gilbert Simondon and Jakob von Uexküll. From this basis a 
morphogenetic theory of individuation-as-process develops. This 
Deleuzean view has its precursors in the philosophies of Spinoza and 
Nietzsche, who both delineated the subject as a result of interplay 
between pre-subjective forces. In analysing such a process of 
individuation, the modal category of the virtual becomes of great 
value. Virtual is not equivalent to the possible, as possibility includes 
always a  pre-given form for its  realisation.  Virtual  is,  rather,  an open 
“charge” of potentiality, which resides in the relationality of every 
actual thing and imbues it with potential to individuate further, 
whether due to inner dynamism or by influence of outerior forces. 
Therefore, as entities are understood as dynamic processes in their 
becoming, difference comes before identity as the genetic factor of 
individuation. Further, the dimension of the virtual in cultural systems 
such as language is considered in this chapter. 
As the virtual concerns becoming or the continuous process of 
actualisation, then time, rather than space, will be the privileged field 
of consideration. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of the 
temporal aspect of the virtual and difference-without-identity. The 
work of Bergson regarding the nature of time is especially important 
to Deleuze. In examining time as qualitative multiplicity, it becomes 
clear that the way to approach difference as fundamental, and thus not 
subjected to identity, lies within such a temporality. Time as difference 
is not an absolute, a priori form  –  as  for  Kant  –  but  rather  the  co-
existence of entities and relations, out of which is formed not 
homogeneous clock-time, but heterogeneous multiplicity. Further, I 
shall describe Deleuze’s notion of the temporal synthesis of 
subjectification in the light of this notion of time. As “pure” time is 
heterogeneous, the essentially temporal process of subjectification 
results in a conception of the subject as composition: an assemblage 
of heterogeneous elements. Therefore art and aesthetic experience is 
valued by Deleuze because they disclose the construct-like nature of 
subjectivity in the sensations they produce. I shall conclude the third 
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chapter by briefly examining Deleuze’s views on cinema and their 
connections to the question of the subject in relation to time. The 
practice of art forms an image of an aesthetic subjectivity whose 
defining modes are transformation, differentiation and individuation. 
Through the domain of the aesthetic the subject is immersed in 
the network of affectivity that constitutes the material diversity of the 
world. A process of mutual determination between the subject and its 
milieu – the world – has become apparent, in which difference rather 
than identity or unity is the generative principle. Such a thought is 
anti-representational, and Deleuze seeks to unearth the roots of 
representational thought in antiquity. He highlights the concept of the 
simulacrum, found in Plato’s dialogues, as a critical concept that is 
able to topple the representational edifice. A simulacrum – an image 
so deformed that it possesses no resemblance to the entity it 
represents – possesses the critical power to cast the whole Platonic 
system of Ideas, incarnations, copies and simulacra in question. By 
presenting a possibility of an entity that does not hold an internal 
similitude to its essential cause, the Form or the Idea, the simulacrum 
implies its presence in every phenomenon and thus corrupts the status 
of an essence as the guarantee of true identity. Simulacra’s “powers of 
the false” are also deployed by Jean Baudrillard, whose conception of 
the simulacrum I shall compare to that of Deleuze. Both philosophers 
present the “modern question”: how to affirm the world in its 
appearing without descending into nihilism of lost foundations of 
knowledge and truth? Here Deleuze turns to a reading of Nietzsche’s 
concept of the eternal return as an idea which affirms the world as-it-
is,  without  a  final  aim  to  act  as  a  basis  of  judgment  of  things.  The  
becoming of the world is understood as eternal repetition of 
difference, necessitating the act of judgment as aesthetic in the 
Kantian sense, without a pre-given concept. 
In  the  final  chapter  of  this  study  I  consider  the  work  of  art  as  
possessing an identity of an assemblage, proceeding from the basis of 
Deleuze. If we accept the proposition that the world is immanent, and 
that identity is not determined by an entity’s internal resemblance to 
an essence or a category but by relations that are exterior to the entity, 
identity must be determined as a movement of development. By 
emphasising its nature as a construction, the work of art is a site that 
remains open to the emergence of difference. Art-as-assemblage is 
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composed of many factors, not alone the work, intention of the artist 
or feelings of the spectator, but rather its effects emerge as qualitative 
traits from the operation of the whole assemblage. In fact, I nominate 
the  specific  taking  place  of  art  as  art-function, which denotes a 
qualitative transformation of an assemblage in general. This can occur 
in  a  multitude  of  different  formations,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  
diversity of forms, mediums and practices of contemporary art, as well 
as art-like assemblages construed outside the established art world. To 
highlight this diversity, my final point of consideration is the work of 
art in the medium of reproduction, as mentioned above. Recording 
technology in music enables the creation of novel assemblages in art 
and effects a new category, phonographic music. Its defining 
characteristic is the thematisation of a tension between an artwork’s 
tendency to repeat the same and its potential for the emergence of 
difference. As recordings are a direct material capture of phenomena 
of the world, they bypass symbolic mediation and work via affectivity, 
transmitting intensities which are virtual; that is, they can actualise in 
many different ways in different circumstances. Certain “meta-
sounds” within the phonographic media – distortion, feedback, the 
scratch and the glitch – are “virtual” sounds in the sense that they are 
phenomena born out of their own conditions of production, the 
productive medium and that they denaturalise the representational 
schema of that implement. Phonographic music thus transforms the 
originally representational function of its medium into a machine 
which inscribes difference by distorting its own form and exposes the 
listener to an encounter with the virtual. 
As my study is an attempt at both explicating theoretical issues 
and applying theory to a practical cultural phenomenon, its 
methodological challenges reflect this twofold construction. 
Encouraged by Deleuze and Guattari’s toolbox approach, early 
reception of Deleuze’s work was characterised on one hand by 
enthusiastic application of Deleuzean concepts to a wide range of 
subjects but, on the other hand, by somewhat hastily read and poorly 
understood utilisation of those concepts. Even if this approach 
remains very much within the spirit of Deleuze’s exhortations to 
utilise6 I would not wish to repeat the eclecticity of those early 
                                               
6 As Brian Massumi, the translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, suggests, 
one should use the work like one would play a record: to skip to those parts that “work” for 
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applications. The problem of uprooting singular Deleuzean concepts 
and notions in order to put them into use in other contexts is that one 
runs the risk of losing the internal dynamic of those very concepts. 
That is, losing the sense of why a certain concept is needed, the sense 
of what constitutes the problem that has provoked this particular 
concept. 
Mainly, this awareness of an insufficient understanding of 
Deleuze’s work is due to a later, more forceful strand in the reception 
of Deleuze that has been increasingly evident in the past few years. 
What  I  mean  by  this  are  a  number  of  readings  which  are  able  to  
systematise the central strands of Deleuze’s thought, to situate those 
within the wider context of contemporary philosophy – whether 
continental or overall developments – and science, as well as to 
continue the progress of Deleuzean concepts by introducing them to 
novel environments, theoretical and practical. Recent work of scholars 
such as Ronald Bogue, Claire Colebrook, Manuel DeLanda, Elizabeth 
Grosz and Brian Massumi, to name just a few, has been very helpful. 
They have been able to proceed from competent and lucid Deleuzean 
exegesis to an original application of that philosophical machinery and 
I make use of their achievements wherever applicable. However, my 
main focus will be in Deleuze’s own work and my approach to 
commentaries is, accordingly, rather selective – the aim being, as 
mentioned above, explication and application.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
the reader. Massumi, “Translators Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy” in Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. xii–xiv. 
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1. Encountering Difference: Deleuze’s “Superior Empiricism” 
 
The present chapter addresses Deleuze’s relation to the history of 
philosophy and attempts, via an illustration of some of his readings of 
historical figures in philosophy, to elaborate the motivation behind 
many of Deleuze’s key concerns. As was discussed in the introduction 
of this study, one of the central aims of Deleuze is to fashion a kind 
of “counter-tradition” against the prominent mainstream of Western 
philosophy, which he feels has privileged identity over difference. 
Starting from identity means the affirmation of what is always already 
known and subjugating difference to a merely accidental relation 
between identities. Deleuze’s orientation is the inverse: he wants to 
establish the thinking of difference as the ontologically fundamental 
term. Difference in itself – rather than difference between X and Y – 
is the generative force that fuels the process of the actualisation of the 
world into discrete individuals. Deleuze suggests, in effect, a step 
“beyond” representations of the world into their genetic processes. 
The actual world is a “solution” to a virtual “problem” and in order to 
give a sufficient account of the actual, we need to address the 
problematic structure that produces it.  
Because of its critical orientation, Deleuze’s philosophy, as well 
as its concepts taken out of their context, is often seen in terms of a 
rupture, a violent break with the tradition and an overcoming of 
previous values. Contrary to this popular belief that results from the 
initial wave of reception in Anglo-American academia, it has to be 
stressed that Deleuze’s work is thoroughly immersed in the Western 
philosophical tradition. There is an image of Deleuze’s thought as an 
anarchic uprising that first spread to the English-speaking world 
through departments of literature, concerned at the time with notions 
such as Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy, Michel 
Foucault’s genealogical project and Jean-François Lyotard’s and Jean 
Baudrillard’s theories of the postmodern era. These very different 
thinkers and theories became, in reception, fused together as “the 
great French philosophy of the Sixties”, as Leonard Lawlor formulates 
it.7 
                                               
7 “The great French philosophy of the Sixties” functions as shorthand for theories generally 
spoken of as “poststructuralism”, “postmodernism”, or “deconstructionism”. Cf. Leonard 
Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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However, Deleuze’s deep-rooted emplacement within the 
historical tradition of philosophy has been evident to his compatriots 
and contemporaries, as, for example, Derrida states that Deleuze was 
the one of their generation to “do” philosophy most innocently.8 
What this means is that Deleuze more often than not works within 
the tradition of canonical Western philosophy and contributes to its 
development. This happens through the reformulation of its questions 
and creation of new philosophical concepts. Even though Deleuze 
has often been connected with such notions as postmodernism or 
postphilosophical relativism – and Deleuze himself has certainly 
expressed his troubled stance regarding the main currents in the 
history of philosophy – the fact remains that in his body of work 
there emerges a decidedly metaphysical meditation on the nature of 
reality. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, “the death of metaphysics or 
the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us”.9 
In fact, French contemporary philosopher Alain Badiou 
characterises Deleuze as a “classical thinker” in the sense that he is 
not willing to limit metaphysical speculation to correspond with the 
boundaries of possible experience – a limit that Immanuel Kant 
imposed on philosophy.10 Quentin  Meillassoux  has  termed  such  a  
post-Kantian philosophy adhering to this limit as “correlationist” 
thinking. Taking its cue from Kant’s division of the world into the 
phenomenal and the noumenal, the correlationist point of view 
focuses on the phenomenal field as incorporating a correlation 
between thinking and being and, accordingly, denounces any access to 
being as it is in itself.11 In short, for the correlationist subjects and 
objects are irrevocably tied together in thinking, and philosophy can 
only provide an account of their interrelation. The correlationist thesis 
is that relations between subjects and objects are reflexive. Stated in 
Kantian terms, the transcendental subject imposes its form unto the 
world and narrows the scope of epistemology to cover only an 
                                               
8 Jacques Derrida, “I’m Going to Have to Wander All Alone” in Derrida, The Work Of 
Mourning, eds. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 193–194. 
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 94. 
10 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor Of Being, trans. Julie Burchill (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press), p. 10. 
11 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier 
(London: Continuum, 2008), p. 5. 
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account of possible experience. Contrary to this, Deleuze seeks to give 
account to the real that “pre-exists” experience from the point of view 
of human consciousness and it is in this sense Badiou can claim that 
Deleuze is a classical – that is pre-Kantian – thinker.  
However, in many ways Deleuze’s thought can be seen as a 
reaction to, and therefore also as a kind of continuation of Kant’s 
project of critical philosophy. The critical definition of subjectivity 
was  central  to  Kant  and  this  is  an  orientation  Deleuze  shares.  As  is  
well known, Kant has laid out the parameters of our knowledge of 
reality in his three Critiques, where he subjugates metaphysics under 
the guidance of epistemology. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in 
philosophy placed the human subject as the locus of the inquiry 
concerning the possibilities of knowledge. Our human faculties 
present the form in which reality can appear to us as phenomena, 
whereas the objective reality, the noumenal Real that is independent 
of human senses, is forever unattainable. Therefore, for Kant, the 
primary task of philosophy is to examine our own means to access 
reality. This denotes focusing the philosophical inquiry on experience 
itself. 
 
DELEUZE’S ENCOUNTERS WITH KANT 
As Deleuze defines his philosophy as empiricism – or to be more 
exact, transcendental empiricism, of which more in the later sections in 
this chapter – there seems to be no initial problem in returning to 
experience as the starting point of any philosophical endeavour. Yet, 
Deleuze’s attitude towards Kant is decidedly critical: he later 
characterised his 1963 work on Kant, Kant’s Critical Philosophy,  as  “a  
book about an enemy” whose machinations he sought to expose.12 
Even though Deleuze gave a thorough lecture course on Kant at 
Vincennes University in 1978 where he praised Kant for having set in 
motion the “tremendous event” of a purely immanent critique of 
reason which instigated a huge paradigm shift in philosophy – as he 
states, “we are all Kantians” – he still considers that Kant has failed to 
fulfil the promise of this immanent critique.13  
                                               
12 Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 6. 
13 Transcriptions of Deleuze’s lectures at Vincennes are available online. These can be 
accessed at http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html (last accessed 20.5.2010) and 
most of the texts appear in translations to several languages. In what follows, I shall refer to 
the English translations of the lectures by the topic of the course and date of the given 
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The potential of Kant’s philosophy lies in its problematization 
of the given. For Kant, the diversity manifest in the sensible must be 
given an account. That is, an organising principle for the diverse must 
be  established.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  one  must  postulate  a  
transcendental level of the mind’s faculties, bestowing form and order 
to our experience. The given is then understood as recognition, for 
cognition is a harmonious functioning of different faculties in 
response to different representations of a given entity. In the simplest 
terms, it is this model of thought as recognition that lies at the core of 
Deleuze’s dissatisfaction with Kant. Recognition only affirms what 
already  is;  it  conforms  to  a  pre-given  “image  of  thought”,  a  
conception of what it means to think. According to Deleuze this 
model is present in the majority of thinkers in classical Western 
philosophy: the image of thought is present whenever we “already” 
know what the objective of thinking is and what the object proper to 
thought is. An image of thought follows the form “Everybody 
knows…” and makes thinking an act of recognition rather than 
discovery of novelty in the world. This kind of foundation for 
philosophy makes thought incapable of truly critical endeavour, that 
of establishing new values.14  
Even though Kant fashions his philosophical apparatus as an 
all-encompassing critique, Deleuze’s claim is that Kant, ultimately, 
ends up tracing the transcendental conditions of experience from the 
empirical – from what we already know – and therefore establishes a 
limit to thinking in accordance with the model of recognition. As 
Deleuze states,  
 
of all philosophers, Kant is the one who discovers the prodigious 
domain of the transcendental. He is the analogue of a great explorer 
– not of another world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this 
one. However, what does he do? … [In] the Critique of Pure Reason he 
describes in detail three syntheses which measure the respective 
contributions of the thinking faculties, all culminating in the third, 
that of recognition, which is expressed in the form of the 
unspecified object as correlate of the ‘I think’ to which all the 
                                                                                                                                             
lecture, using the pagination of the pdf-format documents in which the lectures are available. 
For example: Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1978, p. 1. 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), p. 130. 
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faculties are related. It is clear that, in this manner, Kant traces the 
so-called transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a 
psychological consciousness: the transcendental synthesis of 
apprehension is directly induced from an empirical apprehension, 
and so on.15  
 
Yet, Kant’s critical model of philosophy cannot be simply put aside, 
and it is evident in Deleuze’s own writings that there are many 
parallels between him and Kant. Deleuze formulates his own theory 
of the transcendental conditions of thought, most consistently in his 
magnum opus of 1968, Difference and Repetition, drawing heavily from the 
Kantian notion of the faculties and their co-operation.16 There he 
presents a conception of the initial discordant relation between the 
faculties, derived from Kant’s concept of the sublime, which frees 
thought from the classical model of recognition. Thought is not born 
out of familiarity but from the encounters with the unknown. That is 
philosophy’s empiricist side. Still, what is given in experience is, 
indeed, conditioned by our mental faculties. Thus, an analysis 
concerning the transcendental conditions of experience or knowledge 
is necessary. However, it is important to avoid formulating the 
transcendental conditions as “complete”, limiting the scope of 
thought to that which is already known. Deleuze sometimes terms his 
own philosophy as “superior empiricism” to denote his stance of not 
defining beforehand the borders of the realm of what thinking can 
determine. Deleuze defines the object of “superior empiricism” as the 
“intense world of differences in which we find the reason behind 
qualities and the being of the sensible”. Deleuze thus strives to think 
difference as difference, “before” it is subsumed under the 
representation of difference from something.17  
 
ENCOUNTER BETWEEN KANT AND HUME 
In order to bring together the two frontiers that philosophy faces, the 
empirical and the transcendental, Deleuze stages a kind of encounter 
between the empiricism of David Hume and the rationalism of Kant 
in his writings on the history of philosophy. What this encounter 
                                               
15 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 135. 
16 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, especially chapter III, pp. 129–167. 
17 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 57. 
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attempts to delineate are the strengths and limitations of each 
approach and the possibilities of developing a solution to combine 
features from both stances in a new kind of fusion Deleuze terms as 
“transcendental empiricism”. In short, Deleuze takes from Hume the 
orientation towards the given or sensibility, but does not propose that 
they provide the fundamental ground of experience. There must be a 
Kantian transcendental account for the emergence of the empirical. 
Yet, the transcendental conditions cannot be transcendent, unchanging 
and “outside” or “beyond” the immanence of the world. 
Transcendental empiricism must provide an account of the genesis of 
both experience and the conditions of experience.  
It is worth quoting Deleuze at length in Difference and Repetition, 
where he defines the task of superior or transcendental empiricism:  
 
It is strange that [transcendental] aesthetics (as the science of the 
sensible) could be founded on what can be represented. True, the 
inverse [empiricist] procedure is not much better, consisting of the 
attempt to withdraw the pure sensible from representation and to 
determine it as that which remains once representation is removed 
(a contradictory flux, for example, or a rhapsody of sensations). 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an 
apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible 
that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: 
difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the 
reason behind qualitative diversity. … The intense world of 
differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and the 
being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a superior 
empiricism.18  
 
It is apparent that Deleuze is in the first place interested in providing a 
description of the genetic conditions of experience, yet without 
binding that genesis either in the form of an unchanging 
transcendental subjectivity or onto the foundation of unmediated 
experience. In what follows in this chapter, I shall examine more 
closely Deleuze’s reading of Hume and Kant, their relationship and 
influence in order to provide a basic conception of Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism. 
                                               
18 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 86–87. 
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1.1 Hume and the Problem of the Given 
 
As Deleuze’s own project in general tends to undermine the privileged 
position traditional philosophy has given to identity – subsuming the 
different under the pre-existing Same, rather than considering the 
Same  as  requiring  explanation  in  itself  –  and  seeks  to  formulate  
thinking which could approach the understanding of processes or 
becoming instead of static being, he places empiricism before 
rationalism. This tendency can be observed in his philosophical 
corpus, as well: Deleuze starts his career by publishing a book on the 
British empiricist David Hume, Empiricism and Subjectivity, in 1953. In 
the intellectual climate of his time, dominated by readings of “the 
three H’s”, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, this was at least slightly 
controversial.  
The relationship between Hume and Kant is important to 
Deleuze, as can be seen in his own formulation of his philosophy as 
transcendental empiricism, which combines the Humean and Kantian 
approaches, at least in name, and it warrants closer scrutiny. Stated in 
general terms, Deleuze seeks to position himself somewhere between 
the empiricism of Hume and the transcendental subjectivity of Kant. 
This  is  to  say  that  Deleuze  indeed  seeks  a  way  to  approach  the  
questions of subjectivity, experience and knowledge, but without 
taking a last recourse in transcendentality of the mind. There is no 
transcendent world of “higher” reality, which would pre-form our 
experiential reality. But, crucially, there is no “direct” experience, 
either. Every phenomenon appearing to us is a product of various 
syntheses. There is a hidden genetic component in the phenomenal 
and it is the task of philosophy to address this genesis. It is from this 
point of departure that we may approach some of the central 
questions and problems animating Deleuze’s philosophy. These 
include some very traditional problems of epistemology and 
methodology in philosophy: From where should one start one’s 
inquiry in philosophy? What is the correlation between thinking and 
the world? Can we even have access to the reality of the world or are 
we inevitably bound within our own representations of it? How is one 
able to ascertain the validity of one’s conclusions? Deleuze’s answers 
to these questions are formulated in terms of his empiricism.  
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DELEUZE’S EMPIRICISM  
Reflecting on his work as a philosopher, Deleuze states: “I have 
always  felt  that  I  am  an  empiricist,  that  is,  a  pluralist”.  What  this  
amounts to is, for him, definable by two characteristics. Firstly, “the 
abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained”. Secondly, 
“the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal,  but to find 
the conditions under which something new is produced”.19 This 
formulation seems to place Deleuze squarely in opposition to 
rationalist philosophies such as those of Kant or Spinoza and 
Gottfried Leibniz – yet they are major points of reference throughout 
Deleuze’s work. A philosopher of a rationalist bent would approach 
the experiential world, the concrete given, as a collection of 
phenomena that must be explained. For the rationalist, the concrete 
instances of the world then embody a “higher” order of principles, 
which Deleuze identifies as appearing under such nominations as God 
and the Subject, among others.20 The  task  for  rationalism  is  thus  to  
seek out the processes of embodiment of the abstract.  The given, as 
diversity, is presented as a problem for thought to solve. 
Empiricism reverses this point of view. An empiricist strives to 
approach the given as diversity without reducing it to the unity of 
transcendental laws. Whereas the rationalist will postulate a universal 
category, such as knowledge, to account for the appearance of the 
empirical, the empiricist derives such categories from the flux of 
experience itself. Accordingly, empiricism is commonly defined as a 
theory which states that the origin of all of our knowledge is sense 
experience. The mind is a blank slate before we gather experience of 
the world and, accordingly, increase our knowledge of it.21 To be sure, 
this  is  only  a  crude  definition,  but  it  holds  true  regarding  a  very  
general understanding of empiricism. Any knowledge that we can gain 
is due to our senses, and is thus a posteriori in relation to experience. 
However, as Deleuze states, the “transcendental” empiricism 
he advocates cannot suffice with simple appeals to lived experience.22 
                                               
19 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. vii. 
20 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 58. 
21 This notion is often accounted to Aristotle who describes thought as “a writing-table on 
which as yet nothing actually stands written”, On the Soul, trans. J.A. Smith, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), III, 430a1. 
22 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xx. 
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If we remain within the sensible, we also remain within the boundaries 
of common sense, what is “already” known to us, and we will thus 
bracket out any true novelty in the world. Any “new” knowledge we 
might attain would merely  be an unfolding of an always already pre-
determined possibility that takes place as a novel combination of 
experiential instances. No matter how unforeseeable, those 
combinations would be, in principle, pre-ordained. As stated before, 
Deleuze formulated two characteristics for empiricism: not only anti-
transcendental avoidance of abstractions, but also the  impetus  to  
locate the conditions for the production of something new. These two 
aspects intertwine in the problematic of subjectivity, which Deleuze 
highlights as central for Hume. In the following I shall consider this in 
more detail. 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE GIVEN :  EMPIRICISM AND 
SUBJECTIVITY  
In his foreword to the English language edition of Empiricism and 
Subjectivity, Deleuze singles out the key concepts Hume has introduced 
in his philosophy. These are belief, association and relations.23 By belief, or 
assent, Hume denotes the conjoining of two or more separate 
impressions and ideas: “To believe is in this case to feel an immediate 
impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the 
memory”.24 Sense and memory are thus interlinked in producing a 
belief in the continuity of the world. In discussing the notion of belief 
Deleuze refers to Hume’s epistemological anti-transcendentalism: if 
we posit belief, which is based on probabilities deducted from 
occurrences in experience, instead of knowledge as the guidance for 
our thinking, we accordingly supplant the category of error by illusion. 
On the basis of our experience we may have legitimate beliefs or we 
may fall under illusions or illegitimate beliefs.25 For instance, we may 
have very legitimate reasons to maintain the belief that the sun comes 
up the next morning, once again, as it has been doing during our 
lifetime.  What  legitimises  the  belief  of  sunrise  to  come,  as  well  as  
other beliefs, is the evidence of associations. As Hume’s well-known 
example of causality goes, we “know” that a billiard ball moves after 
                                               
23 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), pp. ix–x. 
24 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Mineola: Dover, 2003), p. 86 
25 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. ix. 
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being hit by another ball, but this knowledge is rather a legitimate 
belief in the occurrence than the truth of the matter. We have no way 
to ascertain that the billiard ball will respond in a similar manner every 
time we hit it with another ball. There may come a day when the ball 
fails to move. Causation is one of the three “principles of connexion” 
or association Hume mentions, the other two being contiguity and 
resemblance. Causation is the strongest of these, as it enables us to go 
beyond the evidence of the immediate perception and fathom certain 
regularities in the word.26 
Without associations, according to Hume, we would be 
presented with sense impressions merely as singular, unconnected 
atoms, and would thus be unable to bind them together to make a 
larger whole and accumulate experience. To account for the 
coherence of our perception and experience, there must be some kind 
of organising principle of impressions and Hume attributes that to the 
associations as our human “nature”. As Deleuze mentions, Hume’s 
theory of associationism is novel in the way it makes thinking a 
practical matter and brings together natural and cultural formations, as 
laid out on the same level of conventions. This exteriorises the 
associations from the internal property of the human mind into a 
wider inter-dependent network of nature and culture.27 Reason is thus 
dethroned  from  its  primal  position  as  the  guarantee  of  truth.  It  is  
rather so that cognition or reason results from processes which 
originate outside of the mind. “[T]he mind is not reason; reason is an 
affection of the mind [that is, pre-rational sensibility]. In this sense, 
reason will be called instinct, habit, or nature”.28 
For Deleuze the third notable invention of Hume is his theory 
of relations. What, then, is a relation? Deleuze defines Hume’s idea of 
relations as that which “allows a passage from a given impression or 
idea to the idea of something not presently given”.29 Further, what is 
of especial interest to Deleuze is Hume’s positing of the exteriority of 
relations.  This  means  that  an  entity  is  never  fully  defined  by  its  
circumstances  –  that  is  the  set  of  relations  it  is  partial  to  –  and  is  
always displaceable to another set of relations. This is to say that a 
being is not just a passive product of its environment, as the most 
                                               
26 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 11. 
27 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, pp. 111–112. 
28 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 30. 
29 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 164. 
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stringent schools of Hegelianism or structuralism would argue. But 
neither is a being an atomistic unit able to subsist in isolationistic 
solipsism, accountable for the whole of its being. To put it otherwise, 
in  order  to  understand  a  certain  situation,  a  “state  of  affairs”,  as  
Deleuze often phrases it, we must not look for the intrinsic meanings 
of beings themselves (atomism), or the internal workings of the 
structures producing the beings (structuralism). Both of these 
perspectives would correspond to transcendent unities, whether 
atomistic or structural. As Deleuze considers Hume, along himself, as 
an anti-transcendentalist, we should approach the question of relation 
from the perspective of immanence and fathom the world as a 
“plane” of relations that are not internal to their terms. 
As the central concepts of Hume, in Deleuze’s interpretation, 
concern the question of human nature, it follows that Hume’s 
empiricism can be seen as working primarily on the problematic of 
subjectivity. At the heart of the matter is the question of the subject’s 
constitution in relation to the given. Whereas transcendentalism 
would start from the subject and ask how it “can give itself the given”, 
empiricism asks how “a subject can be constituted inside the given”.30 
It is true that “naïve” empiricist appeal to nothing but immediate 
sense  data  does  not  get  us  very  far,  as  it  has  a  tendency  to  lead  to  
nominalism which cannot explain the connections between 
particulars.31 We  must  still  account  for  the  manifest  continuity  of  
experience and thus presume some kind of organisational process 
taking place within the formation of experience. This is essentially the 
starting point of Kant’s critical philosophy.  
Yet,  in  Deleuze’s  view,  Kant  errs  on  the  side  of  the  
transcendental by positing the categories as intrinsic to the subject.32 
Thus it seems to me that Deleuze beginning with a treatise on Hume 
acts as a curiously “retro-active” critique on Kant, reversing the 
chronological order both in the Hume–Kant lineage, as well as in 
Deleuze’s own œuvre, where he follows the book on Hume by a 
reading on Kant ten years later in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. By doing 
this, Deleuze turns Hume into a critic of Kant, in opposition of the 
“factual” or chronological succession of the two thinkers. 
                                               
30 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 8. 
31 For a discussion of this problem, see Arthur Pap, “Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals 
– I” in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 37 (1959), pp. 330–340. 
32 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xx. 
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As mentioned, the central problem of the Hume–Kant 
encounter is the relationship between the experiencing self and 
experience. Must not the self be transcendental, as Kant supposes? 
What else would fuse the singular instances of experience into a unity 
that has the appearance of continuity? Kant’s criticism of Hume boils 
down to the question of the operation of the subject. There must be 
some kind of transcendental procedure in order to make experience 
possible at all. That is, if the sense data were understood as atomistic 
instances appearing in the chaotic flux of experience, any kind of 
coherence would be impossible. Kant’s answer to this is the positing 
of transcendental categories of knowledge: “Therefore, although the 
matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, the form of all 
appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations a priori in the 
mind”.33 
This is as far as Deleuze’s reading of Hume agrees with Kant: 
“According to Hume, and also Kant, the principles of knowledge are 
not derived from experience”.34 They both agree that something 
transcends the “raw” sense data of impressions. Despite this common 
ground between Hume and Kant, there is a crucial difference in 
Hume’s thinking of the formation of knowledge. For Hume, the 
unifying organising processes of experience and knowledge are not a 
priori or transcendental, but natural.  As  we  have  seen,  Hume’s  
category of association is a principle of nature which operates by 
establishing a relation between two things. From the repetition of 
these associations we acquire habits: the mind is merely a system of 
associations forming tendencies. Accordingly, Deleuze states: “We 
start with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, 
passages, ‘tendencies,’ which circulate from one to another. These 
tendencies give rise to habits. Isn’t this the answer to the question 
‘what are we?’ We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying 
‘I.’ Perhaps, there is no more striking answer to the problem of the 
Self”.35 This aspect of Deleuze’s reading of Hume can be viewed as 
one of the central tenets of Deleuze’s later thinking. The Humean–
Deleuzean habitual subject has no “pre-formation” in the sense of a 
                                               
33 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1996), A20/B34. 
34 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 111. 
35 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, p. 30. See also the analysis of habit as contraction in 
Difference and Repetition, p. 73.  
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pre-existing identity. Instead, the subject exists in a constant state of 
mutation as its generative process acquires and discards habits. 
Individuation exists in the relations forming an individual.36 
Therefore,  knowledge  is  not  innate  to  the  subject,  as  it  is  for  
Kant, but rather takes place alongside the formation of subjectivity 
itself. This corresponds with Hume’s insistence on the externality of 
relations to their terms. This means that no relation between things is 
necessary or governed by the essence of things or any kind of 
transcendental  law.  Rather,  every  situation  –  a  set  of  relations  –  is  
localised and historicised. What remain universal or constant in the 
human mind are not ideas or concepts, but rather the ways of 
proceeding from one particular idea to another – what is constant is, 
namely, human nature. As Deleuze sees it, this effects Hume’s 
destruction of Kantian “limit-ideas” (Grenzbegriffe): the Self, the World 
and God.37 None of these ideas encloses and explains the whole of 
being any longer, and they are in turn inserted among the multitude of 
ideas produced by human nature.38 
Commenting on the problem of relations and associations 
Deleuze admits that at first glance we seem to encounter a circular 
proposition. For what good is in “explaining relations by principles of 
human nature, principles of association that appear to be just another 
name to designate such relations?”39 If the associations are essentially 
built upon relations, do they really explain anything about relations 
themselves? Here we must look into the pragmatism of relations, the 
functioning of relations and the practical conditions of this 
functioning. 
 
THE PRAGMATISM OF RELATIONS 
Causality is Hume’s principal case of associationism. It is the relation 
that allows for the passage beyond the given. With the relation of 
cause we are not only able to move from a given term to another that 
is not immediately being given, but also to move from something 
                                               
36 A further reference can be made to Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation, which is 
very influential in Deleuze’s thought. Simondon and the process of individuation will be 
addressed in chapter two of the present work. 
37 For Kant limit-ideas or limit-concepts specify what our knowledge cannot reach: 
Grenzbegriffe are not objects of possible knowledge. 
38 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 164. 
39 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 164. 
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given to what has not previously been given, or even to something 
that cannot be given in experience. This is where Hume’s third key 
concept, belief, as singled out by Deleuze, comes into question. 
Deleuze gives examples of a few types of belief: given enough 
evidence in books, I can believe that a certain historical character has 
lived; given enough observations of the recurrence of a certain 
phenomenon, I can believe that it will take place again, given similar 
circumstances – these both are beliefs that we are able to ground in 
experiential evidence. But when we consider such formulations as 
“always”, “tomorrow”, “necessarily”, or “never”, we refer to 
something that is in itself unable to be given in immediate experience. 
In a certain sense, tomorrow never comes to us: we are able to 
experience only the present moment of today.40 
By invoking tomorrow, we take a leap from what is given. 
Deleuze suggests: “In other words, causality is a relation according to 
which I go beyond what given. I say more than what is given or able 
to  be  given”.  This  “saying  more”  amounts  to  belief:  “I infer and I 
believe, I await, I expect”. There, in expectation, is a divisive leap from 
a priori knowledge to knowledge based on and principled by belief. 
Whereas in our understanding we can retain a distinction between two 
separate but co-occurring cases, in our imagination these two 
occurrences become fused together. “I expect”: the fusion of these 
occurrences in imagination constitutes habit. Understanding, in turn, 
accumulates experience based on observed cases and is able to 
calculate the probability occurrences in relation and the plausibility of 
belief. Understanding and belief thus work in combination, forming 
and reinforcing expectations that have proved to be correct and 
correcting those beliefs that display the evidence of falsehood. 41 What 
comes up as noteworthy here is that the collaborative functioning of 
understanding and belief is a processual affair of practice wherein the 
functions constantly influence and adjust each other.  
Thought is, then, situated in the midst of things, provoked and 
re-adjusted by the occurrences of the world as manifested in our 
experience. Inherent in this idea is the conclusion that completely 
naturalises thought: Nature thinking itself. Nature is immanent, thus 
                                               
40 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 164. 
41 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 164. 
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more like Spinoza’s Natura naturans than Hegel’s Absolute.42 Since 
thought is borne along and amidst the relations of the world, it does 
not produce the image of man. That is, thinking has not a natural, 
innate affinity to truth, but rather proceeds in leaps and bounds in 
conjunction with our experience. This is an epistemological challenge 
to Hume, as well as Deleuze. Is there any alternative to the total 
relativism this would imply? Granted, Deleuze describes how for 
Hume the mind, when left to its own functioning, produces “a 
delirium” of dream-images, as the mind jumps haphazardly from idea 
to idea.43 Here the principles of association become a battleground 
between the irrational production of fictions of imagination and the 
well-grounded beliefs of understanding, each “side” using the 
principles of human nature to lend their production the appearance of 
surety to pass off as real.  
This production of images based on the principles of 
association, whether legitimate beliefs or flights of fantasy, is the 
process by which we escape the immediate given. It is not only on the 
basis of tried and true beliefs and predictions that we go beyond our 
experience in inferring and expecting. Rather, it appears that 
imagination uses the same machinery of association to produce 
fictional accounts of causation, correspondence and legitimacy. 
Deleuze uses the example of a liar beginning to believe his own lies by 
way of simple repetition of utterances which simulates the repetition 
of actually observed cases.44 Thus,  there  is  a  rivalry  and  confusion  
between understanding and imagination, and, accordingly, between 
science, education, superstition and poetry. How are we to rely on 
nature in this confusion, since the very same nature provides us the 
counter-nature of our delusions? 
It is because of this mixture of more or less correct ideas that 
Hume renounces the traditional concept of error and replaces it with 
illusion or delirium. As Deleuze emphasises, illusions are not false but 
rather “illegitimate beliefs, illegitimate operations of the faculties, and 
illegitimate functionings of relations … We’re not threatened by error. 
                                               
42 By Natura naturans Spinoza denotes the self-producing activity of nature. There are no 
“external”, transcendent causes in nature and therefore nature is immanent. Natura naturans, 
self-causing nature, encompasses “what is in itself and is conceived through itself”. Baruch 
Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996), I, P29, schol. 
43 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 165. 
44 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 165. 
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It’s much worse: we’re swimming in delirium”.45 Because of the self-
adjusting interplay between relations, the associative principles and 
beliefs, both legitimate and illegitimate, we end up with the situation 
where illusion insinuates itself to human nature. Some of our 
principles of association are based on prior illusions, “tainted” by this 
and thus impossible to distinguish from legitimate beliefs. What is 
more, the system of legitimate beliefs becomes dependent on these 
illegitimate beliefs and roots fiction deeply inside the workings of our 
subjectivity. We are fabricating creatures, weaving our experience and 
habits into a mixture of imagination and understanding. This means 
epistemological immanence: the conditions of experience are not 
“wider” than the conditioned and do not reside on any “higher” level 
of reality.  
What, then, is the outcome of this? How can we escape total 
scepticism if we accept the immanent and “fictional” nature of our 
categories of knowledge or conditions of experience? This is the 
question Levi R. Bryant addresses when analysing Deleuze’s 
transcendental empiricism. Beginning with the diversity of given that 
is not conditioned by transcendental principles, we will ultimately face 
the problem of radical nominalism where every phenomenon 
provides its own explanation as singular self-identity. That is, the 
conditions would be as nominal as the “things” they condition and 
any experience, let alone knowledge, would be the product of random 
differences.46 
The true challenge for someone beginning philosophical 
inquiry from an empiricist point of view is, then, to arrive at differences 
that matter. Even the most nominalistic empiricist must posit some 
primitive level of self-identity. As Bryant states, even starting from the 
assumption that there are sensations makes a claim about “the being 
of being”.47 The given is problematic: there is no escape from 
metaphysics. This is why Kant focuses his critical inquiry on the 
question of subjectivity and why Deleuze portrays the problem of the 
subject as Hume’s central concern, too. From Hume we learn, in 
contrast to Kant, that the categories of knowledge which condition 
the subject are pragmatic or conventional rather than transcendental 
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46 Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of 
Immanence (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), pp. 64–65. 
47 Bryant, Difference and Givenness, pp. 24. 
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principles. This leads to the conclusion that thought is situated within 
the activity of the world. Thinking is negotiation and experimentation, 
making or producing sense.  
 
 
1.2 Kant and the conditions of experience 
 
For Deleuze, a return to Kant is necessary. Hume will get us only so 
far. As mentioned earlier, Deleuze identifies Kant’s importance in the 
“tremendous event” of transcendental critique. As Deleuze makes 
evident in his lecture course on Kant in 1978 at Vincennes University, 
for  him  the  work  of  Kant  means  a  shift  away  from  classical  
philosophy to modern thought. It is clear that in this sense Deleuze 
considers himself “post-Kantian” – and, indeed, Vincent Descombes 
characterises Deleuze as such in his work Modern French Philosophy. 
Descombes formulates three general areas of agreement between 
Deleuze and Kant. The first point in common is a “post-classical” 
conviction of the necessity to abandon a transcendent grounding for 
thought. Classical transcendent entities, such as the soul, the world, or 
God, do not provide the basis of thought, for no number of instances 
among the manifold of experience can function as a guarantee for the 
necessary unity in postulating such a totality. As Descombes states, 
“every philosophy, in its own way, posits the precedence of the One 
over the Many. Rare are the philosophies that dispense attributes in an 
anarchic fashion (in the absence of any ahypothetical arche”. 
Descombes considers Deleuze as belonging to the latter anarchic – or 
nomadic – category: philosophy is no longer a matter of distributing the 
sum of being among entities, but rather of examining and describing 
the way things are dispersed over the expanse of being, like a nomad 
tribe spreading itself over a territory without dividing it among 
individuals. As Descombes says, in nomadic philosophy no “supreme 
principle, no formal basis, no central instance governs this 
‘distribution of essence’”.48  
From this follows a second agreement between Kant and 
Deleuze concerning the active nature of thought. Thinking is 
determination rather than representation. In classical philosophy the 
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truth of thought is based on thinking’s ability to take on and evaluate 
the “true” nature of things. Thus, thinking re-presents, or makes 
explicit,  the  implicit  order  of  the  world.  For  Kant,  however,  it  is  
thought that provides the “form” of our experience and the nature of 
things.49  
Deleuze’s and Kant’s third and last point of sympathy, as 
traced by Descombes, is the refocusing of the problem of difference. 
Whereas, in general, one would approach difference as a relation 
between two things – between two identities or two concepts – for 
Kant and Deleuze the real difference is the difference between 
conceptual and non-conceptual fields. Thus, the real difference exists 
between a concept and an intuition, the intelligible and the sensible, 
the logical and the aesthetic.50 Despite reading Hume as a kind of pre-
emptive critic of Kant, and later characterising Kant’s work as that of 
an enemy thinker, Deleuze still needs to come back to the great 
philosopher of Königsberg. “We are returning to Kant”, Deleuze 
starts his lecture course in 1978,51 and it is worth the effort to briefly 
trace the reasons for this return and to outline some of the topics 
raised during the course.  
 
THE KANTIAN FORM OF EXPERIENCE  
Deleuze locates the Kantian breaking away from classical thought in 
Kant’s establishment of the categories in the place of mere predicates. 
Categories concern the universality and necessity of thought, the a 
priori conditions of thinking. A priori is, according to Kant and 
Deleuze, something that is independent of experience. That is to say 
that it cannot be given in experience. What is not dependent on or 
given in experience? The universal and the necessary. This is because 
experience concerns the particular and the contingent. As Deleuze 
notes, this definition of the non-experiential is well-established in the 
history of philosophy. Whenever we invoke the notions of universality 
or necessity – certain uses of the future tense, the expressions 
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Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage, eds. Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
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“always,” or “necessarily” – we call upon something that cannot be 
contained within experience.52 
As we have seen, the notions of universality and necessity are 
the problems addressed by Hume in his concepts of association and 
belief. How can we provide the grounding for something like the 
“law” of causality? When  I  do  A,  it  necessarily  follows  that  B.  How  is  it  
possible to state such a proposition? There is no access to the 
“whole” of experience from which we could deduce universality. In 
the specificity of our phenomenological point of view the 
indefiniteness of experience is a given, there is no totality of the world 
to be accessed. Thus, if there is something that can be thought of as a 
priori,  it  must  be  defined  both  as  residing  outside  experience  and  as  
what is universal and necessary.  
Here Deleuze raises a question: “How can this universal and 
necessary be defined?”53 The  universal  must  in  any  case  be  
encountered in particulars and that which is independent of 
experience must be applied to experience, and only to it. Deleuze 
gives the example of boiling water. We know that given certain 
standard conditions on the surface of the Earth, water always boils at 
the temperature of 100 degrees Celsius. Yet, we do not know this 
“always” through experience. The fact that we do not have experience 
of this necessity does not prevent us from applying “always” to 
experiential particulars such as water, the event of boiling and the 
condition of 100 degrees Celsius. It follows that a priori, although 
independent of experience, is nevertheless applied to objects of 
experience. The universals and necessaries that are said of objects of 
experience are in Kantian terminology called categories. Deleuze defines 
a category as a “universal predicate” or “universal attribute”.54 This is 
to say that category is attributed to or predicated of any object.  
As an example, we can take the statement “the rose is red” and 
quickly conclude that there is a relation between two concepts, the 
rose  and  red.  Yet,  there  is  no  universality  to  be  found  there.  It  is  
evident  that  not  all  objects  are  roses,  and  that  not  all  roses  are  red.  
Likewise, not all reds are the colour of roses. Here we are dealing with 
a particular, contingent, a posteriori experience which concerns a red 
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rose. We have two a posteriori concepts, the rose and red. These define 
two sets of objects or properties which overlap in the statement 
identifying this particular rose as red. Then again, if we state that “this 
rose has a cause”, we find ourselves immediately outside the sphere of 
sets of objects. Deleuze states that to “have a cause is a universal 
predicate which is applied to all objects of possible experience”. 
Everything that appears before me will possess this predicate and 
everything that could possibly appear would possess the same 
predicate. The predicate of cause is of entirely another type than the 
predicate of red: it applies to every possible object. Therefore the 
predicate  of  cause  does  not  define  any  set  of  objects  “because  it  is  
strictly coextensive with the totality of possible experience”.55 
Here we have Kant invoking the concept of possible 
experience and, as Deleuze notes, it is only through universal 
predicates or categories that the notion of the totality of experience 
becomes intelligible at all. It must be stressed that this totality is 
conceptual, not experiential, and concerns only the form of possible 
experience. Universal predicates, as a priori, are the conditions for 
possible experience. There is a fracture, a scission between actual 
experience and possible experience. Actual experience is 
fundamentally fragmented, incomplete and irrevocably alien to 
totalisation. Within experience there is always something to add, 
another division to make. We can go from roses to other flowers, to 
plants in general, to carbon-based life forms, and further ad infinitum. 
Or we can start classifying roses into sub-species, going down that 
route to the minutest distinctions. In the multifaceted and particular 
nature of experience there is nothing indicating that the whole has 
been reached.  
Deleuze states that the novelty of Kant is exactly the positing 
of the totality of experience in the form of possible experience. This is 
where  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  any  totality  at  all,  since  possible  
experience is conditioned by universal predicates, or categories, 
applying to any object of experience whatsoever. According to Kant, 
categories concern objects “in general”.56 Therefore, as we have seen, 
categories are not classifications, dividing objects into different sets 
and subsets, but rather the a priori conditions for objects to “appear” 
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at all.  Categories are thus applicable only to a totality of objects – to 
any object whatsoever, to all objects insofar as they are objects – and 
not to any specific object. This corresponds with the totality of 
experience, an a priori notion, which would be an impossible or even 
absurd thought from the perspective of actual, empirical experience.  
As Deleuze notes, Kant derives the idea of categories largely 
from Aristotle, who produced a “famous table” of all the things that 
can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition.57 Every object in 
the human experience conforms to the ten categories or 
“predicaments” formulated by Aristotle. These are substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and 
affection.58 After introducing and outlining the Aristotelian and 
Kantian categories, Deleuze somewhat mischievously mentions that 
the  idea  of  a  category  can  be  defined  in  the  simplest  way  as  being  a  
predicate of any object whatever and that one can, after that 
definition, formulate one’s own collection of categories according to 
one’s mood and character: “To make your list of categories is for you 
to ask yourselves what is for me predicable to any object 
whatsoever”.59 This quip playfully echoes Kant’s criticism of 
Aristotle’s selection of categories, which Kant deemed as having been 
gathered “rhapsodically” without any guiding principle, merely 
collected as they occurred to Aristotle.60 
Kant’s own categories have as their guiding principle of 
selection the use of language. The categories are essentially a list of 
what can be said of every object. Here Kant equates knowledge and 
language: the capacity to pronounce a judgment about an object 
amounts to knowledge about the same object. A judgment is the 
knowledge of a thing’s possession of certain attributes. To be able to 
say  “A  is  B”,  as  in  “the  rose  is  red”,  is  to  make  a  judgment.61 Kant 
provides a table of the forms such judgments can take: 
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QUANTITY QUALITY RELATION  MODALITY 
Universal 
Particular 
Singular 
Affirmative 
Negative 
Infinite 
Categorical 
Hypothetical 
Disjunctive 
Problematic 
Assertoric 
Apodictic 
  
The list of judgments functions as the basis for Kant’s further table of 
categories: 
 
QUANTITY QUALITY RELATION  MODALITY 
Unity 
Plurality 
Totality 
Reality 
Negation 
Limitation 
Substance 
Cause 
Reciprocity 
Possibility 
Existence 
Necessity 
 
An object, if it is to be encountered as an object in experience, 
appears under the categories listed above. A thing has to be conceived 
as distinct, as possessing a unity, in order to register as an object. Still, 
it has a plurality as well, since it is composed of a multiplicity of parts. 
This multiplicity-in-oneness produces a totality, which forms the 
reality of the thing. Yet, it excludes everything it is not and possesses 
thus  the  category  of  negation:  A  is  not  B,  not  C,  not  D…  On  the  
basis of this negation, the object has limits or limitation. All objects 
possess substance, have a cause and function themselves as causes of 
other things. (When discussing Kant’s categories in his lecture, 
Deleuze does not go into the categories under the subset 
“modalities”.)62  
Kant further distinguishes two other a priori –  universal  and  
necessary – forms of experience and knowledge: space and time. 
Every object is in space, or at least in time. As Deleuze says, Kant is 
very careful to distinguish the predicates of space and time from the 
categories. Even though they all are a priori elements, space and time 
differ from the categories in the way that categories are concepts and 
thus representations, whereas space and time are sensuous 
presentations. Thus, the realm of a priori contains both presentations 
and representations.63 
                                               
62 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, pp. 3–4. 
63 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 4; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A23–24/B38–39. 
 33 
 
Kant’s division of the two a priori elements on the basis of their 
irreducibility to one another is very important for Deleuze. Here is, 
once again for Kant, a decisive break from tradition. By dividing on 
the one hand the “pure” concepts of the categories and, on the other 
hand,  the pure forms of sensibility  – time and space – Kant situates 
himself between rationalist and empiricist philosophies. One cannot 
start from the rationalist perspective and try to deduce any truths 
about experience or existence by analysing concepts alone. Likewise, 
the empiricist mode of beginning from the contingency of experience 
itself  does not yield any necessary,  universal  truths.  What is  novel  in 
Kant is the denial of both empiricist and rationalist approaches 
considered in isolation: “Without sensibility no object would be given 
to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. 
Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are 
blind”.64 Yet, how to find the method of communication between the 
empirical and the conceptual? We must remember that these are two 
separate orders that differ in nature, one conceptual and a priori, the 
other sensible and a posteriori. 
 
THE “PHENOMENOLOGY” OF KANT 
When considering the possibility of interplay between the fields of a 
priori and a posteriori, we must highlight another notion of Kant’s that 
breaks with the tradition of classical thought. Deleuze identifies this 
notion as that of phenomenon.  Whereas  in  classical  thought  a  
phenomenon can be defined as appearance, in Kant phenomena are 
“apparitions”, as Deleuze calls them. In pre-Kantian thinking the 
notion of phenomenon as appearance distinguished it from 
intelligibility. A phenomenon was something appearing in sensibility, 
something particular given in experience, a posteriori. Appearance was 
thus removed from the realm of intelligible essences, things in their 
“eternal” state as things-in-themselves. Deleuze states: “the whole of 
classical philosophy from Plato onward seemed to develop itself 
within the frame of a duality between sensible appearances and 
intelligible essences”.65 
This dualistic model posits a fundamental division between the 
illusory, fleeting world of experience with its appearances and the true 
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reality with its concepts or ideas. Subjectivity, in this classical schema, 
possesses an inherent epistemological flaw. The possibility of knowing 
the true reality is distorted by defective and deceptive appearances. 
Therefore, if one is to strive for truth, one must fight the constitutive 
infirmity of illusions and seek to leave behind the misleading veils-
behind-veils of the phenomenal world. 
Kant’s thinking, in the light of the classical epistemological 
model, appears novel to Deleuze: “like a bolt of lightning”.66 
According to Kant, we should no longer approach phenomena as 
deceptive appearances. Here the focus shifts completely and 
fundamentally: phenomena shall from Kant onward be considered as 
apparitions. This change in the point of view considering the problem 
of phenomena means, Deleuze states, that Kant can be established as 
the founder of phenomenology. The appearance of things in 
experience shall now be considered not as faulty representations of a 
higher reality of essences, but as things appearing in themselves, as 
apparitions – no further questions asked: “The apparition is what 
appears in so far as it appears. Full stop.”67 
Kant’s “modern” way of fathoming the phenomenal world lays 
out the basic guidelines for later phenomenology. The question is no 
longer “what is outside or beyond appearances?”, but rather “what 
can be said about the very fact that things appear to me?” As Deleuze 
formulates it, the disjunctive relation between appearances and 
essences – one is either appearance or essence – is replaced by another 
kind of relation: one that binds apparitions to the conditions of their 
appearing. Thinking of the phenomenal field in terms of apparitions is 
reached in conjunction with the decline of Christian thought, 
according to Deleuze. The duality between appearances and essences 
implies a lapsed, degraded world, a fall from grace, the original sin of 
man. Apparitions, on the contrary, excite further questioning about 
the sense of the appearing phenomena. In this sense, claims Deleuze, 
figures such as Freud represent modern, Kantian thinkers.68 We have 
something that appears: what does that mean, what is its sense, what 
are the conditions of its appearance? Here we have the same 
“problematic” conception of the given as that which Hume upholds 
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and which Deleuze develops further in his readings on Nietzsche and 
Proust, who Deleuze considers as great symptomatologists.69 
Instead of a fallen creature, lost amidst the deceptive 
appearances of the experiential world, trying to devise a suitable and 
infallible method to reach the surety of essences, the post-Kantian 
subject is seen by Deleuze as constructive or constitutive. This means 
that the subject inhabits the same “plane” as the process that 
produces the given. The subject “is constitutive of the conditions 
under what appears to it appears to it”.70 Instead  of  a  disjunctive  
couple of appearances and essences Kant proposes a conjunctive 
subjectivity, which incorporates both sides of the 
apparition/phenomenon – conditions/sense schema. However, this 
subject is not the empirical subject that is prone to sensory illusions, 
but the transcendental subject. This kind of subject, much in the way 
of the Kantian object in general, denotes the unity of those conditions 
under which something appears to each and every empirical subject. 
Deleuze states: “the formal conditions of all apparition must be 
determined as the dimensions of a subject which conditions the 
appearing of the apparition to an empirical self, this subject cannot 
itself  be an empirical  self,  it  will  be a  universal  and necessary self  … 
the transcendental subject”.71 The conditions of appearing are, as I 
have presented them above, the Kantian categories and the forms of 
space and time. 
 
THE KANTIAN SYNTHESES  
After introducing Kant’s transcendental subject, Deleuze turns to 
Kantian synthesis and highlights the notion of the synthetic a priori as 
the third feature distinguishing Kant from classical thinkers. It is in 
the problematic of the synthesis in relation to the transcendental 
subject that the core of Deleuze’s reading of Kant is exposed as that 
of the establishing the difference between the sensuous and the 
conceptual as the site of “true” difference. Correspondingly, 
subjectivity is defined as the site of unification of that difference.72 
                                               
69 See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983); Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (London: The Athlone Press, 
2000). 
70 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 6. 
71 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 7. 
72 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 154–155. 
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The operation of judgments in the subject is made partially via 
synthesis. Deleuze distinguishes two types of judgments in Kant: 
analytic and synthetic. An analytic judgment “expresses a predicate 
which is already contained in the subject, i.e. there will be an analytic 
relationship between two concepts when one of these concepts is 
contained in the other”.73 A  clear  example  of  this  is  the  principle  of  
identity, “A is A”. A similar case is the statement “bodies are 
extended”, since extension is already contained in the term “body.” 
Analytic judgments are therefore a priori, independent of experience. 
On the contrary, synthetic judgments depend on the a posteriori 
experience. These judgments bring together concepts that are not 
contained within each other. The statement “the rose is red”, as 
mentioned earlier when discussing the universal and necessary in 
contrast to the contingent, connects or synthesises two heterogeneous 
concepts.  A synthetic  judgment is  of  the form “A is  B”.  As Deleuze 
mentions, here we are still entirely within the classical framework 
which links the two types of judgment into the appearance – essence 
duality. Either a judgment is analytic and a priori or it is synthetic and a 
posteriori. One can consider a major portion of classical philosophy as 
trying to measure the respective proportions of analytic and synthetic 
judgments as well as the possibility or impossibility of reducing one 
into the other.74  
A Kantian shock to this classical system of thought arrives in 
the form of a third type of judgment: the synthetic a priori judgment. From 
the perspective of classical philosophy this type of concept is a 
monster, but, as Deleuze states, one cannot create new concepts 
without them being considered as abominations. As for the concept 
of synthetic a priori,  it  is “a prodigious monster” since it introduces a 
third category, according to Deleuze, a “simplest thing in the world 
which bursts a conceptual frame”.75 These types of judgments, 
according to Kant, combine both conceptual and spatio-temporal 
determinations. Kant gives an example of a synthetic a priori 
judgment: give a philosopher a concept of triangle and ask him to 
relate the sum of its angles to a right angle. The philosopher soon 
runs into a dead-end, since the concept of the triangle does not hold 
                                               
73 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 7. 
74 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 8. 
75 Deleuze, Kant 14.03.1987, p. 9. 
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in itself anything that might act as a resource for an analysis starting 
from  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  (180º)  and  ending  at  the  
equation  of  that  sum  with  two  right  angles  (2  x  90º  =  180º).  The  
philosopher cannot produce a solution to the problem, since the 
concept of the triangle does not contain anything outside its 
definition: a polygon with three vertices and three edges.76 Thus, the 
concept of the triangle produces nothing new, it is – ultimately – a 
statement of identity “A is A”. 
Now, give the same problem to a geometrician, and he will 
draw up a proof to Euclid’s famous theorem “sum of the angles of a 
triangle is equal to two right angles”. As Kant says, for the 
geometrician it is a matter of “construction”. To prove this we need 
to extend the base of a triangle BC to point D and draw a parallel to 
line BA that is marked as CE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now we can see that the sum of the three angles touching point C 
equal two right angles and that they correspond with the angles of the 
original triangle, since the lines CD and CE drawn in extension are 
parallel to BC and BA. As Kant says, contrary to the philosopher the 
geometrician produces his solution “through a chain of interferences 
[that is] always guided by intuition”.77  
It is the proof procedure that counts: this geometric 
demonstration involves producing a proof on the basis of sensible 
intuition. We must show the construction of the triangle as the sum of 
two right angles. That means appealing to a field of experience that is 
by definition outside the a priori conceptual realm of concepts. This 
requirement is evident in geometry which Kant defines as “a body of 
synthetic a priori judgments that determines the properties of space”, 
as well as in mathematics in general.78  
                                               
76 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A716/B744. 
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78 Andrew Ward, Kant: The Three Critiques (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 22; Kant, Critique 
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Here the judgment is synthetic since it is not in the concept of 
triangle to extend its base BC to point D and draw the parallel of BA 
as CE and thus to produce the proof to 180º equaling two times 90º. 
Yet, it is a universal and necessary judgment, since it applies to each 
and every triangle. Deleuze provides a similar case: “the straight line is 
the shortest path between two points”. We cannot concur that this 
type of statement is an analytic one, since “the shortest path” is not 
included in the concept of a straight line. It is unclear whether “the 
shortest” would be a predicate or an attribute. What is at stake here, 
states  Deleuze,  is  a  rule  of  construction.  This  he defines as  “the rule  
according to which one produces in experience an object which 
conforms to the concept”.79 
A rule of construction is not included in the concept. For 
example, the Euclidian concept of a straight line – “the straight line is 
the line which is ex aequo in  all  its  points”  –  does  not  give  us  the  
means of producing such a line in experience. Here Deleuze refers to 
Kant’s successor Salomon Maïmon, who highlighted the notion that 
construction  is  based  on  pure  intuition,  at  least  in  the  case  of  
geometry. As Oded Schechter comments, synthesis is “a productive 
activity of the intellect which culminates in creating new objects”.80  
Synthetic a priori judgments are thus of utmost importance, since they 
provide a way of arriving at new, yet necessarily true knowledge. Yet, 
one may ask: Why triangles and straight lines? Why is the discipline of 
geometry nominated as a prioritised field for achieving such 
knowledge? Because geometry researches and operates within the 
spatio-temporal framework which Kant defines as providing the 
“pure forms of sensible intuition”.81 
Thus, in the operation of synthetic a priori judgments, the 
heterogeneous domains of the conceptual and the sensuous are 
brought together. In the example of geometry, the concept of, say, 
triangle corresponds to its conceptual determination, and the rule of 
construction for the triangle contributes in turn to its spatio-temporal 
determination. The contingency of experience is able to fuse 
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heterogeneous concepts together in synthetic a posteriori judgments – 
as  in  the  statement  “this  rose  is  red”  –  but  what  provides  the  
universality and necessity to a priori judgments  is  their  linkage  to  
conceptual order. Why, then, are spatio-temporal determinations not 
containable in concepts? Because of the here-and-now of  time  and  
space. One can very well think of two objects which are strictly 
identical in their concept. To illustrate this Kant gives the famous 
example of two hands. Yet, spatially they are not reducible to one 
another. Take two hands, in every way identical, and you still end up 
with a left hand and a right hand. Despite the various possible 
objections to this argument, one may still say that no spatio-temporal 
objects are superimposable.82 
For Deleuze this means the positing of space and time’s 
diversity which is irreducible to conceptual order: “Spatio-temporal 
position is not a conceptual property”.83 Any given object in 
experience is distinguished not only by contingent a posteriori synthetic 
judgments linking various concepts under the singular perception of 
an object, but also by its unique situation in space and time. 
Categories produce unity; they unify the diverse under a concept. 
Space and time are, on the contrary, diverse – both in the way that 
what appears in spatio-temporal coordinates is diverse, as well as in 
the way that space and time themselves are diverse. There are a 
multitude of points – possible “heres” and “nows” – in time and 
space. Thus we can distinguish between the empirical diversity of 
apparitions and the a priori diversity of space and time.  
 
THE CO-EXISTENCE OF INTUITION AND CONCEPT 
Space and time are the forms of appearing, the presentation of what 
appears. As such, apparitions are immediately in space and time. 
There is no mediation. Concepts, on the contrary, are mediation. That 
which  appears  is  referred  to  a  concept,  which  is  a  re-presentation of 
the presentation of spatio-temporality. Space and time as the forms of 
the given are immediate and passive, concepts are mediating and 
active. Subjectivity inhabits this rift between the passive receptivity 
and active conceptuality. Deleuze notes that the Kantian subject is in 
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this sense modern. In classical philosophy it is space, extension, which 
is the “other” of unextended substance, thought. The finite, extended 
body is the source of all error since it houses the thinking substance. 
Kant modernises this schema: the question is no longer the 
opposition between two substances, extended and unextended, but 
that of the coexistence and synthesis of two forms, sensuous 
receptivity/intuition and conceptual spontaneity. In the Kantian 
subject, the limit to thought is found within thought itself.84  
Deleuze nominates this internal limit to thought as “problem” 
in the geometric sense. As we have seen, for Kant concepts in the 
field of geometry are not analytic but rather synthetic. Their a priori 
necessity and universality is entirely due to the spatio-temporal 
construction of a certain geometrical object. There the given and the 
conceptual are fused together. Any given geometrical object is at the 
same time the source of knowledge about its properties that can be 
applied to any similar object. As Melissa McMahon points out, we 
find in Deleuze the notion of the Kantian geometrical concept taken 
to embrace all concepts: a thing’s concept is not thought of primarily 
in terms of identity (particular x corresponds to concept X), but rather 
as  a  rule  of  construction.  A  concept  demarcates  a  territory,  “a  set  of  
distinctive points or movements” which schematise a certain mode of 
occupying space and time.85 A problem, then, is thought’s encounter 
with the unthought within itself. A problem is where thought runs 
into something indeterminable, unable to resort to representations of 
already-given identities and is forced to construct a rule. This means a 
shift from the question of essence to that of sense. “Sense is located in 
the problem itself”, states Deleuze.86 
Deleuze proposes that if one wishes to gain understanding 
about something, to reach its essence or Idea, one should step outside 
essentialism in the traditional meaning of belief in something like the 
Platonic essences. These would be universal, invariant, eternal 
determinations applying to particular, variable and finite things. The 
Deleuzean essence, derived from the Kantian notion of synthetic a 
priori as a certain, particular spatio-temporal determination which yet 
possesses universality, denotes a particular thing’s capacity to affect 
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and be affected. This capacity may be exercised according to the 
thing’s interaction with other things which may help or hinder its 
functioning. As Deleuze notes, an empirical thing’s “essence” or 
“problem-Idea” is its condition, a “positive multiplicity” of pre-
individual relations.87  
Regarding generative problems, Deleuze speaks about a 
“method of dramatization”, which replaces the essential question 
(“What is x?”) with cartography of local values: Who? When? Where? 
Deleuze’s “dramatisations” concern “dynamisms, dynamic spatio-
temporal determinations, that are pre-qualitative and pre-extensive, 
taking ‘place’ in intensive systems where differences are distributed at 
different depths, whose ‘patients’ are larval subjects and whose 
‘function’  is  to  actualise  Ideas”.88  The term dramatisation is chosen 
because when assigning a system of spatio-temporal determination to 
a concept, one replaces logos with drama.  
 
THE PROBLEM OF LEARNING 
With the concept of problems comes the task of learning. As an 
example of how problems do not just appear to a subject fully formed 
and lacking nothing but their answers, but rather how problems and 
subjectivities are engaged in a process of mutual determination, 
Deleuze considers the case of a would-be swimmer.89 When one is 
learning to swim, a mutual problem-field is developed between the 
body of a swimmer, the physio-dynamic properties of the water, the 
possible social reasons for the learning (“she wants to learn to swim, 
because her older sister bullies her for not knowing how”) and other 
such factors. Here, in order to learn and master the art of swimming, 
one does not simply ask, “What is water?” or “What is swimming?”, 
but rather learns to distinguish the relevant questions and practices as 
one goes into the water and experiences the relations between the 
body and the waves. The question is not about information but of 
individuation. This takes place very concretely in terms of a particular 
body’s capacity to affect and be affected. The bodily capacities change 
for the one who did not previously know how to swim as her milieu 
expands to cover that of swimming pools, lakes and seas. Likewise, 
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the learning process may lead to socio-economic changes when the 
learner becomes fascinated by her new, liquid environment and starts 
a career as a professional athlete.  
Granted, when considering the swimmer and the sea we are 
still within the field of already formed objects. Yet, these “material 
assemblages” present their own sets of pre-individual problems. As 
Deleuze  explains,  the  sea,  for  example,  is  “a  system  of  liaisons  or  
differential relations between particles” which exists as a noumenal 
Idea. The differential relations provide a field of variation, all the 
possibilities for the actual existence of the sea. The totality of this 
transcendental system is “incarnated in the real movement of the 
waves”.90 The waves rolling over the swimmer are, then, the concrete 
actualisations, or local “solutions”, to the “problem” of the sea. In 
Deleuze’s vocabulary, the transcendental, “problematic” field will be 
called the virtual and the empirical, “resolutive” field will be called the 
actual.91  
It is important to keep in mind that Deleuze’s virtual problems 
are not problems in the sense of unclear or missing signification: 
when faced with the transcendental problem-fields, one is as much 
guided by sensibility as by the more cognitive faculties. The process of 
learning is, essentially, unconscious: “Problems-Ideas are by nature 
unconscious: they are extra-propositional and sub-representative”, 
that is, they cannot be judged under concept.92 The only way to truly 
learn is to place oneself in encounter with what is outside one’s 
previous scope, to encounter the virtual. As the body of the swimmer 
adjusts to the buoyancy and movements of its new watery medium, it 
discovers, through sensory rather than perceptive means, the 
previously unknown gestures and postures necessary to keep afloat. 
According to Deleuze this applies to the whole of consciousness and 
knowledge: they accumulate through the sensibility of the body in 
encounter with its surroundings. In the following section I shall 
continue with Deleuze’s reading of Kant, particularly on the matter 
concerning sensibility and its role in judgments and, building on that, I 
can better elaborate the Deleuzean philosophy of transcendental 
empiricism.   
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1.3 Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism 
 
Deleuze’s  reading  of  Kant  is  admittedly  partial,  as  befits  his  style  of  
utilising past philosophers, since he highlights Kant’s anti-classical 
aspects and passes quickly over such features that maintain the 
traditional appearance – essence duality. Namely, Kant is frequently 
quick to remind his readers that one must not confuse the 
phenomenon with the “pure” noumenon, the thing-in-itself. 
However, Deleuze is able to highlight those salient features in Kant’s 
thought which help to reconstruct him as an advocate of non-
essentialism. Whereas the search for essences seeks to unify 
knowledge with what is eternal, and thus formulates thought as the 
recognition of universal values, Deleuze’s “empiricism” strives to 
approach the singular and the unrecognisable, and address “the 
conditions under which something new is produced”.93  
The encounter between Hume and Kant, as staged by Deleuze, 
produces one of the main points of departure for the kind of 
philosophy that attempts to address the problem of novelty. What is 
the relation between “the given”, the experiential world that our 
senses and understanding provide for us, and the conditions of this 
given sensibility? The question is situated, in short, between 
empiricism and rationalism. To once again restate the views of the 
respective positions: Hume’s empiricist notion was to place sensory 
impressions as the primary ground for ideas of consciousness. Any 
appeal to ideas or concepts refers to experience, in the last analysis. 
The path to knowledge begins in experience and is in fact wholly 
derived from it. Concepts do not precede sensibility but are formed 
out of the perceived relations within the manifold of the given. Kant, 
in turn, starts his enquiry by questioning the primacy of the given. It 
seems apparent that human experience is not manifold but rather 
appears under a variety of forms that are universal and a priori, shared 
by any cogent subject. Therefore, if we wish to attain knowledge that 
is universal and necessary, we must turn to the conditions of the 
given. 
Yet, Deleuze asks, does not the notion of the given, either in 
empiricism or rationalism, already suppose too much? How can we 
trust that the supposed immediacy of the sensible provides a stable 
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ground for thinking? Is the given immediate in the first place? Even if 
we follow Kant in considering the given as mediated through the 
conceptual machinery of the categories and the forms of space and 
time, we end up taking the given as given, on the basis of which the 
transcendental conditions can be formulated. In effect we trace the 
transcendental from the empirical. This is why Deleuze claims that 
Kant’s philosophy is in fact too empirical.94  
As we saw earlier, Deleuze considers Kant’s concepts as re-
presentations of the “raw” presentations of the spatio-temporal field. 
Yet again, these representations provide the universal forms of 
sensible presentations. Kant’s transcendental subject makes possible 
the unification of diverse experience and the knowledge of all forms 
of possible experience. Still, states Deleuze, there is beside the 
conditioned possible experience the unconditioned, singular and 
specific actual experience. If philosophy is to be empiricist, as Deleuze 
maintains it should be, it must proceed from the haecceity – “thisness” 
– of things in their appearing.95 We must not take the naïve empiricist 
stance of accepting the given as given, unproblematically, but we must 
likewise avoid the rationalist tendency to posit the agent of the 
unification of experience as a transcendent entity.  
 
KANT BETWEEN THE SENSIBLE AND THE CONCEPTUAL 
Deleuze’s proposed middle ground between Hume and Kant – 
transcendental empiricism – takes as its point of departure the 
opposition of specific actual experience versus general possible 
experience. To explicate his stance, a further consideration of the 
concepts of perception and sensation is needed. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant develops a theory of perception that is a synthesis of 
spatio-temporal appearances. In what he calls “transcendental 
deduction” we can observe three distinct procedures forming a 
synthesis: apprehension, reproduction and recognition.96 These are the 
co-existent phases in the process of forming a perception out of the 
manifest flux and multiplicity of experience. 
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For Kant, apprehension synthesises the multitude of distinct 
parts of experience to form a unity. Likewise, reproduction functions 
as the temporal contraction of parts to form a continuity. This 
sensible spatio-temporal complex must be related to the form of an 
object in recognition. These three elements combine to synthesise for 
us the object in perception. The third element, recognition, provides 
us with a general object-form to which we can “match” the various 
sensations of space and time. Kant calls this “empty” object-form the 
object  x.97 On the one hand, we have sensible diversity, on the other 
hand the form of an object. The former is pure sensation, the latter 
pure perception. The object x will receive a concrete determination in 
the act of synthesis of spatio-temporal diversity. A white, round shape 
with black patches, rolling movement, against a background of green 
horizontal space: a football. These myriad sensations would never attain 
the  status  of  an  object  without  the  empty  form of  object  in  general.  
Without object x there would be nothing to unify the diverse 
sensations of experience as the form of an object, since sense 
experience itself does not intrinsically contain the principle of going 
“beyond” the sensible.  
Thus, the unity of perception provided by the general form of 
object x correlates with the unity of consciousness. The statement “I 
think” expresses this unity. This, notes Deleuze, presents the formal 
objectification of the thinking subject and formulates the “I” as a 
fractured subject-object. For Kant “I think” is an abstraction 
produced from the discrete and diverse items of experience taken to 
its ultimate limit. It can be thought but not known. “I” becomes the 
object of its own thinking. For Deleuze this provides a step forward 
from the form of cogito proposed by René Descartes, which is known 
as the famous formulation “I think, therefore I am”. For Cartesian 
cogito there are two “logical values,” the determined and the 
undetermined. The determination “I think” does imply an 
undetermined existence “I am”, for there has to be existence in order 
to think. “I think” determines this undetermined existence as the 
existence of a thinking subject.98 
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As  Deleuze’s  reading  of  Kant  highlights  the  centrality  of  the  
difference between the conceptual and the sensible, he contradicts the 
Cartesian cogito and the Kantian “I think”. For Deleuze Kant’s 
critique of Descartes questions the possibility of determination’s 
influence over the undetermined. How would “I think” determine the 
undetermined existence expressed by “I am”? Kant’s answer to this is 
to formulate a third logical value, the determinable: “the form in which 
the undetermined is determinable (by the determination)”.99 For 
Deleuze this form amounts to a discovery of an internal difference 
within the subject, taking place between the determination as such and 
that which it determines. This transcendental difference between the 
concept (“I think”) and the sensible (“I am”) is not a difference in 
degree but a difference in kind.  
This qualitative difference between the conceptual and the 
sensible orders is mediated by the form of time. My existence is 
determined in time as the persistence of something in perception and 
this persistence implies that there is a process of determination. This 
mutual determination in Kant is commented by Andrew Brook: “at 
any time at which I represent a representation of mine as occurring, I 
will also represent myself as occurring. Representations come to me as 
mine; I appear in everything in my ‘field’ of representation. Thus, I 
will represent the time of all my representations as inside the time-
span of myself – as ‘in me’”.100  “I think” determines my indeterminate 
existence (“I am”) under the form received from the determinable: as 
a phenomenon in time.  
“Consequences of this are extreme”, as Deleuze notes. The 
undetermined existence of myself is determinable only through time. 
“I” is a phenomenon, “a passive, receptive phenomenal subject 
appearing within time”.101 The active spontaneity associated with the 
conceptual operations of the subject are not the inherent attributes of 
a substantial being, but rather the result of an originary passive 
receptivity of sensibility. “I” experiences itself thinking. According to 
Deleuze, “I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of 
thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which 
represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which 
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experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an 
Other within itself”.102  
 
TOUCHING THE REAL  
It is this receptivity to real experience that Deleuze values in Kant, 
rather than the domain of possible experience as conditioned by the 
transcendental categories. As the rationalist cogito thinks itself and in 
thinking itself relates the diversity of experience to the general form of 
object x, it places the conditions of perception as transcendent. In 
situating the field of consciousness as immanent to a transcendental 
subject, Kant reintroduces the element of identity that is external or 
transcendent to the empirical. In this way, according to Deleuze, Kant 
“betrays” his promise of an immanent critique of reason. Whereas in 
classical philosophy thinking is threatened by the external, extended 
spatium which infiltrates error into the internal and natural processes 
of thought, Hume and Kant introduce a notion of reason where the 
deceptive illusions are produced by the consciousness itself. In other 
words, classical thought begins with already-established identity, the 
knowledge of which is threatened by the wantonness of the world. 
The  critique  of  reason,  in  turn,  situates  identity  as  the  result  of  
transcendental processes.  
As Deleuze emphasises, after Kant the philosophical 
conception of thought  
 
is limited from the inside. There is no longer an extended substance 
which limits thinking substance from the outside, and which resists 
thinking substance, but the form of thought is traversed through 
and through, as if cracked like a plate, it is cracked by the line of 
time.  It  makes  time  the  interior  limit  of  thought  itself,  which  is  to  
say the unthinkable in thought. From Kant onward, philosophy will 
give itself the task of thinking what is not thinkable, instead of 
giving itself the task of thinking what is exterior to thought.103  
 
The key question of post-Kantian philosophy, as defined by Deleuze, 
would then be the enquiry into the nature of the relation between the 
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form of determination (activity, spontaneity) and the form of the 
determinable (passivity, receptivity, time).  
Concepts belong to the “I think”, the active form of 
conceptual determination which combines with the “I am”, the 
passive form of spatio-temporal determination in the act of 
perception. Kant tends to favour conceptual order in positing 
transcendental subjectivity – the site of the unification of experience – 
as already possessing the powers of synthesis, that is the “ingredients” 
of identity-formation. Since this threatens to bring back the 
transcendent in the form of the exteriority of categories from the 
immanence of the sensible field, Deleuze makes an empiricist reversal 
at this stage. Instead of posing the problem as how the given is given 
to  the  subject,  it  is  better  to  ask,  as  Hume  did,  how  the  subject  is  
constituted within the given. To phrase it otherwise, the Deleuzean 
empiricist seeks the conditions of actual or real experience, not the 
general, universal conditions for possible experience. For this, he must 
devise the maxim: “Experiment, never interpret”.104  
As we have seen, Deleuze locates in Kant the potential for 
thinking of experience in its actuality. This can be found in Kant’s 
considerations of the synthetic a priori judgments, where the 
conditions of synthesis are not “wider” than what they condition, but 
rather conditions appear in mutual genesis with the conditioned. This 
is why Deleuze gives much weight to Kant’s later Critique of Judgment, 
for it concerns imagination freed from the legislation of the a priori 
concepts of understanding. Judgment, as quickly summarised, thus 
denotes the “pragmatic” ability to devise or adjust principles 
according to the actual experience.  
 
SYNTHESIS AND AESTHETIC APPREHENSION  
As  Deleuze  explains  in  his  lectures  on  Kant,  in  the  Critique of Pure 
Reason three operations are given which constitute a synthesis. The 
first aspect is the successive synthesis of the apprehension of parts. What 
constitutes the parts mentioned? Every perceived thing is a 
multiplicity: the thing is in relation to multiple other things and is itself 
composed of multiple parts. In apprehending these parts, we notice a 
spatio-temporal succession. The parts are perceived as occupying a 
certain spatial position in comparison to other parts and, however 
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tiny, they themselves possess extension, so that the act of perception 
happens in time. My eyes scan things, here and there, from left to 
right. The succession of apprehension takes place both in terms of the 
spatiality  of  things  –  a  desk  has  an  upper  and  a  lower  side,  its  plane  
has  depth  and  width  et cetera –  as  well  as  in  temporal  terms:  I  relate  
parts to each other, successively, in time and this requires memory. 
This is the second aspect of synthesis: reproduction. Apprehension 
possesses an element of futurity in it, since our attention moves from 
one part to the next, relating part to part, object to object. 
Reproduction, on the other hand, provides the dimension of memory 
in order for relations to emerge, since we have to recall previous parts 
in order to fix a relation with them and a successive new part.105  
Both of these aspects, apprehension and reproduction, refer 
not to passive reception per se,  but  to  the  faculty  of  imagination.  In  
addition to the form of space and time (the form of intuition) and to 
the determined spatio-temporal form (the synthesis of the 
imagination) a third form is needed that relates the spatio-temporal 
form to the general form of an object: the form of recognition. 
Recognition is needed in order to perceive something as a discrete 
object and it bestows the necessary attributes of objectivity to 
sensations: x is an object because it has a cause and it possesses unity 
et cetera. The third aspect of recognition is an act of understanding, not 
of imagination: in understanding one relates the diversity of the 
sensible to the general form of the object x.106 
Thus, the synthesis of perception requires an apprehension of 
successive parts. Yet, what remains to be questioned is what 
constitutes a part. Deleuze finds an answer to this problem in the 
Critique of Judgment, where the structure of syntheses is fully explored in 
relation to spatio-temporal determination: we need an aesthetic 
comprehension of measure.107 This  is  what  is  required  by  the  
imagination in order to begin to synthesise the parts. One might 
appeal to understanding which can provide measure in the 
mathematical concept of number, as in providing a formal framework 
in  the  form  of  a  metric  system,  for  example,  but  this  analytical  
measure does not apply to objects in perception. Imagination does 
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not operate by concepts. Further, objects do not provide a constant, 
universal measure. Imagination can function only by applying a sensible 
or qualitative unit of measure and, as Kant states, such a unit is found 
in the human body.108 Here is, once again, a basis for considering 
Kant as a phenomenological thinker, as Deleuze notes that 
apprehension “already implies something like a lived evaluation of a 
unit of measure”.109 For  example,  in  preparing  a  parcel  to  mail  I  
perform a complex act of measuring the different parts of the 
assembly: I relate the length of a rope to the length and movement of 
my arm and the width of a cardboard box to the length of the rope I 
use to tie the box with.  
Here, beneath the syntheses of perception, we have a necessary 
element of measure that is ultimately aesthetic. That is, the measure is 
subjectively determined, not objectively. From this results that the 
measure is always considered in a given case, the act of measuring 
happens in situ. Because of the measure’s case-by-case nature, 
measures are constantly checked against other measures and 
perceptions. The measure made depends on the object of perception 
or the milieu of the said object. A man is huge in size in comparison 
to an ant but hopelessly outnumbered when compared to the 
denizens of an anthill. From a certain perspective the palm of my 
hand can cover a cathedral. It is aesthetic comprehension, done 
without recourse to concepts. Rather, the evaluation happens in 
experimentation with one’s surroundings: in any given context there 
are a multitude of potential measures and things-to-be-measured.110 
When considering perception we find ourselves constantly on 
the shore, faced with the roar of the sea, out of which we may pick 
various “partial” sounds, as in Leibniz’s famous example, but we 
never catch – in perception – every sound of that multiplicity. When I 
distinguish  a  sound  of  a  particular  wave  hitting  a  rock,  I  have  an  
“apperception” of it, a splashing and hissing sound, but underneath 
the ground provided by my synthetic abilities dwell the minute sounds 
made by the various parts of that certain wave and that certain rock. I, 
as an individual, possess a distinct point of view, a particular clear and 
distinct “zone” in the totality of the world that is unclear and 
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indistinct. As Deleuze formulates it in his lectures on Leibniz at 
Vincennes University, an individual expresses the totality of the world, 
but only a finite, particular portion of it in a clear and distinct manner. 
An individual point of view is thus, according to Deleuze, “the 
proportion of the region of the world expressed clearly and distinctly 
by  an  individual  in  relation  to  the  totality  of  the  world  expressed  
obscurely and confusedly”. 111 Every other part of the world affects a 
particular individual, but in most cases only in a minutely weak 
manner. Here is a parallel between Leibniz and Kant: what constitutes 
the determined point of view of apperceptions is what is related to 
unique spatio-temporal location, that is, the body of an individual. 
What provides the measure and point of view required for the 
synthesis of perception is thus the body and its relations to the world. 
This is clearly a notion that brings both Hume and Kant together in 
Deleuze’s reading. In aesthetic apprehension there is no need for a 
transcendent subjectivity providing a set of universal and invariable 
conditions of experience. Rather, every perception or apperception is 
a unique complex of measures and points of view, providing the 
conditions of this singular perception on a case-by-case basis. Here 
the subject is not constitutive, but is conversely constituted in an 
experimental relation with the world. Experience is not a property of 
the subject, but rather the milieu in which a subject takes form and 
this milieu is, according to Deleuze, the pre-conscious materiality of 
the body or, in other words, the aesthetic. 
 
EXISTENCE AS EXPERIMENT  
Experimentality denotes the dynamic and processual structure of 
individuation. To exist is to constantly adjust and re-adjust one’s 
boundaries, as existence takes place in a network of relations, as the 
lesson  from  Hume  goes.  Existence  is,  thus,  variation.  As  Deleuze  
phrases it, the constant variation of measures on an aesthetic basis 
amounts to the grasping of a rhythm. What is here meant by rhythm is 
a comprehension of a certain relation in the world, and that 
comprehension takes place on a bodily level. Rhythm is outside the 
concept and has thus nothing to do with a metre. Rather, as Deleuze 
and Guattari note in A Thousand Plateaus, rhythm is communication 
between two disparate realms. A metre is the conceptual division of 
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space and time into a homogeneous grid. Rhythm is the relation 
between heterogeneous elements, existing in the in-between. Deleuze 
and Guattari state: “There is rhythm whenever there is a transcoded 
passage from one milieu to another, a communication of milieus, 
coordination between heterogeneous space-times”.112 
A rhythm denotes, then, the exteriority of relations in the 
world, as proposed by Hume. Rhythm is the initial, bodily, aesthetic 
and pre-conscious apperception that acts as a measure for “later” 
judgments. From this notion we get a glimpse into the heart of 
Deleuze’s idea of productive differences. As an illustration and an 
example, however insufficient, I ask you to consider two sets of 
relations – a pictorial rhythm, if you will. First we have two parallel 
series with events distributed evenly and simultaneously: 
From this example we can see that the parallel series produce only a 
mirror-like repetition of each other. This amounts to a repetition of 
the same, communicating nothing, producing nothing novel. Then, as 
a second example, we can introduce another set of parallel series with 
events distributed evenly, but respectively in different meters: 
The events are still placed evenly within their own series, but this time 
bringing the two disparate series together produces at least a slight 
variation into their combination. Suddenly there appears some kind of 
communication between the series, as the metric events accentuate 
each other. We might even state that there is, for the observer, a 
fleeting sensation as the eye searches for the metric regularity between 
the two series presented. Granted, each of the series composes its 
own homogeneous space-time distributed along the line and forming 
a meter, each in isolation as well as together in combination, but the 
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rhythm happens somewhere in between these two series, in the 
transversal relations between the placement of the events in their 
respective series.  
Henri Maldiney, a phenomenological philosopher of art, 
influences Deleuze’s reading of Kant in the present context of the 
notion of rhythm. Rhythm, the “primordial” differential relation 
before identity, constitutes the different faculties of perception. It is 
thus a form of autopoiesis, the self-generation of the world. Maldiney 
states  that  the  sense  of  form  in  formation,  which  takes  place  as  a  
continuous transformation, constitutes the sense of rhythm.113 
Maldiney considers the world as Gestaltung, a formative activity 
endlessly producing new variations of itself. 
 
RHYTHM AND CHAOS :  THE SUBLIME 
Yet,  as  with the sound of a  wave hitting a  rock,  rhythm as the basis  
for  measure  –  and  thus  a  clear  and  distinct  view  of  the  world  –  is  
constantly on the verge of fading back into chaos, into the indistinct 
roar  of  the sea.  As Kant establishes in his  analyses of  the sublime in 
Critique of Judgment,  subject  is  sometimes  faced  with  such  
overwhelming sensations that they produce an intuition of infinity and 
expose the finitude of the subject’s comprehension. In philosophy the 
concept of  the sublime has been used as  a  quality  of  something of a  
vast magnitude, something exceeding the measure of man. In 
experiencing a sublime phenomenon, the rhythm as bodily measure 
collapses and Deleuze recounts this collapse in his lectures on Kant as 
a story involving a series of catastrophes occurring upon the synthesis 
of perception. First, in the act of perception, I am confronted with 
something that overwhelms me, I become dizzy and my imagination 
wavers. This is because I cannot find a suitable unit of measure. Every 
attempt  is  pushed  back  and I  need  to  resort  to  grander  and  grander  
units but nothing will be adequate. Synthesis of apprehension will not 
work.114  
Secondly, while I am able to distinguish heterogeneous parts, 
here and there, distinct from each other, there is no succession 
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between the parts. Every part is encountered as a new one with no 
connection to previous ones. The rhythms of aesthetic apprehension 
are broken. This leads to the third catastrophe: what I encounter with 
my senses is unrecognisable. My sensations do not conform to the 
form of the general object. Apprehension, reproduction and 
recognition all fail me. Now, in Deleuze’s words, “[m]y whole 
structure of perception is in the process of exploding”.115  
Sublime is the term used by Kant to refer to those phenomena 
that awaken in us the intuition of infinity. The feeling of sublime is 
not merely the consciousness of a measure greater than the human 
body. The sublime is rather an intuition of the “boundlessness” of a 
formless object.116 Kant gives us examples of the sublime phenomena 
as  being  those  like  the  vastness  of  a  starry  sky,  the  raging  and  
tumultuous  sea  or  the  magnitude  of  the  forces  of  an  earthquake.  
These can be categorised as belonging to the mathematical sublime, 
which concerns the vast or infinite extension unlimited by ideas, and 
the dynamical sublime, which denotes nature’s intensive might 
overbearing the aesthetic judgment.117 
In the face of the sublime, aesthetic comprehension – the 
evaluation of rhythm – becomes compromised. Deleuze states of this 
confrontation: “instead of a rhythm, I find myself in chaos.” 
Imagination as the synthesis of perception is pushed to its own limit. 
Deleuze notes that here we discover a similar internal limit as we 
found in the faculty of thought. At the same time as we discover the 
ground of the synthesis as rhythm, we unearth its ungrounded nature 
in chaos.118  
Chaos and rhythm constitute the self-differentiating dynamic 
of  Nature  for  Deleuze.  This  is,  then,  the  starting  ground  for  
transcendental empiricism. Deleuze states of transcendental 
philosophy or “metaphysics” of classical nature that they impose a 
disjunctive logic of alternatives: “either an undifferentiated ground, or 
groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without difference 
and without properties, or a  supremely  individuated  Being  and  an  
intensely personalised Form. Without this Being or this Form, you 
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will have only chaos”.119 Metaphysics and transcendental philosophy 
seek to fix the undifferentiated chaos by positing transcendent 
identity, a God or a transcendental subject, to act as the guarantee of 
the individuation of Being. Deleuze is ready to follow Kant into the 
analyses of the sublime, but leaves when Kant discovers a faculty that 
prevents chaos, the faculty of Ideas, or reason. Kant’s own 
comprehension of the element of the sublime is negative: the sublime 
acts  as  a  shock to guide us out of  the realm of the sensible  into the 
transcendental level of Ideas.120 
For Deleuze, the usefulness of the Kantian notion of the 
subject is in the idea of the subject inhabiting a difference between the 
conceptual and the sensible. This occurs in synthesis, especially in the 
aesthetic. Yet, Kant ends up positing the transcendental subject as the 
unchanging locus of distributing identities upon the empirical. 
Experience then becomes an act of recognition or representation of 
the sensible within the categories provided by conceptual reason. On 
the other hand, Kant does not subject the concept of the given to a 
thorough critique, since he derives the conditions of experience from 
the lived experience itself.  
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is, then, a return to the 
immediacy of the given in the sense that his philosophy is concerned 
not with identities, but with differences. Whereas the transcendental 
subject appears in Kant as fully-formed, equipped with the ability to 
condition the given by the powers of synthesis, the Deleuzean subject 
is  a  “larval”  one,  taking  place  or  becoming within the same processes 
that provide the sensible to the subject.121 As  in  Hume,  the  larval  
subject  is  posited  in  constant  encounter  with  its  outside.  It  is  a  
synthetic construction, but unlike in Kant, the conditions of the 
synthesis are themselves constantly shifting: the generative process 
takes place “case-by-case” and every individuation is a haecceity, a 
“thisness” composed within the network of its relations. Here the 
identity of an individual is not formulated in accordance to its internal 
essence that would determine its relations to other entities, but is 
rather understood on the basis of the generative difference that acts as 
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the condition for its becoming existent as a distinct thing. On the 
basis of this, the question of difference becomes central. 
 
DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHY OF DIFFERENCE 
Deleuze’s early philosophy, up to his writings with Guattari, can be 
characterised as being an explicit philosophy of difference. This 
means that he seeks to overturn or invert the established metaphysical 
relation between identity and difference. A philosophy based on 
identity approaches difference as something that diverges from 
identity.  Thus,  the  difference  between  A  and  B  is  fathomed  as  
something between two stable points of identity. There is a secondary 
and accidental relation, difference, between two ontologically primary 
and necessary entities. The diversity manifest in the phenomenal given 
is due to this extension between self-identical instances. Accordingly, 
thought, when seeking the value of truth, must learn to navigate its 
way beyond the appearances of the given into the essences at the 
heart of being. 
In contrast, Deleuze starts from the primacy of difference “in 
itself”. The diversity of the given is a problem from which to begin. 
Difference, understood as the relation which does not derive from 
identity, does not appear as diversity. “Diversity is given”, states 
Deleuze, “but difference is that by which the given is given, that by 
which the given is given as diverse”.122 It  is  true  that  the  immediate  
given displays its diversity, but this diversity exists between already-
given objects. In order to think the “internal”, productive difference 
displayed by entities in their process of formation, it is indeed 
necessary to proceed beyond the given. In this sense, Deleuze’s 
thinking is in alignment with Kant’s critical impetus of questioning the 
conditions of knowledge before proceeding to knowledge itself. 
Deleuze states: “Difference is not phenomenon but the noumenon 
closest to the phenomenon”.123 In statements like these Deleuze even 
retains the Kantian vocabulary. 
Deleuze  also  retains  the  Kantian  ideas  of  the  faculties  and  
synthesis  of  perception,  as  well  as  the  forms  of  space  and  time  as  
conditions of subjective experience. Therefore, in proceeding beyond 
the subject to address the problem of the conditions of the subject 
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and its experience, we must understand the “pure” or internal 
difference as non-spatio-temporal. This means that the internal 
difference is transcendental to the subject. Yet, it is within the 
sensibility of the given, rather than in the conceptual order of reason, 
that we find a way of addressing the transcendental field. For Deleuze 
the Kantian Idea is inverted: rather than pure concept, the Deleuzean 
Idea is “a pure intuition for which there is no concept”.124 For Kant, the Ideas 
of reason impose regulation upon experience and delineate the form 
of all possible experience. Deleuze overturns this Kantian structure of 
Ideas and considers them instead as problem-Ideas which challenge 
reason: experience presents us novel conjunctions of things, “matters-
of-facts”, and thus exceeds our concepts. Each novel matter-of-fact 
presents a Leibnizian clear and distinct point of view in the midst of 
every possible actualisation of relations in the world and in doing so 
alludes to an oscillation of distinct forms arising out of indistinct 
chaos.  
Deleuze finds a way to address this fluctuation between form 
and chaos in Kant’s aesthetics. Whereas rational ideas are 
characterised as re-production, re-cognition and re-presentation of the 
sensible under the form of a concept, the aesthetic ideas as Deleuzean 
problem-Ideas arise out of sensible presentation and are thus outside 
the legislation of conceptual order. Deleuze expands the dynamism of 
the Kantian aesthetic to encompass the whole of thought: we 
encounter something that forces us to think. Yet this something, as a 
problem, does not become resolved in total conceptual determination. 
Thought-as-encounter is rooted in aesthetic receptivity and is, 
ultimately, passive in nature in the sense that we are subjected to thought 
rather than the subjects of thinking. In the analysis of Kant’s concept 
of the sublime Deleuze finds a model for thought’s encounter with its 
outside. In the experience of the sublime the mind’s faculties 
encounter their own limits and an element of discord is introduced 
between reason, understanding, imagination and sensibility. 
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism takes its cue from Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy by situating the conditions of experience 
outside the given. However, in elaborating those conditions we must 
be careful not to reproduce the given in the transcendental conditions 
in the forms of good or common sense. This is,  ultimately, the error 
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of Kant, claims Deleuze. Statements such as “it is evident” or 
“everyone knows” refer to an uncritical form of thought proceeding 
from the self-evidence of the given. Yet, Kant uses these 
commonsensical observations as determining their conditions. This 
results in rationalism that is, perhaps surprisingly, all too empiricist. 
To be faithful to the diversity of the given is to approach it as a 
problem in the light of aesthetic experience. The question is not 
“What is X”, referring to an essence or a concept, but rather “How is 
X”, “When is X”, “In what way does X…”. This refers to phenomena 
as actualisations of problems that are transcendental in the sense that 
they imply pre-individual existence.  
The next two chapters of this study present elaborations of the 
“problematic” relation between the transcendental and the empirical 
and address the questions of individuation in spatial and temporal 
terms, respectively. Chapter two concerns the process of biophysical 
individuation, as well as its connection with the aesthetic sensibility of 
the body and the semiotic sphere of sense. We will come to see that 
Deleuze utilises the work of Gilbert Simondon in formulating an 
account of individuation that relies on the notion of a pre-individual 
field as the genetic component of the emergent individual. Chapter 
three, in turn, concerns Deleuze’s reading of Henri Bergson and 
introduces a temporal dimension into consideration and expands the 
view on the productive difference as a virtual problem.  
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2. Encountering the Outside: Affect, Individuation and Territory  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Gilles Deleuze wants to provide a 
genetic account of the real in his philosophy. This means approaching 
the given as a problem and seeking the method of accessing the 
conditions of experience. This is very much in accord with Kant’s 
critical philosophy, but Deleuze takes a decisive turn away from what 
he calls the Kantian tendency to limit thought to representation. For 
Kant, representation takes place as the harmonious functioning of 
different faculties of consciousness where the sensible intuitions are 
given object-form in the workings of reason. As Deleuze says, Kant 
provides the conceptual framework for all possible experience and the 
task of this framework – the categories – is to “tame difference”.125 
Deleuze finds another model for experience in Kant’s 
philosophy, in the notion of the sublime in Kant’s third Critique. This 
concerns real experience, unbound by the conceptual. As the sublime 
phenomena – exhibiting vastness, infinity and a huge magnitude of 
force – disrupt the grounding of the synthesis of perception in the 
aesthetic appropriation of bodily measures, the discord of faculties 
reveals a true difference at work in the sensible presentation that takes 
place “before” the conceptual representation of things. Thus it is in 
the domain of the aesthetic, in the experience and intuition provided 
by the body and its senses, that we find the process of the subject’s 
constitution. Experience does not appear to “us” as something 
external. It is rather so that “we” are constituted along the unfolding 
of experience.  
One can see two major themes in Deleuze’s early work. The 
first  is  the  questioning  of  the  nature  of  subjectivity.  This  takes  place  
on the basis of Deleuze’s reading of Kant and Hume, and is later on 
accentuated by treatises on Nietzsche, Bergson and Spinoza. Deleuze 
ends up with the notion of a subject that is, on the whole, a product 
of activity outside itself, subject to passive syntheses. A Humean 
rather than Kantian subject: the rules of association as the basis of the 
structuring of experience do not function within the rational activity 
of cognition, but comprise the passive nature of human mind. The 
second, conclusive theme concerns the process of individuation or 
differentiation. If the subject is to be considered as a product of 
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certain processes, what are these processes and how do they produce 
individuals?  
The process of individuation is considered here under the 
thematic of the philosophy of difference. If one started from an 
essentialist point of view, individuation would simply be a matter of 
unfolding in extended terms what is already implied in the concept. 
However, Deleuze’s notion of dynamic individuation seeks to 
question such a foundation for individuation, since that would, in the 
end, produce only variations of the same. In order to replace the 
essentialist model of matter as a passive receptacle of forms, Deleuze 
develops a system of individuation that considers the process of 
formation itself as providing its own conditions. This means that both 
the  “rules”  of  actualisation  as  well  as  the  process  of  actualising  are  
real. Yet, the rules, or problems, are not determined by the concept 
and  are  thus  virtual.  The  virtual  refers  to  a  transcendental  field  of  
spatio-temporal dynamisms, differential relations between intensities, 
which provide the force of actualisation as differentiation. 
When considering such dynamic individuations, one of the 
central questions is the method of transmission between the 
transcendental and the empirical. Membranes, linings and fluids are 
interfaces for mediating intensities. Crystal structures begin to form in 
liquid, wind carries pollen from faraway fields and rain disperses seeds 
into nearby streams. These individual beings – crystals, pollen and 
seeds – in turn reach a moment of stability in new environments and 
encounter new interfaces. Water carries a seed onto wet soil. 
Intensities pass between the seed and its resting place. Given a 
favourable environment, the seed begins a phase of growth, 
transferring nutrients from the soil via the formation of roots. Soon 
the emerging plant encounters the variable conditions occurring 
above the ground and starts to affect its environment in different 
ways.   
The key issue here is that we encounter a constantly variable 
individual, affecting its environment and being in turn affected by 
factors beyond itself. The emergent plant may prosper, but in turn 
shadow other seedlings and hinder their growth. Or the plant may be 
eaten and become nourishment for a passing animal. Individuations 
fluctuate (pollen, seed, sapling, nourishment), but the one constant 
element remaining is a continuous process of mediation. 
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MEDIATION :  THE QUESTION OF INDIVIDUATION  
This chapter addresses the question of mediations and encounters as 
occurring in the relations of affect, as well as in individuation and 
territory formation. The discussion considers both affect’s role in the 
process of individuation and in the context of the affective 
dimension’s function in territoriality, as theorised by Deleuze and 
Guattari. This, in turn, provides a basis for understanding the origin 
of art and artistic activity in the interconnectedness of an individual 
being and its milieu, as well as the function of affect as the mediator 
of this reciprocal connection.  
In Deleuze’s work, affect can be understood – from the 
perspective of human consciousness – as taking place somewhere 
between energy and emotion.126 Affect  is  a  singularity,  which  is  a  
distinct relation between bodies, as well as an expression of a certain 
set of relations. Deleuze inherits this two-fold notion of affect from 
Spinoza: affect is a body’s capacity to affect and be affected by others 
–  and  affect  is  the  encounter  between  the  affected  body  and  the  
affecting body. Things exist by the virtue of their powers and the 
forces that affect them.127 This formulation implies a world of 
dynamic individuation: individuals and their environments or milieus 
can be considered from the point of view of encounters – 
individuation as mediation.  
In the works of Deleuze and Guattari, the concepts of affect, 
individuation, milieu and territory form a dynamic and contrapuntal 
model of emergence and organisation. Rather than approaching the 
world as static Being, via the hylomorphic schema of Form and 
Matter, they see it as a continual process of Becoming.128 Deleuze and 
Guattari construct a theory of “corporeality (materiality) that is not to be 
confused either with an intelligible, formal essentiality or a sensible, 
formed and perceived thinghood”.129 This corporeality, as matter-
energy, is characterised on the one hand by constant changes of state, 
and on the other by intensive or expressive qualities, both producing 
                                               
126 I am indebted to Teemu Taira for this formulation. 
127 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone 
Books, 1990), pp. 93–94. 
128 World-as-becoming has obvious Nietzschean connotations, and the one major influence 
on Deleuze’s philosophy besides Spinoza is indeed Nietzsche. For a thorough elaboration of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of the world as a process of interacting forces, see Deleuze, Nietzsche 
and Philosophy. 
129 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 407. 
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and dissolving individuations. These two elements introduce variation 
in matter, form metastable structures and actualise the abstract virtual 
into the concrete actual. 
Section one of this chapter concerns affect as the mediation of 
intensity between bodies. For a more detailed look at the concept, 
Gregory Seigworth makes further distinctions concerning Deleuze’s 
reading  of  Spinoza  and  his  use  of  the  term  “affect”.  As  well,  Brian  
Massumi’s elaborations on the nature of affect will be considered. 
From both researchers’ writings emerges a conception of affect as a 
pre-individual singularity, the necessary force individualising an 
individual that resides outside consciousness and language. 
In section two, I will use the work of Gilbert Simondon, the 
French philosopher of science, to illustrate Deleuze and Guattari's 
theory of individuation, which by their own admission is heavily 
indebted to Simondon. For Deleuze and Guattari, whose project in 
part tries to address the problem of self-organisation emerging from 
the chaotic flux of the world, Simondon asks the crucial question: 
What is an individual? What highlights one part of the world as a 
discrete thing? This enquiry necessitates the exposition of the 
mechanisms of distinguishing one thing from everything else – that is, 
answering the question concerning what produces an individual out of 
an undifferentiated “pre-individual” field. According to Simondon, an 
individual should not be thought of primarily as a fixed “thing” or 
entity, but rather as an ongoing process. An individual is not a static 
being but a becoming. Because of the temporality of its existence, an 
individual keeps on becoming; it is never “finished”. According to 
such a perspective, one should strive to analyse the dynamics of 
individuation. Rather than starting from individuals as things existing in 
a state of equilibrium, individuation must be thought as a movement 
of tension and release in a system, “a partial and relative resolution in 
a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a certain 
incompatibility with itself”.130 
Individuation happens relationally; the individual is a process 
in which a milieu and an individual take shape and draw a limit. This 
places the individual irreversibly within a certain environment, which 
                                               
130 Gilbert Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual” in Incorporations, eds. Jonathan Crary 
and Sanford Kwinter, trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Publishing, 
1992), p. 300. 
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shapes and provides the “frame” for the being’s capacity for action. In 
section three, we will see how the pioneering biologist of 
biosemiotics, Jakob von Uexküll, provides Deleuze and Guattari with 
a model for an individual’s milieu as Umwelt, as a self-contained 
“world”, that forms the meaningful sphere of existence for a 
particular living being.131 Starting from von Uexküll’s notion of the 
fundamental relationship between animals and their environment, 
Deleuze and Guattari further distinguish between animal milieus and 
territories, with the latter corresponding to an “expressive” 
dimension, where the affective relations forming a milieu find their 
expression and thus form the basis for a non-subjective origin of 
art.132  
We can see the working of the virtual  in the more abstracted 
level of language, too. The relation between experience and sense 
concerns the formation of meaning as a process, as experience 
constructs  a  subject  out  of  the  virtual  intensities  of  the  world.  As  
linguistic propositions concern an already defined world, it is from 
nonsense within language that we can gain an insight into the 
actualisation of meanings. These processes will be addressed in 
section four. 
 
 
2.1 Affect as Intensity 
 
As  stated  earlier,  affect  is  a  relative  term,  as  it  denotes  a  passage  of  
intensity between things. Affect means things acting upon other 
things, nothing more, nothing less. Thus understood, affects 
accompany the actualisation of the world into discrete individuals. 
The ontological concept of affect can also be approached from the 
more familiar perspective of human consciousness. Brian Massumi 
observes that in human experience the affective dimension appears as 
a “background” to everyday perceptions. We live in an actualised 
world that is given to us as organised, consensual reality, which can be 
described in qualitative terms. This habitual terrain is sometimes 
disturbed by inexplicable states of intensity, such as a certain emotion 
                                               
131 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 57. 
132 See chapter “1837: Of the Refrain” in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 310–
350. 
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overtaking us, out of nowhere. The unforeseeable nature of affect is 
“marked by a gap between content and effect”.133 A certain stimulus 
(content) does not produce an expected reaction (effect). As 
affectivity concerns the pre-individual field, this unexpected 
quantitative dimension of intensity is the indicator of an affect, its 
trace or remainder within qualitative reality.134  
The autonomy of affect situates the body into its environment 
on a fundamental level. “The body doesn’t just absorb pulses or 
discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts, it infolds volitions and 
cognitions that are nothing but situated”.135 Thus  the  body  is  always  
already resonating with intensities that at the same time give rise to 
this perceptive body. Here we have the two elements of affect: 
intensity and mediation. Every form of communication includes this 
intensive dimension, which appears as a “transtemporal” event, since 
it derives from pre-conscious and pre-actualised encounters.136  
Massumi analyses the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s colour-coded terror alert system, introduced in March 2002 
in response to the World Trade Center attacks. He notes that the alert 
system functions mainly on the affective level and is used to modulate 
and calibrate the public’s anxiety. The purpose is to create a mood of 
acceptance for the strengthening of security measures in society. Since 
the alert system monitors only the “threat” of an imminent terror 
action, it communicates nothing: threat or possibility cannot really 
take  an  identifiable  form.  As  such,  the  threat  is  also  curiously  
                                               
133 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002), p. 24, original emphasis. 
134 As Deleuze states in Nietzsche and Philosophy, quality is dependent on quantity: affects, as 
differential pre-individual relations, form the genetic conditions for qualities; pp. 42–44. This 
kind of notion of affect is supported also by research done in the field of neuropsychology. 
As the pioneering neuropsychologist Silvan Tomkins phrases it, affects are distinct and 
independent from the basic drives (respiration, hunger, thirst, sex) because affects are not 
bound to the feedback system of the body. Instead, affects are the “silent” neural activations 
of the biological body, resonating, acting upon and sometimes contradicting the qualified 
emotions. As an autonomous “extra-dimension”, affect is what makes feelings “feel”, 
providing intensity to conscious experience. See Tomkins, “What are affects?” in Shame and its 
Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, eds. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 36–37. 
135 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, p. 30, original emphasis. This “infolding” of contexts is 
what Massumi means by the affective dimension. A body is immersed in its environment via 
affectivity, receiving and transmitting intensities. 
136 “Transtemporality” is used here to highlight the event’s two-sided relation to time, 
affecting both the past and the future as it enters our consciousness. 
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transtemporal, since it combines both anxiety about the future as well 
as the trauma of the past. This is the transtemporality of intensity: fear 
strikes  the  body  and  activates  it  even  before  it  is  registered  as  a  
sensation or feeling. “The fear is a dynamic ingathering of an action 
assuring the continuity of its serial unfolding and moving the reality of 
the situation, which is its activation … The experience is in the fear, in 
its ingathering of action, rather than the fear being the content of an 
experience”.137 The object of fear appears in our consciousness only 
retroactively: we feel fear towards what our body just previously 
encountered as intensity. 
As noted in the case of the terror-alert system, intensities are 
also highly transferable. We all know how a certain mood can spread 
rapidly among a crowd of people. Or rather, how a certain intensity 
will spread and produce more or less compatible reactions, according 
to each person’s acquired patterns of response. To take a most drastic 
example, when a bomb goes off in a public space, we share the 
intensity of affect but react in our own fashion to this sudden event: 
we all are alarmed, prepared by the autonomic nervous system for 
flight or fight. Some of us will flee, some will halt in panic and some 
will start to help others. What is noteworthy is that this shared 
intensity, manifested in different ways, produces a crowd of people out 
of discrete individuals: as the pre-individual dimension of transferable 
intensity, the affective is the basis for collective individuation. 
 
AFFECTIVE RELATIONS  
As a concept, affect thus covers a broad range. In his commentary on 
Deleuze’s use of the term, Gregory Seigworth widens the scope of 
consideration beyond human consciousness and distinguishes a third 
aspect of the concept, making the following three-part distinction: 1) 
affectio, affect as “effect”, the influence of one body over another, the 
state of a body, transitive effect undergone by a body in a system; 2) 
affectus, affect as “becoming”, a continuous intensive variation in the 
relations between various forces; 3) affect as “pure immanence”, an 
autonomous multiplicity of affects, without distinction of any 
exteriority or interiority.138 
                                               
137 Brian Massumi, “Fear (The Spectrum Said)”, Positions: East Asia Culture Critique, vol. 13, 
no. 1 (2005), p. 37. 
138 Gregory Seigworth, “From Affection to Soul” in Gilles Deleuze – Key Concepts, ed. Charles J. 
Stivale (Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 2005), pp. 166–167. 
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These three aspects of the concept of affect can be seen to 
form a kind of methodology in Deleuze’s writings, a form of both 
philosophical analysis and critical praxis. First of all, affectio 
corresponds to a materialist analysis of social interaction, as we saw in 
Massumi’s account of the U.S. government terror-alert system. From 
such a viewpoint the social space or situation is seen in terms of 
forces and effects, resonance and collapses between bodies. Socio-
political formations, institutions and language function as the 
imposition of a consensual reality upon different individuals. It is here 
that the Deleuzean and Foucauldian notions of Power are united: 
Power is the affectio of desire,  a  stratification of a  certain set  of  force 
relations.139  
However hegemonic and totalising a certain power structure is, 
there is always the potential for a change in a given system. Affectus 
denotes this potential: the work of recognising and analysing the 
“lines of flight”, or processes of becoming-other, that form their 
beginnings in a certain social space or situation. There are always 
possibilities for escaping the dominant power structures: “The first 
rule  of  the  social  is  that  it  flees  on  all  sides  at  once”.140 This is the 
principle of the rhizome and the line of flight: rather than taking the 
form of resistance or counter-attack, which would already accept the 
power structure as given, the critique of power formations should 
start from the evaluation and “cartography” of possible breaking 
points. In such a way the critique is able to leave the level of actualised 
power (linguistics, politics) and reach the counter-actualising 
machinations of affects. As Deleuze and Guattari state, the affective 
potential of a line of flight concerns an “[i]mperceptible rupture, not 
signifying break” in a given system.141 
Finally, the third level of consideration is affect itself,  seen as a 
positive force, not an effect of force but the “plane of immanence” of 
forces. Immanence here corresponds metaphysically with Spinoza’s 
single substance (Deus sive natura): immanence as immanent to itself, 
immanence as substance.  This  is  why Deleuze and Guattari  speak of 
the plane of immanence: all metaphysical distinctions or hierarchies are 
ultimately collapsed or flattened into an even consistency. This is the 
                                               
139 Seigworth, “From Affection to Soul,” p. 166. 
140 Seigworth, “From Affection to Soul,” p. 166. 
141 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 24. 
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ontological foundation of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy: “pure” 
immanence, not subjected to anything else, does away with real 
distinctions (form/matter, mind/body, concept/content) and 
provides the basis to approach everything as active production. 
In the three-part exposition of affect, the focus moves from 
the  affective  capacity  of  bodies  or  things  to  the  interval  –  a  
derangement or deterritorialization of states of affairs, and finally to 
the plane of immanence as “the absolute ground for philosophy” and 
un-individuated, impersonal life – a life (une vie).142 By nature indefinite, 
this impersonal life is present in all the moments an actualised 
individual goes through – abstract, yet real. A life is abstract because it 
retains all the potentiality of the unactualised world, not yet bound by 
form or subject. It is the grand total of the infinite relations of the 
world. Deleuze summarises:  
 
Each individual, body and soul, possesses an infinity of parts which 
belong to him in a more or less complex relationship. Each 
individual is also himself composed of individuals of a lower order 
and enters into the composition of individuals of a higher order. All 
individuals are in Nature as though on a plane of consistence whose 
whole figure they form, a plane which is variable at each moment. 
They affect each other in so far as the relationship which constitutes 
each one forms a degree of power, a capacity to be affected. 
Everything is simply an encounter in the universe, a good or a bad 
encounter.143  
 
The scope of Deleuze’s concept of affect develops a new form of 
materialism. Approaching things as encounters charges them with the 
potential to transform. Traditional Western thought has approached 
matter as a “silent”, inert, passive substance that requires the 
imposition of form upon it in order to exist in a concrete way. 
Deleuze’s view is that matter possesses immanently the potential to 
form and transform itself. And because of this, matter-energy or 
matter-flow also retains the potential for further modulations or 
transformations. However, flows can come to a halt; matter 
                                               
142 Seigworth, “From Affection to Soul”, p. 168. See chapter three of this work for further 
discussion on the concept of indefinite life. 
143 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, pp. 59–60. 
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coagulates and stable identities are formed. This actualisation is self-
evident. The actualised world is matter-memory, composed of 
individuals in various phases of transformation. Affect as mediation 
implies the structure of individuation, as an individual begins to 
emerge out of its environment. A cloud forms when air cools below 
its saturation point and millions of water droplets take the appearance 
of a white mass. A mass of air is becoming saturated and the cloud is 
an expression of this process. A thing is better known through its 
conditions or what it expresses than through an isolated examination 
of what it is. Therefore we must consider individuals in the process of 
their formation. 
 
 
2.2 Individuation as Process 
 
As Elizabeth Grosz observes, individuation is a matter of creation for 
Deleuze: “actualisation is individuation, the creation of singularity 
(whether physical, psychical or social), insofar as the processes of 
individuation predate the individual[,] yet the individual is a somehow 
open-ended consequence of these processes. Individuation contains 
the ‘ingredients’ of individuality without in any way planning or 
preparing for it”.144 The basic model for such dynamic individuation 
comes from Gilbert Simondon. As Deleuze and Guattari state, 
“Simondon demonstrates that the hylomorphic model leaves many 
things, active and affective, by the wayside”.145 The  wayside  or  the  
outside, “things active and affective” that appear as excess in the 
hylomorphic form/matter schema, include the implicit singularities in 
matter (for example, the undulations of fibers guiding the operation of 
splitting wood) and the variable intensive affects (for example, the 
wood that is more or less porous, more or less elastic). A woodworker 
knows that she must “follow” the plane of wood in order to 
manufacture something out of it. In working with the material one 
                                               
144 Elizabeth Grosz, “Thinking the New: Of Futures Yet Unthought”, Symploke, vol. 6, no. 1 
(1998), p. 52. See also Grosz’s later, extended study on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
dynamic individuation in relation to art: Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).  
145 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 450, original emphasis. 
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addresses less a form imposed upon matter than material traits that 
correspond to the affective dimension of matter.146 
Simondon considers both hylomorphic as well as substantialist 
theories of individuation and finds them deficient. The point of view 
of  these  two  notions  is  backward  as  they  start  from individuals  that  
are already formed rather than from the genetic process of 
individuation. According to Simondon, substantialism regards “the 
unity of living being as its essence” and locates the principle of 
individuation “inside” the individual being. Hylomorphism, in turn, 
approaches the individual as “the conjunction of a form and some 
matter.” But despite the differences in these two conceptions, “there 
is the [shared] assumption that we can discover a principle of 
individuation, exercising its influence before the actual individuation 
itself has occurred, one that is able to explain, produce and determine 
the subsequent course of individuation”.147  
Simondon’s argument is that the individual should be 
approached ontogenetically. Ontogenesis designates “the development of 
the being, or its becoming – in other words, that which makes the 
being develop or become”.148 This means considering the individual as 
a dynamic, continuous process of development that is filled with 
pressure to individuate further. As the process is fundamentally 
contextualised – taking place in a “surrounding” environment – it is 
insufficient to contemplate the individual as a thing in isolation. 
Instead we must approach the individual as developing or becoming 
within its context, a milieu. “The true principle of individuation is 
mediation” and the process of mediation concerns the two-way action 
between an individual and its milieu.149 
Evidently, this reciprocal view of development is shared by the 
theory of evolution in the notions of adaptation and habitat, 
ecological niches and biotopes. For example, we might think of the 
sense organs of a bat, whose sensory capabilities have adapted to the 
conditions of its nocturnal living environment. Or, in the case of 
human products, we can consider the relationship between a certain 
type  of  cheese  and  all  the  elements  it  is  the  result  of:  the  type  of  
mammal providing the milk, the diet of the mammal, the fat content 
                                               
146 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 451. 
147 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 297. 
148 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 300. 
149 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 304. 
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of its milk, the type of bacteria used for the acidification of the milk, 
the type of enzymes used for coagulating the milk, the aging period 
and storage conditions of the maturing cheese et cetera. 
It is often said that a certain variety of wine is a “portrait” of 
the landscape it was produced in, and we can extend this metaphor to 
cover every being’s relation to its milieu. An individual being is a 
product of its environment, which, in turn, is shaped by the 
individual. To reiterate the argument: for Simondon, an individual is 
not a being possessing an essential unity, nor is it just a product of 
conditions that would pre-exist the process of individuation. The 
individual itself should instead be considered as an active and ongoing 
process. The individual, as a process, unendingly forms and shapes 
itself. Further, this formation is situated irrevocably in a milieu, a pre-
individual field of singularities.150 In short, an individual is a process, 
immersed within a milieu and interlinked with many other processes.  
 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN FORMATION  
To an individual-as-process there is no pre-existent form that the 
individual would thus actualise. Rather, becoming exists as one of the 
dimensions of being, “it corresponds to a capacity beings possess of 
falling out of step with themselves”.151 The notion “falling out of step” 
(déphaser) denotes the being’s potential to change its state and resolve 
an initial incompatibility that is rife with potential. This makes an 
individual a local “solution” to a pre-individual “problem”. For 
instance, a living human individual is produced as a process, which 
unfolds in various directions. The forming embryo undergoes multiple 
phases of radical transformation, acquiring both hereditary and 
situational traits in cell division, migration and invasion. The 
developing individual is shaped according to internal and external 
impulses and these impulses form a transversal mixture, not 
structured and totally determined progress. Deleuze and Guattari 
state: “Evolutionary schemas [should] no longer follow models of 
arborescent descent going from the least to the most differentiated, 
                                               
150 It goes without saying that the term singularity must here be understood only relatively, 
since an individual thing may appear as a pre-individual field or milieu from the perspective of 
another individualizing being (which, in turn, acts as a pre-individual singularity to something 
else). Thus there are both pre-individual and individual singularities. 
151 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 300, my emphasis. 
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but instead a rhizome operating immediately in the heterogenous and 
jumping from one differentiated line into another”.152  
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze argues that Darwin’s 
revolution in biology concerns the question of individuals preceding 
the species. It then follows that species should be considered as 
populations of individuals rather than be subjugated under the great 
taxonomic units: genera, families, orders and classes. Biological genera 
or families would possess an integral essence, whereas populations can 
be seen as sets of individuals going through various phases of 
transformation and differentiation.153 Or,  to  be  more  exact,  one  can  
very well speak of biological genera, but these should be seen as 
undergoing processes of individuation similar to what their 
“component” parts, the individuals, undergo. 
Individuals begin forming in the pre-individual or “virtual” 
realm. The virtual should not be understood as chaos in the sense of 
undifferentiated randomness but rather as a state of undifferentiation 
that is nevertheless overflowing with determination. As Deleuze 
emphasises, “far from being undetermined, the virtual is completely 
determined”.154 The  virtual  is  pure  structure  structuring  itself:  fully  
real, yet without being actual. The virtual contains the elements, 
relations and relational values for the actualisation to take place in a 
process of differentiation. Virtuality can be approached, following 
Simondon, as a state of “supersaturation” where the potentialities are 
not pre-formed but unfold in the process of their actualisation. That is 
to say that the potentialities are in a constant state of transformation 
and appear, when located in an individual, as supersaturation, 
“something beyond a unity and an identity”.155  
Conditioned by the virtual, an excess of potential and thus more 
than mere possibility, individuals are in a state of “metastable 
equilibrium”, that is, they always retain the possibility to further 
transform.  Stable  equilibrium  would  be  a  state  in  a  system  that  has  
expended all its possible transformations and no energy remains to 
produce any further changes. Even though a singular being can attain 
                                               
152 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 10.  
153 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 248–249. 
154 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 209. 
155 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 302, original emphasis. 
 72 
 
such a state, its immersion in a milieu ensures that there are additional 
possibilities for further individuation.156 
Transduction is  Simondon’s  term  for  the  mechanism  of  
individuation. This denotes a process that is “physical, biological, 
mental or social … in which an activity gradually sets itself in motion, 
propagating within a given area, through a structuration of the 
different zones of the area over which it operates. Each region of the 
structure that is constituted in this way then serves to constitute the 
next one to such an extent that at the very time this structuration is 
effected there is a progressive modification taking place in tandem 
with it”.157 
The most basic example of the process of transduction 
provided by Simondon is the growth of a crystal, but the scope of the 
concept reaches beyond mineral formation into the more complex 
realms of wide-scale geological, biological and cultural formation. As a 
general structuring function, transduction “is the correlative 
appearance of dimensions and structures in a being in a state of 
preindividual tension”.158 Transduction can thus be understood simply 
as transfer of information, and Simondon defines this as “the tension 
between two disparate realities, it is the signification that emerges when a 
process of individuation reveals the dimension through which two disparate realities 
together become a system”.159 Information implies in itself a problem, a 
possible change of a system’s state, and thus appears as a necessity to 
individuate.  
 
REALITY AS ACTUALISATION  
Simondon’s theory of individuation resonates with Deleuze’s notion 
of reality as a continuous process of actualisation through a synthesis 
of affects, with actualisation taking place as a local solution to a virtual 
problem. This constant, universal synthesis takes place as repetition in 
                                               
156 Simondon distinguishes between physical individuals and living individuals by virtue of an 
“inner” activity of individuation. A physical object, a piece of rock, is more or less a result of 
individuation, and can end up in a state of stable equilibrium, its “inner” energy spent to such 
an extent that it possesses no means of further individuation. A living thing, however, 
“conserves in itself an activity of permanent individuation” (Simondon, “The Genesis of the 
Individual”, p. 305, original emphasis). Thus metastability, a state retaining the potential to 
break a stable equilibrium, is a precondition for life. 
157 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 313. 
158 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 313. 
159 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual”, p. 311, original emphasis. 
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a series. Actualisation of forms and representations happens 
relationally, as James Williams summarises: “We only acquire habits by 
synthesising earlier members of a series in later ones. We only acquire 
representations in memory and in language by synthesising earlier 
memories that are themselves syntheses of experiences”.160 
As there is an infinity of series (affect-encounters), individuals 
are only syntheses of “previous” individuals and are themselves 
effecting further syntheses. Individuation is thus a process of 
encounters, of passages and transductions. This does away with the 
hylomorphic structure of form and content, since both of these are 
constantly changing as well. We cannot adhere to unchanging 
transcendental conditions. Simondon states: “The a priori forms of 
the sensibility are not obtained either a priori or a posteriori by 
abstraction, but rather must be understood as the structures of an 
axiomatic that appears in a process of individuation”.161 In  order  to  
know the nature of a thing, we must follow its trajectory “backwards” 
into the syntheses that produced it. As these synthesis-structures are 
also themselves syntheses, Williams notes that the transcendental 
conditions of individuation are “appearance-specific in the sense that 
the abstract form of conditions turns out to be that there must be 
specific conditions for each thing, rather than general ones for all of 
them”.162 This situates a singular process of individuation within a 
network of processes, a milieu, which acts as the condition of the 
genesis of an individual. 
Simondon emphasises that an individual is fully understood 
only together with its milieu: “the individual possesses only a relative 
existence in two senses: because it does not represent the totality of 
being,  and  because  it  is  merely  the  result  of  a  phase  in  the  being’s  
development during which it existed neither in the form of an 
individual nor as the principle of individuation”.163 The  process  of  
individuation is a mediation or passage of intensities between an 
individual and its milieu. This makes clear the connection between 
Simondon’s notion of individuation and Deleuze’s concept of affect. 
Transduction is affectivity, and analysing the function of affective 
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qualities in the individual’s relation to its milieu is what leads Deleuze 
and Guattari to develop the concept of territoriality. Originally an 
ethological term for animal domains, Deleuze and Guattari expand it 
to address the question of the dynamics between habituation and 
derangement, and territorialization and deterritorialization. 
 
 
2.3 Milieu and Territory 
 
In their book Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari begin to utilise the 
concept of territoriality primarily within the psychological context of 
modelling the investment and location of psychic energies.164 In 
subsequent work they expand this model to a more encompassing 
theory of formation of matter, which takes place as a result of 
encounters between various forces, from the “base” material level of 
geology and biology to the human social level and its institutions.  
Deleuze and Guattari state in A Thousand Plateaus that territory 
and affect  are interlinked,  and from this  point  of  view art,  being the 
primary domain of the affective, is not the privilege of human beings. 
The expressive has a certain auto-objectivity: art, as territoriality, is an 
expression of the various intensive relations taking place on a pre-
individual, affective level.165 Here territoriality needs to be considered 
as a part of the matter-flow process of individuation, as previously 
discussed. 
If we, following Deleuze and Guattari, take the statement bird-
song is the origin of art as our basis of consideration, do we not err on the 
side of humanisation? The sentimental human mind might well 
interpret the dawn chorus of bird-song as a welling of joy springing 
from the new day beginning – but certainly the birds do not sing out 
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of happiness – at least “happiness” as we understand it from the point 
of view of human consciousness and psychology. According to a 
standard ethological view, a bird acts upon a series of internal and 
external  impulses  as  it  perches  on  a  branch  and  starts  its  song  with  
which it announces the domination of its territory and invites 
potential mates to come forth. Even though many birds “improvise” 
additional variations or imitations to their song, this activity can still 
be considered as an impulsive action having to do with the animal’s 
territorial behavior. Bird-song is indeed the paradigmatic example of 
animal territorial activity, and the development of the concept of 
territory in the field of ethology has its beginnings in the study of bird 
behaviour.166 
 
MILIEUS AND TERRITORIES  
The most well-known theorist working in the field of animal 
territoriality is Konrad Lorenz, who in his book On Aggression states 
that territorial behaviour is manifested as the aggression necessary to 
defend one’s own territory, directed both towards other individuals 
within the same species and in some cases towards other species as 
well. Even though aggressive territorial behaviour can lead to injury 
and sometimes even death, it still serves for the survival of the species 
on a scale greater than individuals. Aggression is one of the great 
biological drives and internal struggle is beneficial to the species itself, 
as  it  ensures that  the stronger individual  will  take hold of favourable 
territory and will thus more reliably pass on its genotype.167 
However, it is more favourable for the survival of the species 
if the struggle for territory can take place in a substitutive manner, 
instead of by physical acts of aggression. Territorial behaviour thus 
occurs most often on a symbolic, “expressive” level, where various 
signs  are  used  to  communicate  the  domination  of  a  territory  and  to  
declare the dominator’s powerfulness to a possible rival. Bird-song 
and the vivid colours of tropical fish therefore serve territorial 
behaviour, and function as signs of aggression and potential violence. 
Or, accordingly, various signs can declare the withholding of 
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aggression, for instance when a possessor of territory lets a mating 
partner into its domain.168 
In any case, according to Lorenz, the birds’ morning chorus 
does not possess an element of artistic expression, but should rather 
be regarded as a set of instinctive signals, serving territorial aggression 
and the reproductive instinct. How, then, can one speak of birds as 
the origin of art? In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari observe 
that even though aggression plays a definite role in territorial 
behaviour, it cannot function as a parenthetical reason for the 
formation of territory. Aggression is manifested differently between 
territorial and non-territorial animals, and this goes for many other 
functions as well, such as gathering food, mating and caring for 
offspring. Nevertheless, none of these factors explain territoriality, but 
rather territoriality explains them. As Deleuze and Guattari state: 
“These functions are organised and created only because they are 
territorialized,  and  not  the  other  way  around.  The  T  factor,  the  
territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the 
becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the 
emergence of proper qualities (color, odor, sound, silhouette…)”.169 
These “expressive qualities” appear autonomously, they are 
“auto-objective, in other words, find an objectivity in the territory 
they draw”.170 Expression is thus not confined to the actions of an 
individual being. Rather, it takes place in the network of relations 
between different individuals and milieus. The bright colours of a 
coral snake, for example, express something about the snake and its 
relation to other environmental factors in its habitat. We can here 
recall  the  notion  of  an  individual  being  acting  as  a  portrait  of  its  
environment. Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, expression is 
primary in relation to territoriality: a territory is formed as a result of 
expression, and expression is the “auto-objective” functioning of 
relations within an environment. To grasp this idea, we must now 
acquaint ourselves with the distinction Deleuze and Guattari make 
between environment or milieu and domain or territory. 
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Deleuze and Guattari define a being’s milieu as a coded “block 
of space-time” constituted by the periodic repetition of a code.171 In 
other words, a milieu is the living environment, “the world” of a 
certain being, within which things are able to appear as meaningful 
and continuous. This milieu is differentiated, “coded”, out of 
undifferentiated chaos through a being’s capabilities to perceive and 
act. For instance, one can consider a tick, whose milieu is extremely 
small from our human point of view. Only a few elements make up a 
tick’s world; these include sunlight, butyric acid and warmth. The tick 
climbs to the top of a stalk of grass, its skin being sensitive to sunlight. 
The odour of butyric acid, secreted by mammals, makes the tick 
loosen its grip and drop off the stalk. Provided that it has landed on 
something living, it then directs itself towards the warm skin covered 
under  hair,  pierces  the  host’s  skin  and  sucks  its  blood.  After  
nourishing itself with the host’s blood, the tick drops off to the 
ground, lays its eggs and dies.  
This  is  the  example  used  by  Jakob von Uexküll,  an  early  20th 
Century pioneering ethologist, when he presents his concept of 
milieu, Umwelt, the self-enclosing unity of every individual’s world.172 
This world is constituted of the perceptive capabilities of an animal 
subject and covers all the things a certain animal is able to perceive 
and thus understand. The tick’s Umwelt is very limited; its world is 
constituted  by  a  small  number  of  stimuli  to  which  it  reacts  in  a  
mechanical fashion. For Deleuze, this makes the tick “the true 
philosophical beast” instead of the owl of Minerva. The tick is 
celebrated as such because of its extremely reduced world: it can 
respond to “[n]othing but a few signs like stars in an immense black 
night”.173 Yet, it possesses great power to act. The simplicity of the 
tick’s world helps us to see that a body is defined by its affects.  
The human milieu, on the contrary, is probably the most 
complex, as we possess an enormous number of approaches to our 
environment and a great capacity to respond to and affect it. For any 
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one animal individual, the internal relations within its milieu form the 
appearance of various things and their possible meanings. A dog is a 
source of food for a tick, predator for a rabbit and servant for a 
human. The dog is also manifested very differently in these different 
worlds: as an inviting scent and warmth for the tick, as a threatening 
smell and sharp teeth for the rabbit and as a four-legged, domesticated 
animal for the human. 
Even though we, as humans, often generalise our own milieu 
as the standard for every living being, it is worth bearing in mind that 
our own faculties of perception and understanding are the result of a 
certain process of evolution and individuation. Such a process has 
advanced those capabilities that have best enabled us to survive in our 
living environment and has discarded those that have hindered us. 
Scientific biology has, however, focused on the animal as automaton 
reacting to various stimuli. Against this, von Uexküll wants to 
emphasise the concepts of animal subject and milieu: a living being’s 
perceptual experience accounts for its behavior. “We do no longer ask 
the animal ‘How does the outer world push you around?’, we now ask 
it  ‘What  do  you  perceive  of  the  outer  world,  and  what  is  your  
response?’”174 
One receives countless different answers to von Uexküll’s 
question from countless different milieus. Each milieu or Umwelt has 
its own spatio-temporal dimensions: a tick can spend a very long time 
positioned at the tip of a blade of grass, waiting for an animal to pass 
by,  whereas  a  bird’s  rapid  neural  activity  and  metabolism  makes  it  
appear as a very fast and energetic creature to us. A bird can take wing 
from its branch, we cannot. We, as heavy, wingless creatures, cannot 
even reach the tip of the branch the said bird was sitting on. Each 
milieu is thus “coded” in a certain way. That is, a milieu is organised 
as  a  certain  wholeness  of  meaning.  But,  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari  
stress, “each code is in a perpetual state of transcoding or transduction”.175 
Different milieus pass into one another: a living being’s internal and 
external worlds communicate via different sensory organs, linings, 
membranes and fasciae. Different creatures’ milieus encounter each 
other, for instance, via predatory, parasitic or symbiotic relations. 
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MILIEU AS MEMBRANE 
Deleuze and Guattari praise von Uexküll particularly for his 
observations on transcoding and its importance. In his theory he 
approaches milieus as “melodies in counterpoint, each of which serves 
as a motif for another: Nature as music”.176 Instead  of  using  the  
behavioristic schema of stimulus-and-reaction, von Uexküll considers 
a being’s actions as harmonic relations of resonance between various 
milieus, which are regulated more by “musical” (harmonic/melodic) 
than mechanistic factors. Because of their continuous overlapping, 
predator-prey -relations bear with them perhaps the most complex 
contrapuntal arrangements, as two competing species have adapted 
and counter-adapted their capacity to capture and evade each other. 
For example,  a  spider spins its  web as a  “counterpoint” to a  fly:  the 
filaments of the web must withstand the impact of the fly, but at the 
same time be thin enough to be translucent to it. Also, the mesh of 
the net must match the size of the fly’s body.177  
Nevertheless, a young spider spins its first web without 
“knowing” a thing about flies and cannot be said to understand much 
of its prey after catching it either. The meaning of an action, as well as 
its  expressiveness  –  a  spider’s  web  can  be  considered  as  an  
“expression” of the fly – do not arise from the act of spinning the 
web. Web-spinning can be understood as a single note in a melody, 
and it must be just the right kind in order to resonate harmoniously, 
that is, meaningfully and productively, with a number of milieus. In a 
functioning contrapuntal relation there is a theme that expresses 
meaning, which spans over different milieus. 
A milieu in itself does not, however, constitute a domain or 
territory. Deleuze and Guattari call territory “an act that affects 
milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them”.178 The territorializing 
act is expressive of relations between milieus, it is “artistic” and the 
artist  is  the  first  one  to  set  up  a  marker  stone,  to  plant  a  flag.  
Expressive qualities do not belong to a subject, but rather “delineate a 
territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces them. 
These qualities are signatures, but the signature, the proper name, is 
not the constituted mark of a subject, but the constituting mark of a 
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domain, an abode … One puts one’s signature on something just as 
one plants one’s flag on a piece of land”.179 
The male bowerbird of the Ptilonorhynchidae family collects 
bright-colored stones, components of its milieu, and arranges them in 
the front of  a  small  “hut” it  has built  from twigs,  on top of a  green 
mat of moss it has laid out. Here, functional components (stones, 
twigs, moss) are transformed and arise as qualities. The bird’s action 
forms a rhythm between these components, and the rhythm has 
become expressive. After building itself a stage, the bird displays itself 
on it and begins its song, and thus declares its connection to its 
territory. Deleuze and Guattari state regarding the emergence of 
territory: “There is a territory precisely when milieu components cease 
to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to 
be functional to become expressive. There is a territory when the 
rhythm has expressiveness. What defines the territory is the 
emergence of matters of expressions (qualities)”.180 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that Deleuze and 
Guattari distinguish between milieus and territories in order to avoid a 
certain expressionist anthropomorphism. A singing bird does not 
express its mind-state autonomously, but is rather functioning 
according  to  the  stimuli  offered  by  its  milieu.  It  is  only  when  its  
activity – singing – is situated as a part of a wider rhythm of diverse 
milieus, does its song become expressive and territorializes the milieu. 
The expressive quality, the territorializing factor, precedes both the 
territory and the components out of which it is assembled. 
Expression, the affective intensity, abstracts the milieu into territory. 
The key issue in territorialization is to note the autonomous 
status of expressive qualities: things must be distinguished from the 
components of a milieu in order to become expressive. A coded 
milieu needs to be “decoded” or “deterritorialized” in order to 
become territory. A certain domain needs to be chosen as the location 
for a twig hut, a certain arrangement of the coloured stones needs to 
be made and certain qualities need to be decoded from their previous 
functions and be recoded into a new assemblage. Then things appear 
as new: instead of being consumed as nourishment, the juice of 
berries  is  used  to  color  the  walls  of  the  twig  hut,  stones  are  set  in  
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formation, leaves are collected and placed upside down, so that their 
lighter downside is displayed. 
If  one  can  fathom  an  origin  of  art  in  this  type  of  activity,  it  
means art as deterritorialization or derangement of the “natural” state 
of things.181 Corresponding to the movement from affect-as-effect to 
the interval enabling becoming and further on to the immanence 
itself, as observed in section one, territoriality transforms the simple 
declaration of possession, “planting of the flag”, into autonomous 
expression exactly via decoding. The rhythms and relations between 
decoded components form an autonomous expressive element, which 
is independent of the (animal) subject’s state of mind. The twig hut 
and the song in front of it do not just manifest the domination of a 
certain place, but express the relations of different milieu 
components, which find their expression in the bird’s singing. Now 
“signature becomes style”182 and the bird-song, a reaction to inner and 
outer impulses, becomes music. 
In response to Simondon and von Uexküll’s notion of 
individuation as “musical” or harmonic resonance, taking place on an 
affective level, Deleuze and Guattari use the musical term refrain to 
denote “the active coinvolvement of organisms and milieus in their 
mutual determination”.183 By avoiding any reference to subjects, 
consciousness or cognition, Deleuze and Guattari see the world as a 
continually self-producing or self-transforming multiplicity of 
relations. “The essential relation is no longer matters-forms (or 
substances-attributes); neither is it the continuous development of 
form  and  the  continuous  variation  of  matter.  It  is  now  a  direct  
relation material-forces”.184 Individuations appear, coagulate and stratify, 
and then get swept away again in a perpetual process of becoming-
other. When considered from this perspective, we can see how 
decoding or deterritorialization or “counter-actualisation”, taking 
place in the formation of territory, functions as a model for artistic 
activity. If art is the domain of the excessive – sensations and affects – 
it is by definition oriented towards its own supersaturated condition, 
the virtual. Art takes place as the site that thematises itself as a site, a 
domain or a stage, but simultaneously collapses its unity by expressing 
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qualities that migrate from other milieus. Art as derangement: 
actualised Nature opening up to the virtual forces of the Cosmos.  
 
 
2.4 Experience and Sense 
 
As outlined so far concerning the function of affects in individuation, 
Deleuze  regards  Nature  –  or  the  world  –  as  a  continuously  self-
producing or self-creating system of differential relations. Out of this 
production rise singular beings as temporal stabilisations or 
coagulations of matter-flow. In order to preserve a dimension of 
creation in this system of production Deleuze introduces two 
ontological categories, the virtual and the actual. The process of 
actualisation of the virtual forms the “given” world of beings and 
things that our experience presents. There exists an asymmetry 
between these ontological “states”. For true novelty to appear in the 
world,  the  virtual  must  be  distinct  from the  actual:  if  the  process  of  
actualisation was reversible, the virtual would exist either as a resource 
of  pre-existent  forms  or  as  a  set  of  mere  possibilities  already  
containing the determination of their outcome. As befits Deleuze’s 
philosophy of immanence, such pre-existent forms or determinations 
have to be replaced with the radical relationality of Simondon’s 
ontogenesis. At the core of Simondon’s theory of individuation is the 
concept of transduction, which denotes a state of tension between 
two or more pre-individual singularities and the subsequent resolution 
of this disparity that appears as a new “phase” in the existence of an 
individual. Because the pre-individual relations are themselves 
processes of individuation, there are no transcendental forms or laws 
but rather passing of information and formation of tendencies or 
habits. 
Alberto Toscano notes that at the heart of Deleuze’s 
appropriation of Simondon lies the notion of the individual as a 
certain process of passing information: a “signal-sign system”.185 A 
signal denotes here the existence of a pre-individual field and its initial 
incompatibility or tension of disparate elements. An emerging 
individual is then a sign of the resolution of this problem, a 
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“composite” phenomenon. Deleuze states: “Every phenomenon 
flashes in a signal-sign system. In so far as a system is constituted or 
bounded by at least two heterogeneous series, two disparate orders 
capable of entering into communication, we call it a signal. The 
phenomenon that flashes across this system, bringing about the 
communication between disparate series, is a sign”.186 This notion 
introduces Deleuze’s critique of epistemological representationalism. 
The viewpoint of representationalism embodies philosophy’s dream 
of “pure” empiricism where the subject encloses all that is – the given 
–  and  can  yield  an  adequate  explication  of  it.  This  would  situate  
everything that exists within the sphere of representation and, in 
Deleuze’s view, would thus subjugate everything under total 
anthropomorphism. As Claire Colebrook formulates, Deleuze wants 
instead to posit givenness beyond the subject, knowledge or human 
experience. This appeal to the transcendental situates Deleuze’s 
philosophy as empiricism that extends beyond the subject.187 
The actualised world of representation is a world determined 
by habit: its modes are familiarity, recognition and common sense. In 
order to think beyond representations of the habitual world, one must 
discard abstract universals such as totality or subject and try instead to 
examine those conditions under which something new is produced; 
that is to say, the conditions that make differences appear. Deleuze, as 
an empiricist, defines actual things as “multiplicities”, series of pre-
individual elements. Thought cannot thus begin from a foundation of 
pre-set meanings. It has to strive to examine the production of 
meaning in the same processes that produce the subject that interprets 
those meanings. Therefore one must start from the immediate given, 
the actual, and seek the conditions for that singular immediacy – not 
universal conditions for all possible experience and meaning, as was 
discussed in chapter one of this study. As signal-sign systems, 
individuations are given as phenomena (signs) out of which their 
genesis (signal) can be deduced. Individuations as signs, then, appear 
as expressions or symptoms of pre-individual or virtual “problems”. 
The starting point  for such an empiricism is  a  fracture in the self (the 
Kantian “I” that thinks) that enables one to seek out the limits of 
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representation and to address the conditions of the given. This 
immediacy outside representation can only appear as fracture or 
rupture in the “fabric” of normality. Individuation, when encountered 
as a sign of its conditions, belongs not to knowledge but to the realm 
of the sensible. As such, the sensible sign appears to us as something 
problematic and disruptive. 
 
THE PROBLEMATIC SIGN 
Deleuze first formulates the problematic nature of signs in his study 
Proust and Signs. He discards those interpretations of Proust’s In Search 
of Lost Time that focus on memory and remembrance as the “key” to 
the interpretation of the novel. Instead, Deleuze reads the novel as a 
recount of an apprenticeship in signs: “Everything that teaches us 
something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of 
signs or hieroglyphs”.188 During  the  vast  span  of  Proust’s  work  the  
narrator explores signs of many different orders – all of which, 
provided that they truly are signs of something new and not mere 
recounts of what the narrator already knows, appeal to involuntary 
and unconscious mobilisation rather than to conscious act of 
understanding. Deleuze refers to a passage in the Republic where Plato 
distinguishes between two types of sensations: those that leave the 
mind tranquil and inactive, and those that force it to think. The first 
type are objects of recognition (“that is x”), recognition being the 
harmonious exercise of our faculties. The other type of sensations 
(“what is that?”)  causes  a  discord  in  our  faculties  and  forces  us  to  
think. What is at stake is no more a question of recognition: 
something snaps the mind out of  its  tranquil  state  and makes it  seek 
out the truth.189  
When considering the two types of sensations – recognition 
and encounter – Proust is a Platonist in the latter sense. For Deleuze 
In Search of Lost Time is a gigantic study of signs that force us to think. 
The narrator encounters deceptive signs of society life, signs of love, 
signs of jealousy et cetera. An anxious and jealous lover searching for 
veiled truth behind the actions of his beloved is a far more suitable 
character for Deleuze’s philosophy than a Platonic friend of truth. 
Philosophy’s error is to suppose a benevolence of though; in contrast, 
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the Proustian lover works under no good will or natural love for truth, 
but is rather forced to think under pressing circumstances.190  
Signs implicate and they must be explicated. Thus, they concern 
the sense of things. Sense must be understood here in its widest 
meaning: as in senses, faculties of the sensuous, the five senses. 
Another denotation of sense is “meaning” – it is the sense of a 
proposition. Further, sense can be understood as making sense or 
coming into one’s senses: to conform oneself to the good sense or to 
the common sense, or else be judged senseless. And, finally, sense can 
be understood in the context of sensing: did  you  just  sense  that? 
Something slippery, just out of reach of our senses. 
To summarise or categorise, sense can be located in-between: 
between the senses – that is, the sensory apparatus of our bodies – 
and things themselves. Between one sense and another sense, as the 
wholeness of our affective existence, the bodily or material direction 
of our being-in-the-world; and between words and things, as in the 
“mode of presentation” of a sign. 
The formulation of sense as the mode of presentation of a sign 
originates from Gottlob Frege, who, despite his neo-positivism, still 
posits certain objectivity to sense. Commenting on Frege, Chris Colwell 
notes that Frege distinguishes between the mode of presentation of a 
sign (its sense) and that which the sign designates (its reference). 
Frege’s purpose is to explain the functioning of propositions that 
contain signs that have no referent (for instance, fictional characters 
such as Dorian Gray) or cases in which propositions containing 
different signs have the same reference (for instance, when some 
phenomenon has different names, or when different names are used 
under different circumstances, the classic example being “morning 
star”, “evening star” and the planet Venus). While Frege privileges 
reference over sense, due to reference’s truth-value, sense still retains 
its objectivity – or at least its inter-subjectivity. Sense cannot be wholly 
subjective since it can be the property of more than one thinker. Thus, 
sense resides somewhere between the subjective ideas of thinkers and 
the objects to which thought refers.191 
                                               
190 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, pp. 94–95. 
191 Chris Colwell, “Deleuze, Sense and the Event of AIDS”, Postmodern Culture vol. 6, no. 2 
(1996), p. 4; Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Meaning”, trans. Max Black, in Translations from the 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1982), pp. 56–78. 
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SENSE-IN-BETWEEN  
As Colwell states, the key thing to consider here is the status of the in-
between. A philosophical notion of sense belongs neither to the subject 
(as in phenomenology or existentialism) nor to the object (as in 
positivism). This notion of sense coheres with Deleuze’s 
understanding of sense, as he is most of all a thinker of in-between 
states. For Deleuze, sense contains all its connotations: “meaning”, 
“direction”, sense as the faculty of perception and as the mode of 
presentation. 
In his work The Logic of Sense Deleuze  seeks  to  determine  the  
status of meaning and meaninglessness through a series of inquiries 
with language,  games and literature.  For him, the realm of sense can 
be approached from two directions; one beginning with words or 
propositions, the other beginning with things or states of affairs.192  
On the side of language or words, we find that there are three 
relations within the proposition: 1) denotation, linking the proposition 
to  particular  things  or  states  of  affairs;  2) manifestation, linking the 
proposition to the person who speaks or expresses himself or herself, 
and to beliefs or intentions or such mental states of the speaker, and 
3) signification, linking the proposition to general or universal concepts. 
We now have three factors: first, things, or states of affairs; second, 
the speaker, or the subject and third, language, or the order of signs. 
Deleuze proposes that each relation – denotation, manifestation and 
signification – offers itself as primary; that is, each one claims to be 
the ground for the other two relations. There is a contest between the 
three. In speech, it is the “I” which begins the speech act, the “I” that 
speaks, thus manifestation would seem to be the origin of 
proposition. As Deleuze notes, this is naturally the position of 
Descartes’ Cogito, which functions as the ground of all propositions: 
the “I” is understood as soon as it is said. It presents itself as having 
signification which is immediately understood and identical to its own 
manifestation.193  
However, the primacy of manifestation holds true only in 
speech, as there the “I” is primary in relation to concepts – primary to 
the world and to God. Yet, if another domain exists in which 
significations are valid and developed for themselves, then 
                                               
192 Colwell, “Deleuze, Sense and the Event of AIDS”, p. 6. 
193 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 12–15. 
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significations would be primary and would in turn provide the basis of 
manifestation. As Deleuze notes, this domain is language. We can 
note here the structuralist distinction between language (langue) and 
the use of language (parole). From the point of view of language, 
concepts such as God or the world are always primary in relation to 
the self as a manifested person, as well as to things as designated 
objects. Here, propositions appear as premises or conclusions, 
subsuming their objects under universal categories.194  
Although Deleuze does not offer an explanation for the third 
perspective of denotation, Colwell comments that he must mean the 
primacy of denotation in the “this-now-here” immediacy of sense 
experience.195 Lost between the three competing viewpoints – 
between denotation, manifestation and signification – we find 
ourselves in a circle that Deleuze calls “the circle of proposition”. 
None of the three relations will suffice to function as the principle of 
the proposition, as the condition of the possibility of the proposition 
or as the link between the proposition and what is external to the 
proposition. In addition to the three dimensions of the proposition, 
we need a fourth dimension, which is the dimension of sense. 
Sense cannot be located in one of the three dimensions of the 
proposition, according to Deleuze. Denotation already presupposes 
sense, it cannot give rise to sense. Identifying sense with manifestation 
has a better chance of success, since the designators themselves have 
sense only in virtue of an “I” which manifests itself in the proposition. 
Deleuze considers this “I” a primary in manifestation and quotes 
Alice in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland: “if you only spoke when 
you were spoken to, and the other person always waited for you to 
begin, you see nobody would ever say anything”. Sense would thus 
reside in the beliefs and desires of the person who expresses himself 
or herself.196  
However, the order of beliefs and desires is founded on the 
order of conceptual implications of significations. Even the identity of 
the self or the “I” that speaks is guaranteed only by the permanence 
of certain signifieds, the concept of God or the world. Thus, personal 
identity of the speaker, the “I” that speaks, is founded on the identity 
                                               
194 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 15. 
195 Colwell, “Deleuze, Sense and the Event of AIDS”, p. 6. 
196 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 17–18. 
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of language. If the order of language collapses, or the significations are 
not established in themselves – as often happens, for instance, in 
Carroll’s stories of Alice, where God is indeed dead or mad or just 
arbitrary – the I finds itself “in conditions where God, the world and 
the self become the blurred characters of the dream of someone who 
is poorly determined”.197 
Still, language or signification also fails to establish itself as the 
ground of sense, given its recursive nature. We cannot make the sense 
of one proposition explicit in another proposition without 
presupposing the sense of the second proposition and so forth in 
infinite regress. Every proposition attempting to offer a definition of 
sense will itself require another sense.  
Thus, the only domain for sense has to be a fourth dimension 
of the proposition, a dimension of its own. And this domain, as we 
have already noticed, is the milieu of the in-between. As Deleuze asks:  
 
is there something, aliquid, which merges neither with the 
proposition or with the terms of the proposition, nor with the 
object or with the states of affairs which the proposition denotes, 
neither with the ‘lived,’ or representation or the mental activity of 
the person who expresses herself in the proposition, nor with 
concepts or even signified essences? If there is, sense, or that which 
is expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual 
states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or 
general concepts. The Stoics said it all: neither word nor body, 
neither sensible representation nor rational representation.198  
 
Deleuze outlines sense as “the expressed of the proposition”, as an 
incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a 
pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition. Sense then 
lies somewhere between propositions and states of affairs, on the 
brink of becoming nonsense.  
 
GOOD SENSE,  COMMON SENSE AND NONSENSE 
The adjoining of sense to nonsense serves to distinguish sense from 
the good sense or the common sense. Good sense is, for Deleuze, the 
                                               
197 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 18 
198 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 19, original emphasis. 
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sense of signification. As sense, it is ordered in one direction only, 
along the line of linear thinking. Good sense “foresees” – it is able to 
extrapolate from the present and the past in order to predict the 
becoming of the future, based on past and current models. As the 
“good” sense, it identifies the past, present and future as the Same, as 
a  repetition  of  the  Same in  the  face  of  the  Other  –  a  repetition  that  
denies the possibility of the repetition of difference.199 Common 
sense, on the other hand, is the sense that is linked with and governs 
denotation and manifestation. As Deleuze states, common sense 
“identifies and recognises”, and in doing so it identifies and recognises 
both the self, the “I” that manifests, and the things which the self 
experiences.200  
Good sense and common sense function together in a self-
complementing circle. The identity of common sense provides the 
direction for the movement of good sense. And, in turn, the action of 
good sense, “in bringing the manifold of experience under the 
categories of general signification provides the matter without which 
identity would remain empty”.201 This unidirectional nature of good 
and common sense is underpinned by the multiplicity of directions 
possessed by the “pure” sense, as postulated by Deleuze. This 
multiplicity of directions blurs the particular manifestations of good 
sense and the particular identities of common sense. Sense, thus, 
appears as nonsense from the point of view of good sense and common 
sense. 
“Nonsense, absurdity, expressions that violate the rules of 
good and common sense…” No wonder Deleuze’s Logic of Sense deals 
widely with Alice’s adventures in Wonderland. As Colwell notes, 
Deleuze’s notion of sense grounds the functioning of language in its 
widest range, and that widest range includes nonsense and the absurd. 
Nonsense achieves such instances of meaning, representation and 
thinking that the good sense and common sense cut off in their 
illusory clarity. Colwell sums: “Nonsense is not the absence of sense; 
it is the sense that fails to result in denotation or signification or 
manifestation”, residing in the fourth dimension of propositions.202  
                                               
199 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 75–76. 
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The appearance of nonsense, the stuttering of thought and 
language, brings us to the question of the sign as an encounter with 
the outside of thought. This outside can be approached as residing in 
the affective and will thus formulate common problematic to both 
material and linguistic dimensions: the notion of individuation, 
formation of beings and meanings, as a process of relations. Affect – 
the transduction of intensities – forms the structure of individuation, 
which happens relationally between an individual and its milieu, a pre-
individual field. The notion of individuation-as-transduction can be 
understood in biophysical as well as in linguistic terms: the biological 
material process acquires an expressive dimension in the appearance 
of territory or sense when the components of a certain individuation 
arise as qualities or signs. They appear as deterritorialization of a territory 
or nonsense in language and thought – in other words, as the dimension 
of sensation and art. 
So far, I have sketched the outlines of Deleuze’s ontology of 
encounters as a philosophy of relations and individuation as the 
synthesis of them. The discussion has used the terms and examples of 
a spatial process – crystal growth and cloud formation, spider webs 
and bat ultrasound – but, for Deleuze, the core question of the 
actualisation  of  the  virtual  as  a  synthesis  of  affects  is  a  temporal one. 
Therefore, we must now turn our attention to the concepts of 
process, emergence and event from the point of view of time. In 
order to do this I shall look into Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and the 
value of the conception of time as intensive, qualitative dimension. 
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3. Time and the Virtual: The Intensive Difference 
 
To  sum  up  the  core  content  of  previous  two  chapters  would  be  to  
state that regarding both subjectivity and indentity-formation Deleuze 
faces the question of their genesis. This genesis is defined in terms of 
the pre-individual field and internal, intensive difference. Deleuze 
locates this non-conceptual difference within the empirical: there is 
manifest  diversity  and  in  order  to  do  justice  to  this  diversity  of  the  
world we must not presume some kind of unity or totality “behind it 
all”.  This  means  that  difference  is  though  “as  it  is”,  in  its  self-
grounding nature, without prior reference to a pre-established identity 
as the defining term of difference. Such difference is necessarily 
“internal” in the sense that it is present in every entity’s particularity: 
identity is not based on comparison between conceptually similar 
beings, but rather on the internal differentiating dynamic of every 
thing.  
In chapter one the dynamic of internal difference was located 
in the fracture within the subject: in the “fractured I” born between 
the conceptual and the aesthetic. In chapter two this fracture was 
found in the threshold between individual and its milieu: a forming 
individual is shaped by the impulses of its milieu – yet it periodically 
encounters its “outside” as all milieus are interrelated and their 
boundaries are shifting. This mutual becoming makes possible the 
emergence of novel qualities as the becoming-other of individuals.  
What  must  be  addressed  next  is  the  temporal  nature  of  
intensive, internal difference. In Deleuze’s work, the questions of 
time, movement, difference, and the ontological friction between 
conceptual and non-conceptual come into focus most clearly in his 
reading of Henri Bergson. As his commentators have noted, 
Deleuze’s reception of Bergson is one of the main philosophical 
building blocks of his thinking, and as such warrants sustained 
attention.203 Even though the Deleuzean method of reading other 
                                               
203 One of the earliest commentaries devoting sustained attention to Deleuze’s relation to 
Bergson is Michael Hardt’s Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993). As Deleuze’s contributions to ontological questions 
have been recently reappraised, a number of books and articles detailing Deleuze’s 
connection to Bergson have been published in the last few years; see for example Alexandre 
Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford: University of Standford Press, 
2008); Valentine Moulard-Leonard, Bergson-Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the 
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philosophers is to extract a set of concepts from a certain thinker’s 
system, sometimes involving seemingly odd choices of “minor” or 
neglected strands of thought, Bergson is one of the figures whose 
influence can be noticed throughout Deleuze’s œuvre. Likewise, the 
questions Deleuze focuses on are central in Bergson’s own 
philosophy, too. 
In  particular,  three  key  texts  in  Deleuze’s  work  directly  
reference Bergson as their subject: “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference”, an essay from 1956, his monograph Bergsonism from 
1966, and both volumes of his Cinema books (1983 and 1985). 
Deleuze’s 1956 essay casts Bergson as undertaking a critique of certain 
general dominant philosophical strands of his time, deriving from 
Hegelian dialectics in particular. Granted, Bergson shares with Hegel a 
profound sense of the historicity of philosophy. Thought has arrived 
at a point in its history when it can recognise itself as historical and 
assess its own tendencies. We no longer fall under the illusion of 
timeless and super-human structures – that is, timeless and super-
human history – but recognise those structures as creations of human 
life, historical and changing.  
The recognition of the historicity of human thought in 
philosophy did take place during the same period of time as the early 
development of modern natural and social sciences, from the age of 
Enlightenment onwards, escalating in the 19th Century. Even though 
Bergson ends up criticising the natural sciences, as they seek to 
assume the position of “objective” truth by extracting unchanging 
laws or tendencies from the changing flux of the phenomenal world, 
science recognises, at the very least, the historical development of its 
own methodology too. 
With the historicist notion of human thought in philosophy, 
the problems of novelty and creation become central. How is thinking 
able  to  escape  its  own  bounds  and  renew  itself?  Similarly,  the  same  
question concerns also the processes of life and matter: where lies the 
impetus to change? And what is the nature of that impetus, the spark 
of  life?  As  Elizabeth  Grosz  observes,  it  is  due  to  the  novelty  of  his  
concept of life that Bergson is the most Darwinian of philosophers 
and  Deleuze,  in  turn,  the  most  Bergsonian.  Darwin  formulated  a  
                                                                                                                                             
Thought of the Virtual (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008). Respectively, Alain Badiou also states that 
Bergson is the one “master” to whom Deleuze is most faithful: The Clamor of Being, p. 39. 
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conception  of  life  that  is  an  amalgam  of  activity  and  passivity:  the  
action of individual variation and the passion of natural selection. 
Bergson follows this idea by conceiving life as the process of matter 
individuating itself. This happens in the intersection of the actual 
present time of matter and the virtual, accumulative time of memory. 
Life charges passive matter with vitality and the necessity to change. 
Deleuze’s further refinement is to discard the notion of the passivity 
of matter. For Deleuze, life is not contained merely within the organic 
matter, but in the dynamism within matter itself – whether organic or 
inorganic. As Grosz formulates it, Darwin, Bergson and Deleuze each 
distinguish life “as a kind of contained dynamism, a dynamism within 
a porous boundary”.204  
 
THE INTENSIVE TIME OF INDIVIDUATION  
The Bergsonian answer to the question of the dynamism inherent in 
creation  and  life  is  the  concept  of  duration (durée). The concept of 
duration appears in different guises throughout Bergson’s writings, 
but  its  essence is  the idea of  reality  as  a  dynamic state,  a  mobile  and 
continuous flow. For instance, human consciousness manifests such 
continuity in the experience of different mental states. As Bergson 
states, experience does not consist of a passage from one mental state 
to  another,  as  if  the  states  were  static  and  change  was  result  of  the  
passage only. On the contrary, the passage of mental states denotes a 
changing process in itself: “there is no feeling, no idea, no volition 
which is not undergoing change every moment: if a mental state 
ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow”.205 Duration, then, 
emphasises a certain wholeness of change – process as mobility – and 
as  such  can  be  compared  and  contrasted  to  a  dialectical  view  of  
progress. As can be seen from Bergson’s example of mental states, his 
conception of mobility is not progression from identity to another via 
negation but rather interlinking flow. Mental states do not negate each 
other, even thought they differ.206  
                                               
204 Elizabeth Grosz, “Deleuze, Bergson and the Concept of Life”, Revue internationale de 
philosophie, vol. 61, no. 241 (2007), p. 288. 
205 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Random House, 
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206 Bergson’s insistence on the continuity of duration has been criticized by Gaston Bachelard 
in The Dialectic of Duration, trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000). 
In short. Bachelard claims that the Bergsonian duration lacks the dynamism of a dialectical 
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At the core of Bergson’s critique against dialectics is his unique 
notion of difference, which has been of great influence to Deleuze. 
Whereas the Hegelian movement of dialectics proceeds by negation, 
leading the progress of the world via contradiction to Aufhebung, 
Bergson sees difference as something other than negative. The 
consideration of difference not in terms of identity (X is different 
from Y, because…) but identity in terms of difference (X differs from 
itself and thus produces itself via this internal dynamic) is the task of 
modern philosophy. As Deleuze comments on Bergson: “If 
philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only 
insofar as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself, according to 
what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in 
its internal difference”.207 
As we have seen in several contexts during the present work, 
Deleuze posits the “authentic” internal difference, or difference in 
kind, against the “inauthentic” difference in degree that has 
dominated Western metaphysics since the classical period. This is 
necessary to bracket out the classical notion of substance that locates 
things “in” time, rather than approaches entities as becoming 
“through” time. As Deleuze states, “Bergson’s thesis could be 
summed  up  in  this  way:  real  time  is  alteration,  and  alteration  is  
substance. Difference of nature is therefore no longer between two 
things or rather two tendencies; difference of nature is itself a thing, a 
tendency opposed to some other tendency”.208 Here Deleuze equates 
difference of nature – difference of self with itself – and duration. The 
equation refers to the idea that an event is non-dividable, that is, the 
production of time is the fundamental question of philosophy. This means a 
commitment to the notion that everything real is not already 
determined by “possibility” (that is, a reserve waiting to be actualised 
at some moment in the linear progression of time), but rather that 
everything retains the “virtual” dimension of the “creative process of 
actualization”. In other words, events do not follow a deterministic 
plan; time in itself retains heterogeneity.209 
                                                                                                                                             
Bergson the task of the present is to assimilate the past into a smooth continuity and this, for 
Bachelard, denies the present its autonomy. See pp. 24–29.  
207 Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” in Desert Islands, p. 32. 
208 Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, p. 37. 
209 Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, p. 38. 
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In his own work, Deleuze comes to share Bergson’s focus on 
time. As a representative of the emerging poststructuralism from the 
1960s onwards, Deleuze is concerned with the development of a 
system of thought able to approach the question of difference in itself, 
or “authentic” difference, as mentioned above. Taken in the historical 
context, this type of approach seeks to address and criticise the main 
current of Western metaphysical thinking. By way of recapitulation, 
and to pose the matter in very general terms, the central concepts of 
such a metaphysical tradition include substance, essence, spirit, matter, 
et cetera – all of which imply the ideas of self-presence, identity and 
totality. These ideas form the solid ground, against which difference is 
contrasted and derived from. To think of difference itself requires the 
overturning of this configuration. For Deleuze, thought must strive to 
do justice to “pure” difference, if it is to escape the bounds of its 
stratification and enable true novelty and creation in the world. This is 
certainly a profoundly Bergsonian ambition and marks Bergson’s 
influence in Deleuze’s work.210  
In what follows, I will approach the question of creation in 
Bergson’s work, by introducing some of his most notable concepts 
(duration, intuition and multiplicity). I will outline some central 
conceptions of Bergson’s thinking through Deleuze’s reception of 
those ideas and his subsequent formulations, especially via an 
explication of Deleuze’s notion of the three syntheses of time which 
combine to produce a consciousness of time in the subject. 
Ultimately, to clarify the matter by means of a unified problematic, I 
shall present the “cinematic” question of time and the image: how are 
we able to approach the image as something fundamentally un-
representative? To think of images as representations is to situate 
one’s thinking inside the categories of identity and totality, where 
images would be derivative of the discrete “originals” and would thus 
belong to an inferior category ontologically.  
Cinematic images, as encompassing within them the questions 
of movement and time, provide Deleuze the model for approaching 
the flow of life itself. Cinema is able to present other durations, 
different than the one in which we find ourselves immersed. As an 
                                               
210 This ambition also links both Bergson and Deleuze to the tradition of process philosophy, 
which prioritises change ontologically, and does not treat it as accidental to the substance. 
Other modern process philosophers include Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Peirce, Gaston 
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example of this kind of cinematic presentation, I shall provide an 
analysis of Cristian Mungiu’s film 4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days (4 luni, 
3 saptamâni si 2 zile)  from  2007,  viewed  as  the  image  of  time  –  or  
rather, as intertwining images of different modes of time. This 
intertwining produces a representation that is able to address 
sensibility outside the “interested” point of view of our human 
“sensory-motor schema” and to present different durations of time: 
facets of the intensive, temporal difference itself. 
 
 
3.1 Duration and Multiplicity: The Time of Differentiation 
 
Deleuze shares Bergson’s basic conception of human consciousness: 
as  Kant  formulated  it,  we  do  experience  the  world  only  as  it  is  
synthesised in space and time. It follows that in our experience the 
dimensions of temporality and spatiality are amalgamated, as the one 
dimension cannot be approached without the other. But, as Bergson 
and, following him, Deleuze state, this is only one type of synthesis of 
the world, and supposing the existence of that type only will lead 
thought to a dead-end as thinking will end up reproducing the real on 
the basis of the empirical.211 We become the passive receptors of a 
pre-given, already-synthesised world that is incapable of “true” 
novelty and creation, since the world only has to offer the “possible”. 
This  is  the  world  under  the  “Judgment  of  God”,  a  world  that  is  
essentially a process of stratification where things or entities are 
necessarily compared to a transcendental order (God, Nature, 
Substance, or other totality).212 
If thought is to overcome its stratified state, it must seek its 
own boundaries and by doing so encounter its own conditions. Thus, 
Bergson and Deleuze extend the historicity of thought “backwards” in 
the history of philosophy to Kant and the transcendental conditions 
of experience. It is true that human thought is conditioned by Kantian 
                                               
211 Bergson discusses the intertwining of space and time in relation to Kant in Creative 
Evolution, pp. 223–225. 
212 I can here only refer to the Deleuzean problematic of Nature and matter as dynamic 
processes of stratification and de-stratification. This view he derives largely from Spinoza, via 
the concept of the affect and Spinoza’s radical monism. This, alongside the question of 
individuation, is discussed in chapter two of the present text. As for stratification as the 
“Judgment of God”, see A Thousand Plateaus, chapter three. 
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synthesis that produces our spatio-temporal experience – but what is 
at  question  here  is  human thinking and intellect. Thought traverses 
other possibilities for synthesis: inhuman spatialisations and 
temporalisations. This is what Deleuze means by the indefinite mode 
of life, a life.213  
Instead of approaching time as a spatialised dimension, a 
“timeline” constituted by similar moments one after another, we can 
“displace” time and try to approach it in its pure state. This means a 
mode of time that cannot be distributed spatially into distinct points. 
Bergson calls this “pure” state of time “duration”.  
 
TIME IN ITSELF:  THE BERGSONIAN DURATION  
The concept of duration lies at the core of Bergson’s philosophy and 
forms the cusp of his critique of both Kantian transcendental idealism 
as well as scientific thought. Science, for Bergson, cannot provide a 
fundamental account of time, since science confuses time with its 
spatialised manifestations. The viewpoint of science ignores time as 
the dimension of change, Bergson claims, since science cannot 
conceptualise the “smooth” movement of change within its model of 
points-in-time. In human consciousness, time takes the form of two 
fundamentally different kinds: the scientific, spatialised, 
“chronological” time of separated instants, but also the experienced 
time, which takes transitions between different states as its essence.214 
Bergson sees this latter notion of time as time in its pure state, 
“unmixed” with the dimension of spatiality. The experienced time of 
duration can thus be seen in comparison to Kant’s notion of aesthetic 
apprehension which takes place outside the legislation of concept. 
This type of time, in its mobility, eludes the conceptual, abstract 
scientific  thought.  When  one  attempts  to  measure  a  moment,  it  is  
gone. One measures, instead, an immobile, complete timeline, 
whereas time in itself is always mobile and incomplete. Since we are so 
used to think of time within the conceptual framework of science, the 
                                               
213 Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life” in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995, ed. 
David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2006), 
pp. 384–390. To put it very briefly, Deleuze attributes a life as the transcendental field, pre-
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individuated entities retain their connection to this transcendental field and thus possess a 
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214 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and Scott W. Palmer 
(Mineola: Dover, 2003), pp. 259–260. 
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nature of time as duration can be approached only by intuition. To 
help understand the case, Bergson offers the following image: a thread 
in two spools, one unrolling to represent the ageing of man and the 
diminishing length of his life span, the other spool rolling the thread 
to the form of a ball, representing the accumulation of memory.215 
The image of the two spools is misleading in the sense that it is 
necessarily a spatial representation – time as linear thread rolling 
between the spools – but it begins to illustrate the importance of 
memory to Bergson. For, indeed, consciousness equals memory to 
him. No two moments can be equal or alike, since even though they 
were otherwise completely similar, the latter moment includes the 
memory of the earlier one as well. Memory accumulates. Thus, 
consciousness cannot experience two similar moments, or else it 
would be totally fragmented and in a constant state of birth and 
death.216 The accumulation of memory makes consciousness 
essentially temporal, not spatial. This leads to the equation consciousness 
= memory = duration and makes Bergson a philosopher of time in the 
first place. His philosophy is really an extended attempt to detach the 
thinking of time from all forms of spatiality.  
If no two moments can be the same for consciousness, then 
the consciousness of time itself (without spatiality) must be 
heterogeneous in nature. For Bergson, the immediate data of 
consciousness forms a multiplicity and is temporal in its nature.217 In 
discussing the relation between time and space, Bergson makes the 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative multiplicities. 
Quantitative  multiplicity  would  be,  for  example,  a  flock  of  sheep:  a  
homogenous group (they are all alike), yet composed of distinctive 
individuals with spatial coordinates. The flock is therefore numeric, 
discontinuous and yet homogenous. The qualitative multiplicity, 
however, is temporal in nature: it does not form a set with definite 
spatial coordinates but unveils in linear (spatialised) time as a process. 
As an example, we can think of the shifting of emotions in ourselves: 
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emotions are not distinct, they do not negate each other and they 
cannot be juxtaposed, therefore the qualitative multiplicity is 
continuous and heterogeneous.218  
As Leonard Lawlor and Valentine Moulard suggest, the 
Bergsonian concept of multiplicity has to be seen as an attack on 
Kant, who, for Bergson, ends up producing a mixture of time and 
space in his philosophy, as touched upon above.219 The 
spatiotemporal amalgamation results in difficulties, especially when 
considering the possibility of freedom and free will, since Kant ends 
up positing the idea of free will transcendentally, outside the sphere of 
man. As Bergson states, freedom requires necessarily a dimension 
outside mechanistic causality: mobility, and he is committed to the 
notion of man’s freedom of action outside the material dimension 
bound by the laws of causality.220  
 
QUALITATIVE PROCESS:  THE INDIVISIBILITY OF MOVEMENT  
Two central concepts have emerged so far in Bergson’s elaborations: 
time and movement, and they both can be equated with duration. I 
have already followed Bergson’s argument about the indivisibility of 
time – divided time is spatialised – but a similar reasoning applies to 
movement as well. Granted, when one starts to think about 
movement, it is likely to be in terms of spatiality: an object moving in 
a certain space. But this conception of movement already involves a 
separation between the object and the “empty” space it moves across. 
Bergson’s aim is to show that this distinction does not capture the 
nature of movement, as it should be grasped from the perspective of 
the  moving  object.  Otherwise  we  end  up  not  with  movement,  but  
immobility as the object of our thinking. 
In Matter and Memory Bergson takes up the ancient Greek 
philosopher Zeno’s paradoxes of movement and its impossibility. In 
short, movement becomes impossible for Zeno because of 
movement’s infinite divisibility. If we want to get from point A to 
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point B, we first have to leave from A, passing through some “halfway 
point” towards B. Still, arriving at the halfway point requires itself 
another halfway point, and this arrival yet another halfway point, 
leading to infinite regression. As a result, we will never arrive at point 
B.221 
For Bergson, paradoxes like this mean that movement – as 
well as time – is often confused with spatiality in common sense. 
Duration, as movement and time, must be indivisible; otherwise we 
will not get to the temporal essence of it, but rather remain within the 
spatial framework. The example of Zeno’s paradox does not capture 
movement  as  such,  but  presents  a  series  of  still  images.  If  I  were  to  
move my hand across my desk, it would start from a halted position, 
move along the plane of the table and proceed to a halt again at the 
other side of the desk. Surely, I can see the trajectory my arm makes, 
as  it  arcs  across  the  desk.  Likewise,  I  can  plot  as  many  intermediary  
points within the trajectory as I wish, representing the different stages 
of  the  movement.  Yet  again,  these  points  and  stages  “freeze”  
movement in its temporality, states Bergson: “at a stage we halt¸ 
whereas at these points the moving body passes.  Now a  passage  is  a  
movement  and  a  halt  is  an  immobility.  The  halt  interrupts  the  
movement; the passage is one with the movement itself”.222 
 
THE METHOD OF INTUITION  
If  duration,  in its  temporality  and multiplicity,  is  out  of  reach of our 
common sense, how can we grasp it? If our everyday spatialised 
intelligence is guided by our needs and interests, how to achieve a 
sense of the world that is purely temporal?  Conceptual thinking 
essentially partakes in the spatial, as according to Kant, it cannot grasp 
movement as such. Hence, Bergson states, to achieve an “immediate 
contact” with an object, is to approach it in its temporal continuity. At 
the core is the idea that analytical (meaning “symbolic” for Bergson) 
representation can never give an account of a thing’s dimensional 
value. Bergson gives an example of walking through a city. The 
experience of that walk can only grasped by simple intuition, not by 
the most elaborate reconstruction of the walk via juxtaposed 
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photographs taken from every possible angle.223 What  Bergson  is  
looking for is something akin to Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment, 
which captures the process of construction of the object, as discussed 
in chapter one of this study. 
Intuition would thus be a method of getting back to things as 
they are, in themselves as duration. An illuminating example of 
duration can be found in Creative Evolution, where Bergson discusses 
the dissolving of a lump of sugar into a glass of water. If we want to 
mix  the  sugar  with  the  water,  we  must  wait  for  it  to  dissolve.  “This  
little fact is big with meaning”, comments Bergson, since in this 
situation we have the interlinking of several durations or several pre-
individual meters or series as they form the rhythm of the individual 
named “sugared water”. Surely, one can give a scientific account of 
sugar’s dissolving, even measure the time it takes for the crystals to 
mix into water, but it would not account for our waiting for this to 
happen.224  
The “mathematical” model of sugar’s dissolution would give 
equal value to each moment it abstracts in the process. However, for 
us, this would not be an any-moment-whatever, but a unique one, a 
perhaps frustrating and boring wait for the sugar’s dissolution. The 
moment also incorporates an encounter of different durations: our 
own, the sugar’s crystalline duration and the water’s fluid one. As for 
the dissolving of sugar: a stream or flow of phenomena has its own 
direction and rhythm. A sugar cube, when immersed in water, starts to 
liquefy and this process is irreversible. If the process is abstracted into 
points in time, the moments can be “re-visited” in their 
representations, and the process turned backwards. This is an 
impossibility, if we conceive time as duration. 
Analytical thought can proceed ad infinitum, piling up different 
viewpoints, dividing the analysed object and translating the divided 
fragments into symbols, but it never succeeds in grasping a thing in its 
uniqueness, in its duration. This is because the components of analysis 
are by necessity generalised, symbols or concepts. Their divisibility 
forms the core of the problem: first, concepts themselves represent 
isolated perspectives on the thing examined, and secondly, they form 
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a system of concepts, out of which one can choose the most 
appropriate. The analytical thinking has its origin in our practical, 
everyday needs. Human intellect, in its evolution, has developed the 
patterns most suited to its survival, and these include perception of 
the world in terms of necessity and utility. As such, this analytical 
intellect is practical, useful and even necessary for us to function in 
the everyday world, to succeed in planning things, and to create 
scientific models of the workings of the world. Still, for philosophy 
this cannot be the final word. In phenomenological terms, philosophy 
must move beyond the intentionality of perception. The method of 
intuition is then an attempt to achieve “absolute”, disinterested 
knowledge outside the habitual and interested human viewpoint. 
Deleuze highlights the notion of intuition in his reading of Bergson, 
as it functions as a way beyond the boundaries of human subjectivity. 
Kant teaches us a valuable lesson: the given world of our experience is 
the result of a transcendental synthesis, but this synthesis must not 
concern the conditions of real experience. In a word, the world could 
be different. Or, the world is difference. Therefore we must take a 
step further from Kant and intuit the genesis of the syntheses that 
constitute the given. This genesis Deleuze posits as the “pure” 
difference – or difference without identity – and he sees it as a 
fundamentally temporal term. Therefore he turns his attention to the 
habitual formation of subjectivity as a series of temporal syntheses, 
and in the next section I shall describe his contemplations on the 
matter.  
 
 
3.2 The Three Syntheses of Time 
 
Deleuze considers the common sense notions of time in the actual 
experience of a human subject in Difference and Repetition. In a way that 
is influenced by Bergson’s conception of time, as well as Hume’s 
concept of habit, Deleuze distinguishes the three transcendental 
conditions – three syntheses of time – that combine in the 
consciousness of the “passage” of time. Our experience of the passing 
of  time  is  thus  constituted  by  a  series  of  syntheses,  making  up  the  
phenomenal time. The three syntheses of time are passive as they 
concern the formation of subjectivity in its passive receptivity. In this 
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way the passive synthesis of subjectivity is, like Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Kant’s aesthetic sensation, determined by the bodily 
dimension of spatio-temporal complexes rather than by the 
conceptual order imposed by a transcendent subject. In fact, Deleuze 
goes beyond the psychic life in developing his notion of passive 
synthesis, as he maintains that this originary synthesis concerns bio-
physical life in general. Life, in the barest terms, is the contraction of 
excitation on material surface. Life contemplates: not in a psychological 
sense, but as “a sensitive plate”, retaining and joining singular instants 
to form a continuum that appears to the consciousness as “living 
present”, the flow of time.225 
Everything is contemplation. Deleuze asks: “What organism is 
not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and 
contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby 
intertwining all the habits of which it is composed?” The element of 
contemplation Deleuze nominates as “soul”. Or rather, in the plural 
terms “souls”, as the individual is composed of smaller-scale 
individuals. “Underneath the self which acts are little selves which 
contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active 
subject.  We  speak  of  our  ‘self’  only  in  virtue  of  these  thousands  of  
little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party 
who says ‘me’.” And these souls are not consciousness as “[t]hese 
contemplative souls must be assigned even to the rat in the labyrinth 
and to each muscle of the rat”.226 
Originary synthesis, as a process of excitation and its 
contemplation in contraction is essentially temporal, pre-individual 
and pre-conscious. As Deleuze states, the synthesis of time in the 
subject is necessarily passive since it is not “carried out by the mind, 
but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and 
all reflection”.227 As  parts  in  the  habitual  formation  of  subject,  each  
synthesis exhibits a certain form of repetition serving as the 
foundation, ground and ungrounding of time, respectively.  
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THE FIRST SYNTHESIS OF PRESENT AND HABIT  
The first synthesis of time “expresses the foundation of time upon the 
basis of living present”.228 This is a synthesis of the habit, a repetition 
of present moments into linearity. Given three discrete moments (A, 
B,  C),  we  contract  them  into  a  continuity  by  dividing  them  as  
belonging to a series running from past to future via the present 
moment. This synthesis, acting according to Hume’s concept of 
association, provides the relation between one moment and another. 
The present, as such, would be meaningless without relation to other 
moments. The present moment lives in the recall, or retention, of the 
past and anticipation, or projection, of the future. The first synthesis, 
as the foundation for the empirical consciousness of time, can be 
schematised as in the following figure: 
 
This synthesis is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the 
present moment in the first place. Without it there would be no one 
to contemplate or gather together the multiplicity of singular 
excitations. Deleuze states: “Habit [the first synthesis] is the originary 
synthesis of time, which constitutes the life of the passing present”.229 
Yet, what is characteristic of the present is that it passes. Here appears 
a paradox, since what passes must have something to pass through. 
The first synthesis does not provide us with this dynamic; it is only a 
static  line  of  time.  As  the  present  constitutes  time,  how  can  it  pass  
within the constituted time? There must be a transcendental ground 
for the empirical foundation of present, passing time. Deleuze 
continues: “there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can 
occur”.230 The present moment in itself does not explain the notion of 
its passing. First there is moment A. Then comes moment B. Does 
this second moment come into presence out of nowhere to “push” 
the previous moment into the past? There must be something more 
than mere present within the present, for otherwise the appearance 
and disappearance of present moments would be unexplainable. Time 
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passes and for this passing it needs a “wider” temporal dimension. 
What would this transcendental ground be, “against” which the 
present moment would gain the momentum of passing? Deleuze’s 
answer is derived from Bergson: memory.  
 
THE SECOND SYNTHESIS OF PAST AND MEMORY 
The second synthesis of time, memory, is that of the virtual past. The 
present moment contains both the passing present as well as a ground 
that is transcendental to it. The temporal dimension of the past, in the 
way Bergson fathomed it as duration, lingers in every moment, yet it is 
qualitatively different from the present. Duration presents us the 
internal difference, the difference in kind: “Duration is that which differs 
from itself”.231 The virtual past is not a depository of present moments 
in the sense that it would be merely a passive receptacle. Misleadingly, 
the notion of passive accumulation of time in the form of memory is 
easily invoked by Bergson’s example of time as a thread running 
between two spools. Yet, as a qualitatively different mode of time, the 
virtual past cannot have been present as a present moment, even 
though it is the condition for the present.  
This notion is difficult to understand, since, when leaving the 
first synthesis behind, we also forsake the empirical understanding of 
time.  Here  memory,  or  the  virtual  past,  must  be  understood  as  
Bergson’s duration, as a “pure, a priori past, the past in general”.232 
This virtual past functions as the “double” of each actual present 
moment. It is a double since it exceeds the recollection and prediction 
of the first synthesis, which happens in accordance to the interests 
and needs of an empirical subject. Therefore, past is not a “dimension 
of time, [it] is the synthesis of all time of which the present and the 
future are only dimensions”.233 In a way, the pure past provides 
“spatiality” to time, in terms of which it is possible to represent past 
present moments. Virtual past is the transcendental condition of 
empirical time. As the actual present moment is the contraction of the 
virtual past’s transcendental field, the infinite layers of pure past are, 
from the point of view of consciousness, understood as memory. To 
use, once again, the Leibnizian notion of clear and distinct zones of 
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perception, we can fathom the pure past as the indistinct totality of 
time, out of which the intentionality and interests of consciousness 
represent moments as memories. 
The virtual past is, then, not an extensive accumulation of 
singular moments, a collection of “that which has happened”, but 
rather an intensive dimension of time, as discussed earlier regarding 
Bergson’s conception of duration. Therefore, the virtual past does not 
consist  of  an  extended  set  of  discrete  past  moments.  It  is  the  
preservation of the past in and for itself. As our consciousness is 
geared towards the interests of adaptation to our environment, 
recollections are also born out of the needs of utility and practicality. 
Actual  memory  is  always  a  representation:  it  is  formed  from  some  
perspective, a clear and distinct zone. The virtual memory is the past 
as it is – our relation to it cannot be anything but disinterested,  in  the  
Kantian aesthetic sense, as well as regarding Bergson’s conception of 
intuition as an anti-analytical stance. 
Thus,  in  order  to  understand  the  virtual  nature  of  time,  the  
Bergsonian method of intuition is needed. In the actualised world, 
identities are formed according to an opposition between different 
elements. X is not Y, not Z … et cetera. Therefore the relation of 
difference between things is something that is only secondary to 
identity. As can be recalled from Bergson’s discussion of intuition as 
activity trying to grasp a qualitative multiplicity, the intensive 
difference is not an accidental, but a primary and generative relation. 
The virtual past is of the intensive type. Certainly, Bergson proposes 
that there is a “storehouse” memory, out of which we can recall 
successive instants as if looking into the past. But alongside this 
memory  is  the  pure  memory  of  the  virtual  past.234 The  first  kind  of  
memory is comprised of extensions of the present, as they refer to 
their moment of being present. In a way, the storehouse memory 
attests  to  our  finitude,  as  it  expresses  –  bio-physically  as  well  as  
psychically – the limits of our powers to contract singular instances 
into our being. The virtual past does not know this limit. It is the past 
as such, the unlimited identity expressed in the roar of Leibniz’s sea, 
out of which we acquire representations as distinct perceptions. The 
virtual past can be envisioned as the whole of the past “pushing” itself 
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into the present by offering present perceptions additional context 
and depth. 
 
THE THIRD SYNTHESIS OF FUTURE AND THOUGHT 
Up until now we have gathered from Deleuze two temporal 
dimensions; those of the passing present and the pure past. Still, our 
relation to pure past necessitates further questioning. If the pure past 
is the co-existence of all pasts, how to make a distinction within this 
virtual  past?  In the present,  a  version of  the past  is  selected,  from the 
point  of  view  of  the  actual  moment.  The  pure  past,  in  turn,  is  
independent of such active selection. What is the nature of the 
relation between these two temporal dimensions? Deleuze offers an 
example: consider two events, one infantile, one adult, in the life of a 
person. What is the nature of their relation? It is clear through 
psychology and psychoanalysis that childhood events can have an 
influence on later adult life. Yet, this influence is not mechanistic or 
continuous but takes place when triggered and bestows its effect as 
from a distance. The past does not influence the present in a 
continuous manner: there must be chance, the dimension of future, to 
initiate the influence of past events on the present.235 
Deleuze’s account of the three syntheses retains a decidedly 
Kantian structure, and one can fathom the passive temporal syntheses 
– present, past and future – as corresponding respectively to Kant’s 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition.236 In chapter one I 
followed Deleuze’s reading of the Kantian synthesis as it ends up in 
the  catastrophe  of  the  sublime.  Here  the  same  is  stated  in  terms  of  
temporality. In the beginning there is the discontinuity of singular 
instants. Then, in the first synthesis of habit, the present moment is 
constructed as retention and projection order the singular excitations 
into series to form a passage of time. The second synthesis of memory 
introduces the transcendental field of pure past as the condition of the 
present moment. It is an impersonal past, time in itself, out of which 
memories are actualised and “personalised” from the perspective of 
the present. Past, in itself, does not yield any answers or direction to 
things. Without a third dimension of the future nothing would be 
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determinable. This is why Deleuze nominates the third synthesis of 
the future as “thought”237:  it  is  the  determination  of  objects  of  
thought out of the singularity of the personal present and 
impersonality of the pure past.  
Thought as determination is the opposite of a Platonic 
conception of thinking as “reminiscence”, unearthing already existing 
relations within being. The world is a multiplicity of relations external 
to their terms and this is why the pure past is qualitative and intensive 
– that is, virtual. There is nothing necessary in representations pushing 
up to the surface of our consciousness. Rather, thought experiments 
with combinations of different elements as it actualises those 
representations. Difference appears as difference in nature – the 
internal difference – only outside the empirical, in the virtuality of the 
pure past, and it is the object of the futurity of thought to intuit this 
difference. Yet, one must not conceive thought as an exercise of free 
will. As Deleuze states, the “present exists, but the past alone insists” 
and thus propels thought to an encounter with the virtual past.238 
Thinking as the act of philosophy is, then, experimental and 
not analytical. Thought strives to think difference as difference, to 
remain faithful to the multiplicity of the real outside the conditions of 
possible experience. Bergson considers that Kant’s project of critical 
philosophy ends up stuck within the analytical approach: “if 
metaphysics is only a construction, there are several systems of 
metaphysic equally plausible, which consequently refute each other, 
and the last word must remain with a critical philosophy, which holds 
all knowledge to be relative and the ultimate nature of things to be 
inaccessible to the mind”. For Bergson, this is not enough, for this 
means that philosophy remains within the framework of human needs 
and utility and thus comes to stand for “an intellect enslaved to 
certain necessities of bodily life, and concerned with a matter which 
man has had to disorganize for the satisfaction of his wants”.239 This 
clearly echoes the Deleuzean critique of Kant’s philosophy as 
succumbing to a pre-established image of thought. 
As Deleuze summarises in Bergsonism, the notion of intuition 
denotes an immediate knowledge, but it must be capable of forming a 
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method, if it is to act as a guiding principle for metaphysics. The crux 
of the matter lies in the freedom to state problems: it is erroneous to 
restrict  the  categories  of  the  true  and  the  false  to  solutions  only.  A  
speculative problem is solved as soon as it is stated, since it “contains” 
the possible solutions in itself. A “true” problem is characterised by its 
persistence. As we saw in discussion on Deleuze’s notion of problems 
in chapter one, problems have more to do with learning than with 
knowing.240 
In short, the ability and freedom to pose problems testify to 
the fact that we can reach out beyond the given and thus approach the 
conditions of the given. We must consider each entity as a symptom of 
its conditions. Deleuze summarises thus: “We will never find the 
sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical 
phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the 
thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in 
it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a 
sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force”.241  
Thought is able to determine a particular group of symptoms 
by way of constructing a distinctive assemblage out of the unlimited 
senses of objects. This bears a striking resemblance to the artistic 
process: thought is understood as composition. Deleuze has famously 
stated that philosophical enquiry should resemble a detective novel or 
a work of science fiction, not in imitation of the form, but in sharing a 
similar  drive  to  approach  a  given  situation  as  a  set  of  leads  and  to  
construct a world out of them.242 As Deleuze has drawn parallels 
between philosophical thought and other types of creative thinking, 
we can approach, for example, filmmakers as participating in the 
creation of new possibilities of experience, constructing an assemblage 
out of assorted parts (frames, shots, sounds and cuts). In the 
following section I shall briefly sketch Deleuze’s ideas about cinema, 
and consider how that medium can contribute to the “thinking 
outside our boundaries”, a project that philosophy and the arts share. 
Moreover, Deleuze’s notion of cinema connects many issues that 
were raised in his reading of Bergson, especially concerning the form 
of time.  
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3.3 Cinema: Time and Movement 
 
Time and movement, the ultimate Bergsonian concepts, would also 
seem to be the ultimate concepts of cinema. Bergson, however, 
criticised the new cinematic art form of his time and maintained that 
cinema failed to present movement as such, and instead resorted to 
presenting an immobile series of images.243 That  goes  to  say  that  
cinema, ultimately, betrays the dimension of time in favour of 
spatiality as it does not capture the inner quality of moment as such. 
Bergson’s doubts about cinema probably stem from the relative 
novelty of the medium in late 19th and  early  20th Century. In 1878 
photographer Eadweard Muybridge famously managed to capture the 
trot of a horse with 24 cameras, providing a paradigm for technology’s 
ability to dissect fluid motion and isolate it into fragments. 
Muybridge’s series of photographs capturing the sequentiality of 
movement would aptly serve to illustrate Bergson’s idea of the 
representation of motion that actually produces only immobility. This 
series of “motion pictures” results in cutting the gait of the animal 
into objective still points. This cutting-up of movement is also 
presented against a measuring grid that represents the space that the 
horse-object moves across. Bergson even names this “false” 
conception of movement as “the cinematographic illusion”.244 
Yet,  out  of  all  Deleuze’s  writings  not  devoted  to  a  single  
philosopher, Bergson features most prominently in Deleuze’s two 
volumes on cinema. As Deleuze notes, despite Bergson’s criticisms of 
the medium, his ideas about time and movement encompass the 
essential features of cinema. Granted, Bergson seems to be correct in 
stating, that the cinematic image presents an illusion of movement – 
“the oldest illusion” – as it is a photogramme, consisting of numerous 
immobile sections. But, Deleuze argues, cinema gives us precisely a 
moving image,  not  an  image  that  has  movement  added  to  it.  In  a  
cinematic image movement belongs “to the intermediate image as 
immediate given”.245 
Thus, in order to think of cinema as such – its very “nature” – 
we must return to Bergson: “nothing can prevent an encounter 
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between movement-image … and the cinematographic image”.246 In 
hindsight, we can see that Bergson’s philosophical ideas were shaped 
by the same cultural, economic and technological climate that gave 
rise to early forms of cinema. Hence, maybe, the distrust: for Bergson, 
cinema  was  perhaps  too  much  “of  its  time”  and  he  did  not  see  the  
potential inherent in this emerging medium. Obviously, cinematic 
presentation was still in its infancy at the time of the publication of 
Creative Evolution in 1907. 
Deleuze’s aim in his two volumes of Cinema is to trace out the 
development of the form, but also to approach cinema as a type of 
thinking. Not the conceptual, linguistic type, but the one that 
experiments with matter and motion and through juxtaposition of 
various elements tries to give a presentation to various durations. In 
general, Deleuze posits a fundamental shift between classical cinema 
up until World War II, and post-war cinema. The two volumes devote 
themselves to these two periods, and their titles – Cinema  1:  The  
Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image – indicate the central 
concepts Deleuze finds specific to the earlier and later periods. The 
former type of cinema, characterised by moving-images, is epitomised 
by the classical Hollywood-era genre film and has its essence in 
movement and action. The later type, presenting the time-image, is 
portrayed by European post-war art film, where the narrative 
sequence of images is often disjointed and cut off from the sensory-
motor schema that our common sense expects. 
 
THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE AND TIME-IMAGE 
Even though Deleuze’s Cinema books proceed by a detailed taxonomy 
of various images as cinematic elements (the movement- and time-
image, plus their various subtypes), I shall confine myself here to a 
short elaboration of the two main types of images. As mentioned, the 
movement-image is a defining feature of the classical cinema for 
Deleuze: “The cinema of action depicts sensory-motor situations: 
there are characters, in a certain situation, who act, perhaps very 
violently, according to how they perceive the situation. Actions are 
linked to perceptions and perceptions develop into actions”.247 The 
“sensory-motor schema” denotes a view of the world that is oriented 
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towards the survival and well-being of the subject. Within it things 
appear in terms of the good sense and common sense, actions have 
objectives and effects have causes. 
The movement-image presents a situation, in which the 
characters,  as  well  as  the  viewers,  inhabit  a  narrative  –  and  logical  –  
world. The characters can interact with the world, events in it “fall 
into place”, the movement-image is a form of spatialised cinema: time 
determined and measured by movement. This does not exclude 
montage, for the impressions of movement and action are enhanced, 
rather than diminished, by the techniques of cutting and juxtaposing 
the shots. It is relevant that in the movement-image past, present and 
future can be distinguished from each other. The viewer is kept aware 
whether a scene refers to something that has happened in the past or 
alludes to something that is going to happen in the future.  
The time-image, on the other hand, presents the past, future 
and present as indistinguishable and the sensory-motor schema as 
collapsed. Deleuze locates this tendency of the modern cinema in the 
conditions of the post-war period which presents: “Situations which 
we no longer know how to react to, in spaces which we no longer 
know how to describe”.248 Rather than telling a story, the time-image 
presents disoriented, discordant movements that form other patterns 
than narrative structures. The time-image oscillates between the past 
and the future – it is sense in its formation, inhabiting the temporality 
of Aion as it tears a bifurcating split into the present time of Chronos, 
as was discussed in chapter two. The time-image refracts time like a 
crystal and presents time’s two directions out of the present which 
Deleuze describes: “One of which is launched towards the future 
while the other falls into the past”.249 Time-image “disturbs” the 
memory – the actual memory of chronological recollections – by 
presenting something that exceeds our sensory-motor schemas and 
reveals the co-existence of all pure past. This is achieved, for example, 
by “irrational” cuts between images, stating the exteriority of relations 
between them. Movement image cuts between images to present the 
continuity of motion – at its barest it functions like the Muybridge 
photographs. Time-image presents the disruption of this schema and, 
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accordingly, brings to the fore the very structure of perception on 
which cinema is founded. Cinematic images are able to present us an 
acentred view of the world. In short, they remind us of the 
catastrophe of the sublime waiting at the end of the Kantian synthesis 
of faculties. According to Deleuze, cinema has devised methods to 
address  its  ultimate  subject  matter:  time.  By  images  that  may  be  
categorised as belonging to sub-sets of time-images, cinematic 
presentation has achieved glimpses of time as difference. 
 
IMAGE,  BRAIN AND PROCESS  
Deleuze begins the discussion of movement-images with a 
commentary on Bergson. He situates Bergson in a time, when the 
“historical crisis of psychology coincided with the moment at which it 
was no longer possible to hold a certain position. This position 
involved placing images in consciousness and movements in space”.250 
Thus, images were isolated into a matter of consciousness, they were 
qualitative and without extension. Movement, on the contrary, would 
be spatial: extended and quantitative. Deleuze sees Bergson’s 
philosophy as an attempt to join the two disparate dimensions, so that 
things may pass from one order to the other. Otherwise we would end 
up with the dead ends of pure idealism or pure materialism. 
The  birth  of  cinema  takes  place  in  a  similar  cultural  and  
scientific environment and Deleuze notes the “factors which placed 
more and more movement into conscious life, and more and more 
images into the material world”.251 Cinema  would  thus  produce  its  
own evidence of this as the movement-image. While philosophy still 
had to deal with the anchored and centred position of the subject, 
cinema had the advantage of lacking a “natural” centre. Montage 
presents us with the possibility of a variety of divergent “views”. 
Deleuze speculates: “Instead of going from the acentred state of 
things to centred perception, [cinema] could go back up towards the 
acentred state of things and get closer to it”.252 To phrase it otherwise, 
cinema could be able to present a multiplicity. For Deleuze cinema 
does not produce a spatialised image of time, but presents the 
interconnectedness of time and space. The cinematic image is 
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movement: it is not a question of illusion – the Bergsonian 
“cinematic” illusion of 24 frames per second – but movement as such. 
A similar presentation is achieved in the time-image, as it shows 
temporality without reducing it to spatiality. Representation based on 
identity thus falters. 
This denotes a transition from the human condition to an 
inhuman perspective and this is what Deleuze means when he states: 
“the brain is the screen”.253 The brain, as the rest of human existence 
for Deleuze, is a process; it is made up of the encounters that it takes 
up and which it organises through the body’s active and passive 
powers. As such, thought extends out into the world and we ourselves 
are shaped by our experiences. This notion defuses the union between 
thinking and human consciousness. Thought exceeds the boundaries 
of the thinker. 
Alongside philosophy, Deleuze sees the history of arts, as well 
as the history of science, as alternative fields of development of 
thought. Philosophy, arts and sciences experiment with reality and 
create new reality themselves. Thus, for Deleuze, the history of 
cinema is not localisable somewhere within human history, as a simple 
part of the whole that transcends its parts. Rather, the “event” of 
cinema – as well as the events of baroque painting or atonal music, for 
example – transform “man” in kind, not in degree. There is a genuine 
change, something new created in the world. This links the practice of 
art with thinking. Both are able to reach out beyond the human 
condition – the conditions of possible experience – to present a 
qualitative change. In the case of cinema, artistic thought presents us 
with the time-image: a non-spatialised image of time through the 
cinematic apparatus. Even though Deleuze often characterises the 
time-image  in  terms  of  techniques  of  montage  or  cut  of  the  film,  I  
propose that the time-image can reside in a variety of cinematographic 
presentations. In what follows, I conclude this chapter with an 
example of the interplay between movement- and time-images in 
modern cinema. 
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DURATIONS :  4 MONTHS,  3 WEEKS AND 2 DAYS 
Otilia and G?bi??, the central characters of Christian Mungiu’s film 4 
Months,  3  Weeks  and  2  Days,  share  a  room in  a  student  dormitory  in  
Bucharest during the final years of Communism in Romania. G?bi?? is 
pregnant and needs an abortion, which is illegal. Distracted and 
inexperienced, she seems to have postponed the abortion until very 
late,  and  needs  the  more  steady  and  practical  Otilia  to  help  in  
managing to arrange the operation. As they have to resort to a 
clandestine non-professional “physician” to perform the abortion, 
arrangements have to be made in secrecy. Everywhere they encounter 
obstacles, from getting a hotel room to paying the abortionist and 
meeting his ever-growing demands. 
Finally, they manage to get a room, and after having 
succumbed to the requirements – money and sex – of the abortionist, 
he performs the operation. Injecting a probe, he leaves G?bi?? to wait 
for the foetus to come out. He tells her that it might take some time, 
and she has to lie still during the waiting. Otilia has to leave her friend, 
since she feels obliged to go to a party at her boyfriend’s parents. She 
leaves the hotel and goes to the boyfriend’s home, only to get stuck at 
the dinner table among middle-aged strangers. She is visibly anxious 
to get back to the hotel, and tries to call G?bi?? a few times, with no 
answer. Finally she manages to leave and rushes back to her friend. 
We find that the probe has worked and G?bi?? has had the abortion, 
the foetus lying dead on the bathroom floor. Now they have to 
dispose of the already relatively developed foetus, and since G?bi?? 
feels  very  weak,  understandably,  Otilia  does  what  she  has  to  do  and 
runs out to hide the small body. In desperation, she finally drops the 
foetus into a dumpster. Returning back to hotel, she finds to her 
horror that G?bi?? is not in the room. She fears the worst, until it 
turns out that G?bi?? has managed to go downstairs to the hotel 
restaurant and is having a dinner. The two friends sit by the table, in 
silence, and the movie ends. 
It is clear to see that the film deals with time as its subject 
matter. Everything in the narrative happens during one day. The title 
4  Months,  3  Weeks  and  2  Days  refers  to  the  time  G?bi?? has  been  
pregnant – a very long time in terms of abortion. Then there is further 
delay: the abortionist tells her to wait for the probe to take effect, 
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which should take a maximum of two days and this results in 
difficulties securing the privacy of her hotel room. 
All in all, the narrative unfolds in a fashion that represents a 
very “realistic” flow of time. The scenes are long, with very little 
editing between the shots and as such the film builds upon 
movement-images in its construction. However, the viewer is 
constantly presented by the “thickness” of time in the form of delays, 
hindrances, obstacles: the hotel room is difficult to secure; Otilia has 
to switch the hotel once as she cannot get the room that was originally 
booked; the Communist-era bureaucracy requires constant showing of 
identity cards and filling of forms; the abortionist has to be persuaded 
to perform the operation, since the pregnancy is already so far along, 
and Otilia has to go to meet her boyfriend’s parents and gets mired in 
the tedious dinner table conversation. 
Thus, the whole film seems to unfold in a state of suspension, 
a state of suspended mobility. This gives rise to a feeling of tension in 
the viewer, which reaches its peak at the moment when a true time-
image  is  at  last  presented  in  the  film.  As  Otilia  returns  from  the  
boyfriend’s parents’ place, she rushes back to the hotel, unaware of 
??bi??’s fate, as she has not answered the phone. Fearing the worst, 
she has to negotiate her way into the room – again encountering 
reluctant officials trying to hinder her access – and finally gets to see 
what has happened: the abortion has occurred and the dead foetus is 
on the bathroom floor. Here the camera pans down to focus on the 
foetus, for a shot that feels unbearably long. This breaks the 
narrative’s sensory-motor schema: the viewer feels the need to turn 
the gaze from the sight of death – embodying the four months, three 
weeks and two days’ life span of the child – but the camera does not 
turn  away  and  forces  us  to  watch.  We  get  a  sense  of  the  finality  of  
??bi??’s choice, the event of death, the durations of the characters; 
??bi??’s naïve passivity (time just flows by her), Otilia’s anxiety (she 
has to force her way through the “thickness” of time), and the dead 
child’s stillness, death’s stoppage of time. This image ties the elements 
of the film together: this  is  where  we  ended  up… It presents the 
particularity of the situation, as in question is not the abstract concept 
of the sensory-motor situation (“any death whatsoever”), but rather 
the  singularity  of  the  life  that  has  ended.  We  sense  the  virtual  
dimension of the individuation that has ceased: what could have 
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become of this child, what might be the effect of this on Otilia and 
??bi??’s life, what could have been had the child not been 
conceived…  
As such, the image of the aborted child on the bathroom floor 
illustrates the ability of certain images to contain heterogeneity, to 
force us to think or, to be more precise, to expose us to the force of 
thought which exists outside our boundaries. Earlier on in his work 
Deleuze has nominated such images as simulacra. In the next section I 
shall present Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum as a concept that 
possesses critical power over representational thinking, the tradition 
of thought which prioritises identity and thus produces a weakened 
understanding of difference in itself. Representational thinking 
suppresses the dimension of time, as it fathoms entities as situated 
“in” time and change as movement between points in time. In order 
to think the “authentic” difference, the identity of things must be 
understood as becoming “through” time and expressing the internal 
differential dynamic that is at the base of their becoming. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, this dynamic is mediated through a 
synthetic process that produces constant heterogeneous variations on 
the individual. Representational thinking does not fathom this 
dynamism and regards the instances of such heterogeneity as a threat 
of unlimited identity, bound to derail the good and common sense 
into a dimension of madness. This threat of the simulacrum, as 
originated by Plato, is the question addressed next. 
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4. “Powers of the False”: Images, Copies and Simulacra 
 
Consider a television show about the producers of a television show. 
Or an actor elected as a president. Or the said president’s co-optation 
of a movie character as a symbol of foreign policy and military might. 
Are we not witnessing a displaced presence? Or the complete erasure 
of any presence whatsoever?  
As a quintessential concept in the theories of postmodernity, 
the word “simulacrum” has frequently been deployed to account for 
the disappearance of reality and the rampant scattering of groundless 
images of which our contemporary world is supposed to increasingly 
consist. Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “simulacrum” as 
follows:  
 
Simulacrum: a) a material image, made as a representation of some 
deity, person, or thing; b) something having merely the form or 
appearance of a certain thing, without possessing its substance or 
proper qualities; c) a mere image, a specious imitation or likeness of 
something.  
 
And the corresponding OED definition of the term “simulation” is:  
 
Simulation: a) the action of practice of simulating, with an intent to 
deceive; b) a false assumption or display, a surface resemblance or 
imitation of something; c) the technique of imitating the behavior of 
some situation or process ... by means of a suitably analogous 
situation or apparatus.  
 
The French sociologist and philosopher Jean Baudrillard is perhaps 
the most well known user of the term, and he defines the simulacrum 
as an image that “bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own 
pure simulacrum”.254 The simulacrum should, according to 
Baudrillard, be understood as an image without a foundation or a 
referent. Furthermore, such an image cannot be distinguished from 
images retaining a relationship to some origin and it effects a collapse 
of the dichotomy between an original and a copy. 
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In his social theory from the end of the 1960s onwards, 
Baudrillard postulates a rupture between the modern society, based on 
political economy of the production and consumption of 
commodities, and the postmodern world in which groundless 
simulacra, as signs or images, comprise the objects of circulation in 
society. Whereas the modern form of the social is definable in Marx’s 
terms of capital, the bourgeoisie and the workers’ struggle against 
exploitation, the postmodern era is characterised by the end of 
production as a social organising force. This means that the 
established forms of social theory have come to an end. Baudrillard 
states: “The end of labor. The end of production. The end of political 
economy. The end of … the exchange value/use value dialectic”.255  
The end of production here comes to mean the beginning of 
reproduction. Labour, in the modern era, meant the production of 
goods, services or such, all of which added to the accumulation of 
capital, and provided the “reality” of social theories. In the 
postmodern world, we are in the midst of simulation instead of 
production. Labour has become a sign: a sign of one’s position in the 
workplace, a sign of one’s social position, a sign of one’s personality 
and lifestyle choices. The reproduction of these signs in the society 
becomes the primary mode of organisation. To be sure, the “basic” 
reality of material production has not disappeared – it has just been 
outsourced, symbolically or concretely, into the “lower” regions of the 
social organisation, into countries with low labour costs, and to 
immigrant workers. Yet, the prime objective of the postmodern 
formation is the circulation of signs: information technologies, media, 
communication networks and the “knowledge industry”.  
There is a decidedly ambiguous tone in Baudrillard’s rhetoric 
about the era of simulacra and simulation, at once melancholic and 
gleeful as regards the closure of the modern society. We have forsaken 
the Real of our established social order, the reality of production, and 
entered the hall-of-mirrors of recursive and circulating images without 
ground. This shift to the simulacra means the death of previous social 
theories, for the postmodern configurations of the social cannot be 
conceptualised and critiqued with, for example, the Marxian apparatus 
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so suitable for analysing the modern industrialised world of capital, 
labour and its exploitation. 
In this chapter I wish to elaborate on the concept of the 
simulacrum in correspondence with what has been discussed in the 
previous part of this study; namely, the possibility of formulating a 
non-representative model of individuation and identity in 
philosophical thought. In contrast and comparison to Baudrillard’s 
elaboration of the simulacrum, I shall explicate how Gilles Deleuze 
uses the concept as well, in Difference and Repetition and in one of the 
appendices of The Logic of Sense, “Simulacra and Ancient 
Philosophy”.256 There is one decisive difference between Deleuze and 
Baudrillard: Deleuze does not apply the simulacrum as a concept for 
historical analysis of social forms, as Baudrillard presents his theory of 
the notion. Rather, Deleuze’s simulacrum functions as a problematic 
concept eroding the foundations of philosophy of representation 
since Plato. For him, the simulacrum is a “bad copy”, a deceptive 
imitation so removed from the phenomenon it imitates that it does 
not count as an image or representation anymore. As such, simulacra 
denote the pure production of difference-in-itself and disrupt the 
schema of appearances and essences. The proliferation of simulacra is 
not a socio-historical observation for Deleuze, but rather something 
that is present at the core of Western philosophy right from the very 
beginning: the threat presented by the diverse and the multiple to 
thought based on similitude and unity. Therefore, simulation – the 
production of simulacra – is not primarily the concern of “our” times, 
but is to be celebrated wherever and whenever these deceptions show 
up.  
 
THE INVERTING CRITIQUE 
Deleuze finds a connection between Plato and Kant in that for both 
of them the “inverse” of their systems of thought lies within their 
own writings. As we have seen, Deleuze establishes Kant as a thinker 
of apparitions instead of appearances, and parallel to this, in the 
concept of the simulacrum he finds the tools for the “overturning” of 
Platonic representationalism in the works of Plato himself. In contrast 
to Baudrillard’s conception of the simulacra as the end of production, 
Deleuze sees simulation as the production of production. As has 
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become evident, for Deleuze Kant’s theory of the faculties opens up a 
transcendental field that is novel in the history of philosophy. For the 
first time the problem of subjectivity becomes synthetic. Kant seeks 
to answer the following question: what are the conditions of there 
being phenomena? And further, of what nature is the operation of the 
subject experiencing these phenomena? However, Kant’s concern is, 
in the final analysis, legislative, as he seeks to provide the grounds for 
distinguishing illegitimate uses of reason from legitimate ones.  
Deleuze sees a fundamental flaw in this jurisdiction of the 
faculties. It traces the transcendental from the empirical and produces 
a vicious circle. The Kantian subject is supposed to be an active one, 
providing the conditions of all possible experience from within its 
own synthetic processes. Yet, these processes are modelled after the 
already given observations of our psychological consciousness. Kant’s 
transcendental subject retains the form of an empirical person. This 
means that the transcendental is in fact conditioned by the empirical, 
even though the Kantian analysis constructs its goal as being the other 
way around, with the transcendental conditioning the empirical. 
If the transcendental conditions of experience are modelled on 
the basis of the empirical, we end up at an impasse. The legislation of 
reason can only recognise and represent what we already know, 
distributing sameness to account for the diversity and singularity of 
the experiential world. Thus, the notion of genuine creation becomes 
problematic. Therefore Deleuze takes up the considerations on 
aesthetic experience in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. There he finds that 
Kant opens up a possibility of pushing the harmonious co-operation 
of the faculties to their limits – into an “unregulated excercise of all 
faculties” – as the subject is faced with aesthetic phenomena that do 
not subsume themselves to pre-given conceptual categories.257 For 
Kant the aesthetic phenomena appear as “problems” to thought, 
requiring the adjustment of the limits of conceptual understanding. 
Deleuze takes this model and extends it to cover all actual experience. 
In effect, he moves from Kant’s first Critique, with its transcendental 
aesthetic providing the forms of possible experience, to the third 
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Critique which posits aesthetic judgment as an exploration of the 
conditions of real experience.  
As Deleuze argues, the form of possible experience and the 
reflection of real experience must be tied together and “the conditions 
of experience in general must become conditions of real 
experience”.258 Deleuze attempts this with his category of the virtual.  
Instead of governing all possible experience with universal and general 
categories, the virtual must give account to the singularity of real 
experience, manifest in the contingency of actual states-of-affairs. 
Thus, the question is not about conditioning but about production. 
What produces a certain entity? As I have discussed in chapter two, an 
individuation can be considered as a local solution to a virtual 
problem.  
What this means can be clarified by Gilbert Simondon’s 
physicalist terms: an individual is a product of a pre-individual 
“tension” or “supersaturation” in a certain system of relations. As 
Simondon’s example of crystal formation attests, the growth of a 
crystal is due to a potential within its environment. This potential to 
crystallise does not, however, contain any determining possibility 
which would then be exactly like its actualisation, minus reality. This 
would be essentialism: the “idea” of a crystal would be pre-existent in 
comparison to its actualisation. Deleuze’s virtual is, in this sense, anti-
essential as he stresses that the transcendental field of the virtual is not 
the field of the possible. If the transcendental were “merely” possible, 
it would be populated by entities resembling the empirical field, 
lacking in their degree of reality since they are not actualised. For the 
virtual  to  be  a  genetic  factor,  it  must  be  distinct  from  the  possible.  
Therefore the virtual must be considered as “real without being actual, 
ideal without being abstract”.259 The virtual is “ideal” in the sense that 
it  is  the principle  of  emergence of actualisations.  It  is  not abstract  in 
the way that it would provide universal and general principles or 
conditions for actualisation – actualisations, as well as their 
conditions, are always singular. It is this singularity of actualisations as 
apparitions that Deleuze thematises in the concept of the simulacrum. 
It provides a non-essentialist model for considering the images, visual, 
aural or tactile, of art. Yet, images as simulacra are not removed from 
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the real,  as  Baudrillard claims,  but  rather express it.  In the following 
chapter we shall examine in more detail the two facets of simulacra – 
the Baudrillardian simulation and Deleuzean expression – and 
approach the question of the affirmation of world-as-appearance and 
its repercussions. 
 
 
4.1 A Solar Vision: The Hierarchy of Images and Copies 
 
The question of appearances and their value is an enormous one in 
the history of philosophy. Respecting the breadth of this theme, the 
present discussion shall be limited to staking out the foundations of 
the problematic category of simulacra. My point of view is in a wider 
sense the mimetic relation between the perceived reality and its 
representation and as such, I present an explicitly aesthetic perspective 
on this question. The standard definition of mimesis is formulated 
according to Plato and Aristotle as the representation of nature. Here, 
then, appears a division between representation and nature, the 
former being second-rate action in relation to the primacy of nature 
that is immediately present to itself. To provide a short introduction 
to the problem of the simulacra starting from antiquity, I shall very 
briefly introduce Stephen Halliwell, who presents an admirably clear 
and concise account of the problem of mimesis within the tradition of 
Western philosophy in his book The Aesthetics of Mimesis.  
In his study on mimesis Halliwell claims that the mimetic 
function, most often ascribed to art, contains two often opposing 
positions: world-reflecting and world-creating. The first of these 
fathoms representation as the mirroring of world and thus allows art 
merely the function of a passive reflection of reality which exists 
“outside” the artwork. The second position conceives art as 
imagination and bestows it with power to create an alternative world-
in-itself.260 The  span  of  mimeticism  is  thus  spread  between  the  two  
poles of artwork as mirror of the world and artwork as creation of an 
alternate world. The tension between these two extremes shows in 
Plato, as one of the founding thinkers of the distrust of appearances, 
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when he fails to reconcile the power of artistic creation with the 
demand for a truthful representation of the world. Hence the standard 
view of Plato as the imposer of domesticating demands on art: it must 
not be given too much leeway, since artistic imagination results from 
divine madness – inspiration – and can lead a susceptible audience 
astray by the force of its rhetoric. Yet, even though art can be 
convincing, it is not truthful, as it gains its momentum from madness. 
Further, art, when trying to imitate the phenomena of the world, 
necessarily results in a second-hand depiction of a material thing that 
is already removed from its essence. The resulting conclusion is, then, 
that art is either too powerful or holds too little power in its inability 
to convey to us the truth of the world. In short, art is not truthful. 
 
PLATO AND THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE 
Namely, the principal site of considering the mimetic relation between 
appearances and essences is Plato’s famous Cave – without a doubt 
the most well-known philosophical fable in the Western tradition. The 
allegory appears in Republic’s 7th Book as a dialogue between Socrates 
and Glaucon and concerns the education of men. Therefore its 
immediate context is that of epistemology and pedagogy. As Socrates 
describes it, the fable considers the tendency of men to treat as reality 
that which on closer study is revealed to be illusion. The renowned 
mise-en-scène is as follows: a group of slaves is held in a cave. They have 
been chained there since their childhood, with their heads fixed to 
face the back of the cave. Behind them is a great bonfire and a 
walkway goes between the slaves and the fire. People pass by on the 
walkway carrying various things including figures of men and animals. 
All  that  the  slaves  can  see  is  the  wall  of  the  cave,  onto  which  the  
flames cast shadows of everything that passes by via the walkway. 
Likewise, everything they hear is an echo of sounds issuing from the 
walkway.261 
Now, asks Socrates, would it not be only natural that the 
prisoners in the cave comprehend the things they see and hear – 
shadows  and  echoes  –  as  reality?  It  is  all  that  they  have  ever  
experienced. Likewise, would they not consider as wise the one who 
could better envision what forms shall appear next and in which 
                                               
261 Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve, in Plato: Complete Works, ed.  John 
M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), VII, 514a–c. 
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conjunctions? If one of the slaves would be capable of accurate 
predictions like that, he or she would be thought of as possessing true 
knowledge about the nature of things in the world.  
If  one of the slaves should be released from his  captivity  and 
shown the things that have caused the shadows the slaves have 
witnessed, he undoubtedly would not recognise the things in 
themselves and would still consider their shadows as the true reality. 
Also, if the slave was to turn his gaze to the fire, he would be blinded 
by the blaze and avert his eyes from the brightness back into the 
twilight  world  of  shadows.  Further,  if  dragged  from  the  cave,  the  
prisoner would be extremely distressed and seek to return to his 
familiar habitat.262  
However, says Socrates, after some time outside the cave the 
former prisoner would begin to acquaint himself with his new 
environment and would gradually come to see his earlier reality – that 
of the shadows – as unreality. Finally able to look upwards into the 
sky, he would understand the sun as the source of all the things he has 
previously seen. If he returned to the cave, the freed slave would 
undoubtedly pity the impoverished existence of the chained prisoners 
and consider their supposed knowledge as inferior to what he now 
knows about the workings of the world.263 
The fable of prisoners is analogous to our situation within the 
experiential world of perceptions. Socrates likens us to the slaves: 
what we see around us are shadows of a higher reality of essences. 
The  empirical  world  is  a  world  of  images,  caused  by  something  
unperceived by our senses. As the slave must leave the cave in order 
to  fathom  the  world  in  a  deeper  way,  so  must  we  aspire  to  
contemplate the world of ideas, ultimately the idea of Good. As the 
sun makes other things visible and is thus the source of our perceptual 
knowledge, the Good makes other things intelligible and, in a sense, 
provides being to them. Thus, as the sun is revealed as the source of 
perceptions to the freed slave from the cave, the Good is the highest 
form of knowledge, distributing intelligibility and value to every other 
being. 
 
 
                                               
262 Plato, Republic, VII, 515a–e. 
263 Plato, Republic, VII, 516c–e. 
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THE PEDAGOGY OF ESSENCES  
Here, then, is the paradigmatic scenario of classical epistemology: we 
have a variety of experiences which turn out to be mere fleeting 
images reflecting unchanging essences. On the one hand there are 
intelligible or supersensory essences, on the other hand there are 
sensible appearances. Further, there is a hierarchy between these 
things, since mere appearances do not yield, within themselves, any 
true knowledge about the world. The diversity and ever-changing 
nature of the empirical world present a problem for the thinker. Plato 
devised a kind of multi-tiered pedagogy to guide people towards 
enlightenment. In Symposium he presents a process of acquiring 
knowledge in an example of a lover.264  
To love is to desire something that one does not possess. The 
lover’s path to wisdom begins with the basest object of love, that of a 
beautiful body. Yet, this sexual love is but an expression of the 
craving for something unchanging, so that a wise man is able to move 
to a more abstract level in his quest for the truth of love. A corporeal, 
beautiful body shares characteristics with other beautiful bodies, so 
nothing in this one particular body is original. If one seeks the essence 
of love,  it  seems clear  that  it  is  found in every body inspiring desire.  
As there are traits worth loving also in bodies that are not beautiful, 
we can see that the desire of the lover must be transferred to a more 
worthy goal, the beautiful soul.  
As the lover comes to realise that there are institutions that are 
responsible for the existence of beautiful souls, he shall move to 
contemplate the beauty of these institutions guaranteeing a 
harmonious and just social order. From here the lover shall move on 
to love knowledge itself, as it makes intelligible the good social order. 
Here we are evidently very far removed from the love of a single 
beautiful body. In contemplating the generality found in love and 
beauty, the lover finally arrives at the philosophical treasure his quest 
will present: the form of beauty itself. It is not itself any thing, but as 
the essence of beauty partakes in all beautiful things.  
The quest for essences is presented in the analogy of ladder. 
There one must process, as if from rung to rung, from the base 
material phenomena towards “higher” intelligible reality and, finally, 
to essence itself. Plato states:  
                                               
264 Plato, Symposium, trans. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff, in Plato: Complete Works, 210a–211b. 
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one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out 
from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one 
body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from 
beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning 
beautiful things, and from this lesson he arrives in the end at this 
lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he 
comes to know just what it is to be beautiful.265  
 
This pedagogy presents a hierarchy ranging from particular 
appearances and general intelligible notions to universal and eternal 
essences. In Republic this hierarchy is discussed explicitly in relation to 
images. The dialogue in the 10th Book concerns the role of imitation. 
If one is to revere the truth, says Socrates, one cannot revere a man 
more.266 Even though he has loved the epic poetry of Homer since 
youth, Socrates must speak out against poetic imitation. As an 
example  of  imitation  he  considers  a  bed.  There  are  a  multitude  of  
beds in the world. What is common to all of them, if anything? 
Socrates answers: “we customarily hypothesize a single form in 
connection with each of the many things to which we apply the same 
name”.267 What makes a particular phenomenon a bed is its relation to 
the  general  form of  a  bed.  Beds  come in  many  different  shapes  and  
compositions. Therefore, their appearance cannot guarantee true 
knowledge about their “bedness”. A particular instance is, then, 
contrasted to the unity and generality of a form. Apparent nature 
appears, thus, under the principle of a universal mimesis: every 
phenomenon is a reflection, or imitation, of some other, foundational 
reality.268 
                                               
265 Plato, Symposium, 211c–d. 
266 Plato, Republic, X, 595c. 
267 Plato, Republic, X, 596a. 
268 Modern scientific reductionism can also be included in the group of mimetic theories. 
Scientific reductionism seeks to explain “higher” level, complex phenomena via the working 
of their more elementary parts. Thus, reductionism subscribes to a notion of a fundamental 
reality which is able to provide an explanation of the apparent world. Entities such as sub-
atomic particles or genes have been posited as foundational elements in various theories; see, 
for instance, Steven Weinberg in physics (Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental 
Laws of Nature, New York: Vintage Books, 1993) or Richard Dawkins in genetics (The Selfish 
Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). However, a problem of emergence persists in 
science: the limits of reductionism become apparent when studying highly complex systems 
which exhibit properties that are not causally determinable from any elementary parts. Such 
systems can be located in neurology, meteorology, and study of ecosystems, as well as in 
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4.2 Realer than the Real: Baudrillard and Simulacra 
 
The Platonic conception of truth is solar. Like the sun emanates light 
and makes things visible, so do the various perceptions in the world 
find their origin in a higher principle which distributes order, meaning 
and value throughout the extended spatium. This model of emanation 
lays the foundation for a hierarchy of things, as well, in providing the 
means of categorising particulars as partaking more or less in the 
intelligible. Therefore we can state that an original entity is closer to 
truth than its imitation, a picture, for example. The highest principle – 
whether God, the Good or the World – guarantees the hierarchy of 
things and grades them according to their proximity to the grounding 
principle. As in the allegory of the cave, the highest principle emanates 
light and enlightens the world. Within its luminescence we can 
evaluate, measure and classify, as well as condemn and denounce 
those things that are shadowy and obscure and thus further from 
truth. Our earthly organisations and institutions follow the celestial 
forms and from this similitude we can ascertain their righteousness. 
Politics,  economy,  manufacture  and  the  arts  should  thus  strive  to  
follow the model set out by the highest principle and distribute their 
elements in accordance with the ideal forms.  
Yet,  asks  Baudrillard,  what  if  the  solar  principle  is  not  of  
rational distribution but of excess and expenditure? The sun keeps on 
burning away, granting its light and warmth for free, and asks nothing 
in return. The fundamental nature of the world is not rational 
organization but rather obliteration and excess. This is the point of 
departure for Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death where he 
champions Georges Bataille’s view of the primacy of expenditure and 
sacrifice in social formations. Through Bataille, as well as via the work 
of Marcel Mauss and Ferdinand de Saussure, it is possible to conclude 
that one must prioritise the “symbolic exchange” of signs before the 
capitalist exchange of property. The contemporary – as well as 
premodern – society is built fundamentally on values contrary to 
those which appear to us as “rational”: utility, economy, production. 
Instead, a “general economy” of expenditure, waste, sacrifice and 
                                                                                                                                             
human sciences, such as sociology. See the American theoretical biologist and complex 
systems researcher Stuart Kauffman’s critique of reductionism in Reinventing the Sacred: A New 
View of Science, Reason, and Religion (New York: Basic Books, 2008). 
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destruction lays the foundations of human existence. Historically, 
different social formations can be divided along the line of “symbolic” 
and “productivist”, with corresponding values prioritising either 
symbolic exchange or production and exchange of commodities.269 
Thus, modern society is on its way to returning to a pre-
modern organization of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard, following 
Bataille,  claims  that  it  is  in  the  “nature”  of  human  beings  to  value  
modes of production which do not contribute to a utilitarian system 
of production and accumulation of wealth. The extravagance and 
luxury inherent in works of art, for example, attests to this. From the 
utilitarian perspective the excess radiating from symbolic exchange 
appears as death: the destruction of meaning, of good sense and 
rationality.270 Death is, in the final analysis, implicated within the folds 
of life, Baudrillard suggests, as “excess, ambivalence, gift, sacrifice, 
expenditure and the paroxysm,” in other words “anti-economy”.271 
Accordingly, within the sphere of symbolisation and meaning, 
the modern society has reached a stage which in fact is in conflict with 
the capitalist rationalism of utility. The symbolic value of things is 
highlighted, and the productive value or use-value of things is 
suppressed. Use-value has traditionally been understood as the value 
accumulated by an object according to which real uses the object can 
be put. Marxian theory postulated a shift away from the use-value of 
things to their exchange-value in the market of purchased goods. 
Further, exchange-value elevated itself as the fundamental ground of 
valuation as the universal equalization by the monetary system made 
possible the valuation of every thing in monetary terms. The acts of 
accumulation and consumption have replaced production as the basis 
of reality. Thus, the modern social formation finds itself at “the end of 
production”.272  
 
 
 
                                               
269 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, chapter one, “The End of Production”, pp. 6–49. 
270 A powerful example of the intertwining of excess and death in the form of art is Damien 
Hirst’s extravagantly expensive artwork For the Love of God (2007), a platinum cast of a human 
skull completely encrusted with diamonds, offered for sale with the asking price of 50 million 
pounds. Such a crass display of wealth created an amount of controversy and criticism 
regarding the artist’s intentions and the artistic merits of the work. 
271 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, p. 155. 
272 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, p. 30. 
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THE AGE OF SIMULACRA 
The end of production and the loss of use-value define the age of 
simulacra. It is not so much that the post-modern society is returning 
to the pre-modern mode of symbolic exchange, but rather that the 
mode of production characterising the modern society is succeeded by 
a unique mode of “simulation”. What Baudrillard means by simulation 
can be illustrated by his  example of  a  story by Jorge Luis  Borges.  In 
On Exactitude in Science Borges writes about a great Empire which was 
able to create a map that was so exact that it ended up covering the 
whole of the Empire. When the Empire finally ceased to exist, all that 
was  left  was  the  map.  Now,  the  “fable  has  come  full  circle  for  us”,  
states Baudrillard.273 
What was once real – labour, production and use-value – has 
been abolished. Gradually, “we” post-moderns find ourselves among 
signs and codes, denoting to other signs and codes in an infinite 
recession. The image has always possessed this subversive dimension, 
as can be noted in the discussion of Plato and mimesis above, but 
now, according to Baudrillard, the subversion of reality has been fully 
accomplished. In a world that is characterised by the “precession of 
simulacra” reality has come to emulate its simulations. It is as if 
everything has shifted to a “meta-level” of articulation, essentially 
putting an end to the distinction between the real and the simulated. 
We find ourselves facing the devaluation of the real and the 
devaluation of the power of the images that no longer possess the 
abstractive capacity in relation to extinct reality. Baudrillard 
emphasises: “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of 
reduplication, nor even parody. It is rather a question of substituting 
signs of the real for the real itself”.274 
We have arrived at this hyperreal state  via  three  stages  of  the  
simulacra. The first stage is that of the “counterfeit” image, the 
dominant schema of the image in the classical period when images 
were considered to be inferior substitutes for the real. The second 
phase is that of the “production” of images taking place at the time of 
the Industrial Revolution and the means of increasingly perfect 
reproduction. It is here that the distinction between reality and its 
representations starts to fade. The third stage is the “precession” of 
                                               
273 Baudrillard, Simulations, p. 1. 
274 Baudrillard, Simulations, p. 4. 
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simulacra, when simulation or representation is “the dominant 
schema” and precedes reality.275 
The image conjured up at the beginning of this chapter, the 
political figure as film star and vice versa, can here be considered again. 
In the modern age of Marxist use-value and bourgeois alienation of 
labour it was still possible to critique the perverting features of 
emerging exchange-value and capitalist marketplace. Now there can 
be no ideologies beyond what is shown on the TV screen. The 
ultimate star-become-politician – Ronald Reagan, or in a more recent 
case, Arnold Schwarzenegger – is a recurrent example of the non-
ideology of the hyperreal age. The image and sign come first, 
fashioning a politics, economics or a sphere of culture only 
afterwards. The image itself has shifted from being “the reflection of a 
basic reality” to masking and perverting the reality. Further, now the 
image “masks the absence of a basic reality” and “bears no relation to 
any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum”, Baudrillard 
says.276 
The post-modern era of simulation is thus characterised by 
various end-points: the end of production, the end of ideologies, the 
end of critique. The subjects of such hyperreality become monad-like 
individuals, immersing themselves in the empty play of signs-upon-
signs. The former collective values of culture and politics become 
supplanted by entertainment, mass “communication” and information 
technologies. Images insinuate themselves into everyday lives in a way 
that everything becomes a surface or projection screen: the workplace 
becomes a fashion show, with “casual Fridays” to display one’s 
weekend fashion wear in advance; cultural sites become tourist 
attractions become shopping malls become casinos. Disneyland and 
Las Vegas are the most prized referents for Baudrillard. They are no 
longer artificial entertainment complexes as the notion of artificiality 
has  become  extinct.  Go  to  Paris  to  see  the  Eiffel  tower,  or  go  to  
Vegas to do the same. There is no longer an essential distinction 
between those two options.  
 
 
 
                                               
275 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, p. 50. 
276 Baudrillard, Simulations, p. 11. 
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SIMULATION AND CONTROL  
As will become evident in the following section dealing with 
Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum, there are many similarities 
between Baudrillard and Deleuze on this matter. For instance, 
Baudrillard’s theories of simulation and hyperreality resonate with 
Deleuze’s statements of the “control society” that succeeds the 
Foucaultian disciplinary social order.277 The Baudrillardian subject of 
simulation is in a very similar situation with the subject of the society 
of control that Deleuze envisions: individuals are expected to 
“broadcast” themselves continuously, to emit a perpetual “tele-
presence” in order to function as members of the society. Whereas in 
Baudrillard’s modern era and Foucault’s disciplinary society the rules 
of conduct came as impositions from the outside, regulating the 
bodily or material existence of individuals by the way of constructing 
spaces of containment (the factory, the school, the hospital), in 
hyperreality or control societies the rules are internalised. The post-
modern subject wants to commit him- or herself to life-long learning, 
to become a healthier and better-looking person by dieting and 
exercising, to distribute and broadcast his or her personal traits via 
more and more popular social media.  
Yet, Baudrillard’s constant stance of pronouncing the “end” of 
modernity belies a mixture of fascination and nostalgia: fascination 
with the emerging order of simulacra and nostalgia for the reality of 
production that once was. There is a tone of simultaneous celebration 
and revulsion in Baudrillard’s descriptions of the masses who willingly 
immerse themselves in the “ecstasy of communication” and “media 
massage”. The post-modern condition has abolished all limits on 
meaning and thus annihilated the possibility of meaning itself. In a 
sense, modernity has erased itself, appearing only as ironic nostalgia 
for pre-modern social forms. Still, the existence of nostalgia attests to 
the fact that an idea of a reality remains, even though as an image in 
groundless circulation. Deleuze’s theory of the simulacrum is not so 
much socio-political critique as a philosophical exposition of the 
concept’s origins and its place in a system of representation. 
Therefore, as Deleuze sees the simulacra present right at the start of 
philosophical thinking, he does not end up in a dead end of the real, 
but rather finds the means of questioning the dichotomy of reality and 
                                               
277 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies” in Negotiations, pp. 177–182. 
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appearance in the foundations of thinking. Simulacra are for Deleuze 
something to be affirmed – as the real and not as the replacement of it 
– rather than lamented.  
 
 
4.3 The Disruptive Sign: Deleuze’s Simulacra 
 
Baudrillard’s analyses of the simulacra and the society of simulation 
seem to lead us to a dead end of nihilism, irony, regret and nostalgia 
for the real. As we have seen, Baudrillard’s abandonment of his early 
valorisation of primitive societies’ symbolic exchange and his 
subsequent embrace of a mode of aristocratic aestheticism in the play 
of seduction leaves us with nothing much than the ecstasy of 
groundless signs. Yet, this arrangement still retains the Platonic 
distinction between the original and the copy and will result in a 
Nietzschean scenario of nihilism, losing faith in appearances as a 
result of losing faith in their originals. 
Deleuze’s work on simulacra presents, on the one hand, a 
somewhat similar approach and critique of the Platonic epistemology, 
and yet, on the other hand, an alternative model of deceptive images 
that might lead us to the affirmation of the world as appearance rather 
than to Baudrillardian irony and nihilism. Further, Deleuze’s reading 
of Plato and the representative system of thought is, in a somewhat 
mischievous manner, still a Platonist one, however skewed it might be 
from the standard tradition of reception. 
The simulacrum is a concept employed by Deleuze only in his 
work from the late 1960s. The context for the consideration of 
simulacra is that of challenging the representational image of thought 
that Deleuze nominates as Platonism. As such, he follows the trail 
marked out by Nietzsche in his decree to the philosophy of the future: 
to “reverse” Platonism. What would it mean to reverse Platonism asks 
Deleuze in the beginning of “The Simulacrum and Ancient 
Philosophy”, an appendix to The Logic of Sense and the longest text 
devoted to the topic of the simulacrum. What philosophy has not 
tried the reversal? If understood as the “overturning” of Platonism, 
such an inversion would mean the elevation of appearances over 
essences – in short, turning the Platonic hierarchy of being on its 
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head. This endeavour, claims Deleuze, “dates back to Hegel or, better 
yet, to Kant”.278  
As was discussed in chapter one, Kant is for Deleuze the first 
“modern” – that is, post-classical – philosopher, who does indeed 
invert the hierarchy of essences and appearances. For Kant the 
problem is no longer the classical one addressing extended spatium 
reflecting the internal intelligibility of the true world more or less 
incorrectly or imperfectly. In such a conception it is the essential 
which grounds and guarantees knowledge and truth. Conversely, the 
problem of modern philosophy is the appearance of appearances as 
such: as Deleuze says, for Kant appearances are apparitions. Yet, for 
Kant,  as  well  as  for  Hegel,  the  overturning  of  Platonism  comes  to  
mean “the abolition of the world of essences and of the world of 
appearances”.279 This remark shall be clarified in greater detail later on 
in  this  chapter,  but  in  short  it  means  that  the  recourse  to  idealism  
cannot avoid the Nietzschean scenario in which Man does away with 
God but retains the similar dynamic of “manufacturing the divine”.280 
Does  the  reversal  of  Platonism  result  in  idealism?  It  is  from  
this question or problematic that Deleuze’s ruminations on the 
simulacrum begin. Rather than attempting to overcome the Platonist 
schema of essences and appearances, Deleuze, once again, infiltrates 
the textual work of Plato and seeks to produce a reading that is both 
faithful and perverse. As Alfred North Whitehead has famously 
claimed, all Western philosophy stands in the shadow of Plato’s work, 
amounting to little more than footnotes to Plato’s dialogues.281 The 
question of overcoming this tradition is akin to that of man trying to 
overcome the need for eating. One may vary one’s diet and even try 
fasting for a while, but one cannot simply leave behind the context of 
eating in general.  
“To reverse” should be understood, then, as the attempt to 
produce an inverse. To turn inside out. To produce a topological 
variation where parts of a system are pushed down when they 
previously were pulled up and vice versa. Not overcoming as 
overturning, with Plato ending upside down and non-subjective 
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idealism replaced with a subjective one, but as the inversion of the 
structure that produces a new kind of problematic. As Deleuze states, 
he attempts to bring “the motivation” of Platonism into the light, 
proceeding from the abstraction of receiving a pre-given system of 
thought into the active consideration of its underlying ground. This 
hidden motivation of Platonism, for Deleuze, is the “will to select and 
choose”.282 What this amounts to is elaborated on in the next section.  
 
THE WILL TO CHOOSE 
Deleuze’s “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy” begins with a 
discussion of the Platonic motivation to make a difference, to 
distinguish “the ‘thing’ itself from its images, the original from the 
copy, the model from the simulacrum”.283 This selection is essential 
for Plato if we are to proceed to knowledge from the diversity of 
experience. As we have discussed regarding the well-known Platonic 
epistemology, an empirical thing is – according to the solar and visual 
metaphor – but a shadow of its essence. Earlier on in The Logic of Sense 
Deleuze associates this will to select with language and its difficulties 
in coming to terms of the becoming of the world, the flux and 
mutability of material reality in comparison to the eternal, unchanging 
and pure being of the essences. In chapter two of this study, regarding 
the paradoxical relationship between sense and nonsense, we have 
come to see how the good sense’s affirmation of a determinable 
direction (sens) in all  things is disturbed by the paradox of becoming. 
Deleuze’s examples of this are Alice’s becomings in Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice in Wonderland, where she undergoes a series of transformations. 
By eating a mushroom, Alice “becomes larger than [she] was and 
smaller than [she] becomes”, as Deleuze describes the paradox of her 
transformation. It is the characteristic of a becoming to pull in two 
directions at once: the difference between two directions becomes 
actual only in taking one route – going left, I make apparent the right. 
According to Deleuze, this paradox “is the affirmation of both senses 
or directions at the same time”.284 
It is in the context of the paradoxes of pure becoming that 
Deleuze refers to Plato and distinguishes two Platonic dimensions. 
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 137 
 
The first dimension is that of limitation and measure which means the 
assignment of fixed qualities onto particular subjects in particular 
instances of time, “for example, a particular subject having a particular 
largeness or a particular smallness at a particular moment”.285 This 
dimension is contrasted by the second one, the dimension without 
limitation or measure. This is the dimension of becoming and it is 
inhabited by intensities: the quality “larger” is in perpetual movement, 
never stopping, becoming larger still. A definite quality – say, a 
volume  of  3,5  cubic  meters  –  is  halted,  fixed,  quantifiable.  An  
intensive quality such as “larger” does not find a similar state of rest. 
Its restlessness, or paradoxical lack and overflow  of  direction  (sens), 
situates it as the “madness” inherent in becoming. 
Plato, says Deleuze, is the one establishing this division 
between the limited being and the unlimited pure becoming. 
However, this division does not take place in the Platonic dualism 
between the intelligible and the sensible, between Ideas and matter, 
but rather it occurs as a “more profound and secret dualism hidden in 
sensible and material bodies themselves”. Within matter itself there is 
a hidden and “subterranean” scission between that which partakes in 
the workings of the Ideal and that which eludes the hold of the 
intelligible. This, according to Deleuze, is the definitive Platonic 
distinction. It does not occur between Ideas and their manifestations, 
models and copies, where there is continuity between the original and 
the follower. Rather, the dangerous division for thought takes place 
between copies and simulacra: between those that partake and those 
that elude.286 
The problem of the simulacrum lies at the heart of the 
question of identity.  As discussed earlier  in the context  of  sense and 
signs, Plato concurs that there are things which we recognise and 
which leave the mind in tranquillity and there are things which cause 
an uproar in our faculties as they cannot be categorised immediately. 
These  latter  things  Deleuze  nominates  as  signs,  as  was  discussed  in  
chapter two of this study.  The Platonic epistemology thus hovers 
between the twin poles of fixed and unfixed identity. To have 
knowledge of a thing is to determine its participation (metechein) in the 
corresponding Idea. Participation in the ideal fixes the being and 
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identity of a thing. In contrast to this there is a dimension of chthonic 
obscurity, that of infinite identity which belongs to pure becoming. 
This is the dimension of relationality, the immanent field of Kantian 
aesthetic apprehension where bodies are related, and thus 
apprehended, to other bodies, or as “microperceptions”, as Deleuzes 
later on formulates with Guattari. 
The paradox of infinite identity eludes the fixity of present 
moment and exists in the category of Deleuze’s second temporal 
synthesis, suggesting a fracture in the course of time. In the paradox 
of becoming both past and present are affirmed, but as a divided 
process that keeps on bifurcating – “larger” making a thing smaller in 
the past than it will be in the future. This slipperiness of becoming is 
worrisome for Plato, as it threatens the foundations of knowledge 
based on essences and identities.  
 
THE PHILOSOPHER AS STRANGER  
What causes Plato’s fear of the ungrounding of knowledge and 
identity? Paradoxically enough, the threat of this seems to be built 
within the very conditions of philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari 
present a “geophilosophical”, that is historical, geo-political and 
cultural, account of the birth of the doubt over the stability of identity 
in the face of becoming in Greek thinking.287  Whereas thinking in 
social formations previous to the Greek city-states had been founded 
on myths of sovereign power and their guarantee of meaning, Greek 
philosophy is born in an immanent expanse of rival thinkers. The 
origins of Greek thought lie in the archaic empires of the Near East 
from where the proto-philosophers migrated to Greece. The archaic 
states “captured” the flux of becoming in meaning by “overcoding” 
the surrounding geographical areas into the transcendent, mythical 
order of the despot. The value and meaning of things (money, goods, 
subjects) were guaranteed by the ruler whose status as the “master 
signifier” was, in turn, guaranteed by a founding myth, such as a god 
bestowing the divine power on the despot to wield upon earth. The 
spatial organization of imperial State is denominated by Deleuze and 
Guattari as an arithmetic unity with the ruler at its centre.288 
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The Greek cities, on the contrary, formed a different kind of 
space, that of a geometrical organisation. Instead of a centred space of 
the imperial states, where the flow of signs, people and goods was 
seen in relation to a single, transcendent central point, the Greek cities 
existed within a network of commercial, political and military circuits. 
As Deleuze and Guattari state, the Greek structure of city-states is 
“fractal” and it forms an immanent milieu  of  relations.  This  is  due  to  
Greece’s geographical position regarding the eastern empires: they are 
close enough to gain from the wealth and circulation of things from 
archaic  states,  but  far  enough  away  to  be  able  to  be  organised  in  a  
different way.289  
Both models of socio-political organisation – the archaic State 
and the Greek City – deterritorialize the surrounding landscape and 
reterritorialize its resources. That is, the flow of goods, people and the 
like is diverted towards the center. “The imperial spatium of the State” 
is reterritorialized on the palace and the treasures and supplies 
hoarded there. “[T]he political extensio of  the  city”  is,  in  turn,  
reterritorialized on the agora and marketplace. In the State formation 
the de- and reterritorialization appears as from on high: a celestial 
component rises from the deserted earth and a “Stranger” – an 
individual like no other – makes of the earth a territory, a State. The 
emergent Emperor is established as a transcendent power, 
magnificent palaces and temples are erected to display this might. 
City-states, on the contrary, are formed as immanent planes of 
competing interests. They constitute a kind of “international market” 
on the margins of States and free select groups – merchants, artisans 
and other wanderers – from the bonds to an Emperor.290 
The figure of the thinker changes accordingly. In the archaic 
empires  the  thinker  takes  the  form  of  a  wise  man  or  a  priest.  His  
function is to devise and support the founding myth of the State and 
thus grant a transcendent despondency to the ruler. This foundation 
supplies fixity to identity and meaning: everything can be checked 
against the significance of the Empire; everyone is a subject to the 
Emperor. The precursor of philosophy is, according to this 
conception, mythopoeic thinking. Its purpose is to manufacture (poieîn) a 
myth  (mûthos).  The  central  characteristic  of  a  myth  is  that  it  is  self-
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justifying, as stated, for example, by the historian of philosophy Henri 
Frankfort.291 The divine origin of the inspiration of poets, wise men 
and  priests  provides  the  guarantee  of  the  validity  of  the  myth.  This  
means that the founding myths are not argumentative, but instead 
present an unquestionable foundation that justifies their own validity. 
Likewise, the mouthpieces of the myths, the wise men, remain fixed 
to the foundation, inhabiting the courts and temples of the imperial 
order. 
When we shift our focus to ancient Greece, we find, in turn, 
the despotic institution largely gone. This is partially due to the 
practice of trade, which had eroded the tradition of kingship over 
time. The despot was no more the sole locus of the incoming flow of 
wealth and goods. Officials rather than kings ruled the emerging 
Greek city-states. For instance, in Athens the office of árchôn took the 
place of a king. What is more, this office was filled by election, not by 
inheritance, and the group qualified to be candidates for the post 
slowly shifted from noblemen to those with sufficient wealth. For an 
ambitious merchant operating within the fertile trade network of the 
Mediterranean Sea, North Africa and Near East, prestige could be 
achieved via the accumulation of riches in place of the traditional 
hereditary route.292 Since trade is, by definition, a passage between 
territories, it could slip outside the jurisdiction of local rulers – an 
exemplary case of deterritorialization.  
The trade of ideas and education, too, would leave the courts 
of kings and begin to reach wider regions. At first, the earliest known 
Greek philosophers operated within the Greek colonial periphery of 
Ionia (nowadays Turkey), Italy, Sicily and the northern Aegean.293 The 
first shining moment of Western philosophical tradition, the teaching 
of Socrates and Plato, would occur in the largest and the most famous 
place of trade, Athens. Its commercial democracy provided the social 
conditions ripe for the exchange of goods, as well as ideas.  
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Yet, the figure of the philosopher is that of a Stranger, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari: “These types come from the 
borderlands of the Greek world, strangers in flight, breaking with 
empire and colonised by peoples of Apollo – not only artisans and 
merchants but philosophers”. They deterritorialize thinking from the 
surrounding empires and reterritorialize it in the agoras of Greek cities. 
Greece provides the suitable socio-economical environment for the 
practice of wisdom which migrates into its milieu. Deleuze and 
Guattari continue: “Philosophers are strangers but philosophy is 
Greek”.294 
Deleuze and Guattari delineate three conditions of philosophy 
that could be found in the Greek environment. First is the “the pure 
sociability as milieu of immanence”.295 This  means the free ability  to 
pursue associations, without the interference and legislation of 
imperial sovereignty. This immanence of thought implies no prior 
interest because, on the contrary, conflicting and competing interests 
act as the conditions for it.  
The second factor necessary for the birth of philosophy is, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, “a certain pleasure in forming 
associations”.296 Deleuze  and  Guattari  situate  the  origin  of  these  
associations of friendship, and also of rivalry, in the societies formed 
by émigrés into Greece. There is a certain joy in sharing one’s thinking 
and arguing against the others, competing in the marketplace of 
philosophy. Accordingly, they consider the third genetic element of 
philosophy as the “taste for the exchange of views, of 
conversation”.297 These three features constitute the conditions of 
Greek philosophy: immanence, friendship and opinion. Yet, these 
factors constitute a competitive milieu as well. The immanence of 
sociability has its own cruelty. The pleasure of friendship contains also 
the joy of rivalry. The taste for opinion leads to antagonisms and 
retributions.  
The condition for the birth of philosophy – the community of 
free men – defines it also as an antagonistic or agonistic practice: 
rivalry between free men. It is in the Greek agon as a milieu of rivalry 
that Plato’s thinking is situated. To return to the question of the 
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paradoxes of becoming, the determination of identities is cast into 
crisis right at the beginning of this agonistic relationship between 
competing thinkers. The philosopher is no longer the wise man, with 
a guarantee and authority bestowed as from on high – from the 
despot or from the gods themselves – but a philo-sophos, a friend of 
wisdom.  But  who  is  to  distinguish  the  true  friend  from  the  
pretenders? 
 
THE PHILOSOPHER AMONG RIVALS 
As Deleuze phrases it, his conception of Platonism “appears as a 
selective doctrine, as a selection among claimants or rivals”.298 The initial 
motivation of Plato’s philosophy is to distinguish the essential from 
mere appearances and this is due to philosophy’s deterritorialization 
from the transcendent power provided by the state and the despot. 
Within the field of imperial overcoding, meaning and identity could be 
fixed, with the grounding for stable identities provided by a founding 
myth which endowed the emperor with a divine might. Now, in the 
agon of Greek philosophy, identity is in danger of becoming infinite: 
sophistry abounds. Deleuze notes that in Plato’s dialogues all sorts of 
claimants declare themselves as the true inheritors of a certain quality. 
Even though the Platonic method is to establish a relation between a 
phenomenon and a corresponding essence, it is only the first step in 
the dialogues. If, as in the Statesman dialogue, we come to establish 
that the statesman is a shepherd of men, then arrives the problem of a 
rivalry of claims. “I am the true shepherd of men”, say the doctor and 
the merchant, as well as the gymnastic trainer and the labourer.299 
Now, who possesses the wisdom of shepherding men in this case? 
Whereas the priest or the wise man of an imperial regime 
could lay his claim to wisdom simply by referring to his status as the 
mouthpiece of imperial or divine order, guaranteed by a founding 
myth, the philosopher is in a much more agonistic situation. He is a 
“friend” of wisdom, but only a friend among others. To be a friend of 
wisdom does not imply the possession of it. As Deleuze and Guattari 
say, the Greek milieu bestows thinking with immanent sociability 
among friends who gain enjoyment from the pursuit of wisdom.300 
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However, this sociability has its reverse in the cruelty, rivalry and 
antagonism between competing thinkers. And yet, the possibility for 
this rivalry – the immanent relations between equal men – is the 
possibility or condition for philosophy in general.  
Thus the Platonic aporia: the immanence of rivalry necessitates 
the search for fixed identities, yet the search is compromised by the 
lack of transcendent ground and the emergence of competing 
claimants. It is as if the Platonic sun is blocked by a crowd of people, 
or  the  rays  of  the  sun  are  refracted  through  a  maze  of  mirrors.  
“Which way, which way?”, Alice keeps asking in Wonderland. What 
direction does the sense of a phenomenon lead to? The possibility of 
both directions, of infinite identity, always threatens.  
 
THE QUESTION OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
As Deleuze and Guattari state, transcendent thought, which is 
contrasted to immanent philosophy, projects itself onto the mortal 
world in the shape of icons:  
 
[T]he transcendent God would remain empty, or at least absconditus, 
if it were not projected on a plane of immanence of creation … In 
both cases, imperial unity or spiritual empire, the transcendence that 
is projected on the plane of immanence paves it or populates it with 
Figures.  It  is  a  wisdom  or  a  religion  –  it  does  not  much  matter  
which. It is only from this point of view that Chinese hexagrams, 
Hindu mandalas, Jewish sephiroth, Islamic ‘imaginals,’ and Christian 
icons can be considered together: thinking through figures.301  
 
The prephilosophical figure implies projection from the heights of 
transcendence. A philosophical concept, in turn, implies a connection 
with its neighbours on an immanent plane. The Platonic Idea is, in the 
first  place,  constituted  in  such  a  way  as  to  ward  it  off  from  the  
accidental. As we have discussed, according to Plato we can draw 
distinctions in phenomena according to their participation in Ideas. 
Yet, as Deleuze observes, in some of Plato’s dialogues the question of 
essence – “What is X?” – is inevitably displaced and mixed with other 
questions. The search for the essence becomes, more often than not, a 
question of “the case”. This happens in the so-called aporetic 
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dialogues of Plato where the question “What is this?” takes other 
forms, as Deleuze states: “who? in the Republic; how much? in Philebus; 
where and when? in the Sophist; and in which case? in Parmenides”.302 
The question of circumstance – the relations of an Idea on an 
immanent plane of thought – replaces the question of essence. In 
Deleuze’s interpretation, the Platonic notion of the Idea retains its 
pre-Socratic, “Dionysian” energy exactly because it concerns the 
spatio-temporal dynamic of a phenomenon.303 In Deleuze’s view it is 
only in the later Aristotelian interpretation that the Platonic Idea is 
nominated as “the division of a genus into contrary species in order to 
subsume the thing investigated under the appropriate species”.304 This 
later Aristotelian specification misses the real motivation of the 
Platonic division, claims Deleuze. The Platonic method of division 
does not concern the dialectic of contrariety that is used in the 
determination of species. The “real” purpose of the Platonic division 
is  the  selection  among claimants.  As  was  noted  earlier,  in  the  Greek  
milieu of immanence, all  kinds of rivals make their claims to possess 
the true essence of this and that. Deleuze states: “The purpose of 
division then is not at all to divide a genus into species, but, more 
profoundly, to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to distinguish 
the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic”.305 
Division, then, is not to be understood in its width – the 
determination of a genus and species – but in its depth: the selection of 
true lineage among the dialectic of rivalry (amphisbetesis). The division 
starts from “commingled” mass of undifferentiated matter and is 
analogous to the work of refining gold. It is a process of gradual 
selection of valuable matter among the various more or less impure 
metals, earth and stone, “the removal of which through repeated 
smelting and testing leaves the ‘unalloyed’ gold … for us to see”, Plato 
describes the process.306 Here it is important to note the difference in 
the notion of determination between Plato and Aristotle. Whereas the 
Aristotelian division begins its method of division into categories by 
establishing a determination in the first place, the Platonic dialogues 
present arduous processes of confrontation with the immediate. Plato 
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establishes philosophy as the discipline of making a difference – or 
determining which differences matter – but this determining of 
differences takes place from the undifferentiated ground up. Despite 
the Ideas providing a ground for the establishment of limited 
identities, the method of establishing those still needs to grapple with 
the unlimited.  
This is why the dialogues of Plato take such twists and turns. 
Gregory Flaxman notes: “Neither abstraction nor synthesis 
characterise the Idea in Platonism”, and this is why it still retains a 
connection with difference in itself.307 Aristotle criticises Plato for the 
lack of mediation in his method: there is no “middle term” which 
could act as the basis of selecting a thing’s participation in one species 
or another. Accordingly, Deleuze praises Plato’s dialogues for 
displaying the “brute presence” of not having succumbed to the 
requirements of representation.308 Thus,  the  Platonic  Idea  is  not  
simply opposed to the image, but rather is born out of the necessity to 
select among the various images which are presented to us by the 
immediate experience. 
 
THE MYTHIC FOUNDATION  
Yet, claims Deleuze, the first irony of Plato’s dialogues, the arrival of 
numerous rivals, is superseded by a second one. When the work of 
division undergoes its selection, it suddenly renounces itself and 
makes an evasive action by a detour into myth. In the Phaedrus as well 
as in the Statesman the introduction of a myth seems to interrupt the 
process of selection. Is it not the case, as Aristotle would claim, that 
the lack of mediation forces the Platonic discussants to take recourse 
in the mythic structure, which alone can impose their claims with the 
force of plausibility? It may seem so, but Deleuze does not agree. 
Myth  is  indeed  the  story  of  a  foundation.  Myth  presents  a  model  
according to which the different claimants can be judged. It is the 
claim or pretension which needs a foundation. The various rivals can 
be judged against this mythic ground. Deleuze uses the example of 
Phaedrus where the myth of souls before their incarnation is 
introduced. Prior to their incarnation into bodies, souls were able to 
see the Ideas. From there we derive the method of judging the 
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different claimants who propose themselves as possessing the true 
love: those souls who have seen many things prior to being born into 
the  world  of  mortals  are  worthy  of  the  claim  to  divine  love.  True  
claimants take part in the Idea of love. False pretenders – in this case 
the sensual, forgetful and petty souls – are distinguished by their lack 
of participation. Deleuze states: “In short, elective participation is the 
response to the problem of a method of selection”.309 
According to the Platonic hierarchy, to participate (metechein) is 
inevitably to possess only a part, to rank second. Only the Idea 
possesses  itself  fully.  A  is  A,  but  not  only  in  the  sense  of  a  Kantian  
analytic judgment. The Idea also bestows something on the 
participants. It possesses a certain quality firsthand and the 
participants claim it second-hand. Deleuze evokes a Neoplatonic triad 
of the unparticipated, the participated and the participant and 
provides the following analogies: 
 
Unparticipated participated participant 
Foundation object aspired to pretender 
Father daughter fiancé 
 
Deleuze says: “The participated is what the unparticipated possesses 
primarily. The unparticipated gives it out for participation, it offers the 
participated to the participants”.310 However, this possession can be 
merely partial, since only the foundation can lay claim to itself in full. 
The Idea is pure quality and the material world provides the extension 
to this quality. This is, correspondingly, the structure of 
representation: quality and extension. As Deleuze states, this structure 
subordinates difference to resemblance: “difference necessarily tends 
to be cancelled in the quality which covers it, while at the same time 
inequality tends to be equalised within the extension in which it is 
distributed”.311 
According to Socrates’ analogy of the cave, the world consists 
of a multi-tiered hierarchy of representations, ranging from concrete 
things to vague images of things. The domain of representation 
consists of “copies-icons” which are “defined not by an extrinsic 
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relation to an object, but by an intrinsic relation to the model or 
foundation”. The model or the foundation is the Same, that which 
possesses primarily. The copy is the Similar: “the pretender who 
possesses in a secondary way”.312 We  have,  thus,  two  kinds  of  
possessions. The pure self-identity of the foundation possesses an 
exemplary similitude. The pure resemblance of the copy possesses an 
imitative similitude.  
 
THE ABYSS BEYOND BAD COPIES 
The Platonic copy-icon can be judged according to the degree of its 
participation in the corresponding Idea. This participation is imitative, 
but not merely of an external 
character, of “likeness”, but of an internal, “noetic” nature. This 
noetic participation denotes a correspondence between the Idea and a 
thing’s relational and proportional values. The entire world consists of 
this participation; every thing lays its claim to some Idea. However, 
the world is not occupied only by copies – the resemblance of which 
can be determined by the Platonic dialectic as the measurement of a 
thing’s mimetic potential – but also by entities whose claim to an Idea 
is unfounded.  These  unfounded  things  are  of  the  order  of  shadows,  
illusions, mirages, phantasms: the simulacra. The Platonic category of 
images is divided into two: copies-icons and simulacra-phantasms. It 
is not that the simulacrum is merely a bad copy. The difference 
between copies and simulacra is a difference of nature.  A bad copy is an 
image  removed  from  the  Idea  by  the  2nd,  3rd and  4th generation of 
copies-of-copies. Yet, even the worst copy still retains at least an iota 
of  resemblance.  The  simulacrum,  in  turn,  is  an  image  without  
resemblance.313 
Here Deleuze draws up on an example from the catechism, 
inspired by Platonism: “God made man in his image and resemblance. 
Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining 
the image. We have become simulacra. We have forsaken moral 
existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence”.314 There  is  an  
element of the Fall into sin in the simulacrum. It is an image “spoiled” 
by its deceptive appearance without internal resemblance. 
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As one can devise the most complicated hierarchies from the 
basis of Plato’s system of models and copies and the latters’ validity 
according to their level of participation in the foundational models, 
one can also run down the ladder of hierarchy to encounter worse and 
worse participants. In this descent, proposes Deleuze, we are 
presented with a constant degradation of claimants until the process 
culminates in the one that does not possess anything more than an 
empty external resemblance – a simulacrum.315 In the Greek agonistic 
rivalry of thinkers, the problem becomes that of distinguishing the 
pretenders from the worthy claimants. 
The claims to Platonic Ideas are based on the supposed 
participation in a certain quality which is possessed firsthand by a pre-
existent foundation. For example, there is the quality of 
courageousness to which the courageous man can lay a claim. Yet, 
among the rivals, there are different degrees of possession of this 
quality  and  who is  to  say  which  claimant  is  the  courageous  one?  Up 
until this point we can still proceed by the way of Socrates’ dialectic, 
trying our way here and there with questions testing the validity of 
claims. However, according to Plato, there are also rivals who base 
their claim on nothing more than empty images and thus do not 
possess the foundation at all. The game of claims is no longer fair; it is 
spoiled by the impostors.  
Who is this false pretender? The Sophist. Sophist?s, the one 
who “does” wisdom, the one who makes his business with wisdom. 
The figure of the sophist in the Platonic dialogues is of one who 
practises the art of philosophy through rhetoric and thus introduces 
an element of treachery into the proceedings. Originally a term for a 
wise man or a poet, by the time of Plato the word sophist had come 
to denote a wandering teacher who gave tuition for a price. Plato 
portrays the sophists in several dialogues as wily rhetoricians taking 
advantage of the ambiguities of language in order to produce an effect 
or appearance of wisdom, instead of practising philosophy for the 
love  of  wisdom  and  justice.  Thus  the  sophist  is  a  false  friend  of  
wisdom – a pretender and a charlatan claiming to possess wisdom that 
he does not have. That makes the sophist a being of the simulacrum. 
What is really noteworthy according to Deleuze is the structure 
of Plato’s dialogue, the Sophist. Contrary to the other dialogues 
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utilising the method of division – the Phaedrus and the Statesman – we 
are presented with no founding myth in the Sophist. The reason for 
this is simple enough for Deleuze: as the myth constructs a 
“foundation-test according to which the pretenders should be judged 
and their pretensions measured”, the corresponding dialectic of 
division results in the authentication of the Idea. Now, here the object 
of division is the sophist, a claimant without resemblance to the Idea, 
and his definition cannot be founded on any originating myth, for 
otherwise the sophist would have an essence after all.316 
The sophist is false, and his falsehood cannot be given 
foundation. There is no way to define the true sophist. Faced with this 
“satyr, or centaur, the Proteus who meddles and insinuates himself 
everywhere”, Plato ends up questioning the very notion of the system 
of models and copies.317 The case of the sophist is much more 
troublesome than the problem of the possible formlessness of such 
things as mud, hair and dirt. When questioned in Parmenides whether 
Socrates thought that there is a corresponding Idea for “undignified 
and worthless” things like dirt, his answer was that there could not be. 
Socrates states that mud and dirt are “just what we see. Surely it’s too 
outlandish to think there is a form for them”.318 This exclusion of 
base things of life can be explained away by philosophy’s perennial 
preoccupation with the eternal and fear of the body,319 but the sophist 
presents an active force of resistance to the model-copy system of 
representation.  
According  to  Deleuze,  the  sophists’  claim  to  wisdom  is  a  
simulacrum, an underhanded pretension, taking place “under cover of 
an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, ‘against the father,’ and 
without passing through the Idea”.320 The sophists’ pretension 
conceals a dissimilarity within the pretending image. Whereas the 
faithful copy or copy-of-a-copy – say, a table and an image of a table – 
resemble something on the basis of an internal resemblance between 
the model and the copy (or copy-of-a-copy et cetera), the simulacrum 
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only feigns a relation of resemblance. Therefore Deleuze posits a 
difference of nature between copies and simulacra. The sophist wields 
this infernal, demonic power of the simulacrum in order to argue his 
point of view without being a “true” friend of wisdom. Whereas the 
philosopher is concerned with knowledge and thus with the 
production of a right opinion, the sophist’s subversion is merely an 
unproductive art of rhetoric that places itself outside the sphere of 
knowledge. The philosopher wants to define, to fix, to impose a limit; 
the sophist, in turn, evades, changes, mutates and undoes limits.  
Thus,  the  Platonic  aim  is  to  suppress  the  simulacra.  Not  
because of their being such bad copies that they have lost their claim 
to truth, but because their simulation enables the critique of the 
representative order in the first place. Therefore, with respect to 
copies and simulacra, we have a dualism of heights and depths. Plato’s 
method  of  division  aims  to  utilise  the  dialectic  process  to  ascend  to  
the heights of pure Ideas. Against this, the sophists are self-
contradictory, subterranean creatures, distributing quasi-wisdom for a 
price. They use methods that do not contribute to the search of 
knowledge and trick the true friends of wisdom. Such is their craft 
that they have to be repressed and buried as deep as possible.  
Yet, the sophist – once recognised and defined – has already 
done his damage. Even the consideration of simulacra has forced 
Plato over the abyss of simulation and in a lightning flash of an instant 
has poisoned the roots of the tree of knowledge. As the sophist and 
the simulacrum lack a true essence, it becomes impossible to 
distinguish the true claimants from the pretenders. How can we even 
distinguish Socrates from a sophist? He is haunted by a demonic 
double: the simulator. In the Sophist the final definition of the sophist 
is indistinguishable from Socrates: an ironist who works by means of 
arguments in order to compel the person who he is conversing with 
to contradict himself.321 In an instant Socrates’ uniqueness is gone: he 
is truly a philosophical gadfly, but his distinctness is lost in a swarm of 
other argumentative gadflies. 
The Platonic edifice is then overturned by an image that does 
not resemble anything other than itself. Here resemblance is to be 
understood in the sense of a connection between an essence and its 
manifestation. The sophist is a man whose true essence is his lack of 
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essence. This is the crux of Plato’s criticism of sophists. There can be 
no founding myth for the sophist. Yet, the very definition of the 
sophist opens up the possibility of entities without essence and thus 
collapses the whole Platonic hierarchy of essences, manifestations, 
copies, images and simulacra. Falsehood – images without internal 
resemblance to Idea – can be everywhere. This is the position Deleuze 
assigns to Hume when he notes that illusion has insinuated itself into 
human  nature  in  the  form  of  illegitimate  beliefs  which  act  as  the  
building blocks for future associations and beliefs. Truly, we are 
swimming in delirium.  
In the simulacrum we can observe a dimension of becoming-
mad: of unlimited identity. Using words reminiscent of the Kantian 
sublime, Deleuze notes that “the simulacrum implies huge 
dimensions, depths and distances that the observer cannot master”.322 
When presented with these apparitions, we are in the presence of the 
same “aleatory point” that Deleuze described in the failure of the 
third passive synthesis and the disharmony of faculties, as discussed in 
chapter one of this study. In experience there is only appearance, but 
from which point of view? The faculties cannot prove a 
transcendental grounding for experience. Once again we are presented 
with Alice’s question in Wonderland: “Which way, which way?” What 
can provide a sense to things? As Socrates found out, once one has 
gazed into the abyss of the simulacra, the danger of the viewer 
becoming a simulacrum presents itself.  
The  danger  of  unlimited  identity  was,  thus,  recognised  in  
Plato’s works. Yet, despite the seeds of contradiction found within the 
writings of Plato himself, the progress of representational thought has 
continued throughout the history of Western philosophy. Deleuze 
identified the will to choose as the motivation of Platonism. Still, he 
says,  Plato  is  content  to  establish  the  model  of  the  Same  and  the  
intrinsic relation between foundation and appearances, and to merely 
exclude everything else as obfuscations of this domain. It is in 
Aristotle that the true deployment of representation as the method of 
limitation gains its full force. For him the method of division is 
perfected as specification – dividing being into genera and species.323 
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A third moment in the history of representation in philosophy occurs 
as the effect of Christianity when philosophers such as Leibniz and 
Hegel try to render representation infinite, to claim the unlimited by 
inserting it into the system of division. Deleuze states that 
representation becomes then “orgiastic”, inserting the infinitely small 
or large within the fold of what is representable.324 Yet, in Deleuze’s 
view such orgiastic representation ultimately fails in affirming 
difference as it is. How, then, should one proceed in trying to affirm 
difference? That is the question addressed in the following section. 
 
 
4.4 Affirming Difference-in-Itself: Lucretius, Nietzsche and 
Deleuze 
 
The  aesthetic  is  the  sphere  of  the  affect:  an  “aliquid”325 world  of  
liminalities, membranes, interfaces, exchanges, passings and 
becomings. Affectivity immerses objects in a network of relations. 
Everything consists of powers to affect and be affected. In an 
immanent philosophy that is the only hierarchy. For Deleuze the 
aesthetic experience – or apperception in the Kantian sense – is the 
site of the genesis of our representations. As the first part of the study 
at hand has hopefully established, for Deleuze the path of going from 
the given to the conditions of experience leads to Kant, especially via 
a thorough detour of Critique of Judgment. It is here, says Deleuze, that 
the Kantian legacy is ultimately formed: namely in the notion that the 
aesthetic experience opens up a possibility to think of experience in 
general without conditions, that is, to address the issue of real 
experience instead of possible experience. The aesthetic resides 
outside legislation. It cannot be judged on the basis of the conceptual. 
And, upon discovering this, Kant throws the whole issue of 
normativity into question. The aesthetic is radically singular. One can 
make aesthetic judgments only on a case-by-case basis, as the aesthetic 
phenomena appear as under categories which are born alongside the 
phenomena.  
This  is  why  Deleuze  nominates  Kant  as  the  first  “modern”  
philosopher of apparitions instead of appearances, and it happens on 
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the grounds of the aesthetic. The existence of the simulacra is 
aesthetic, not moral (that is, hierarchical in the Platonic sense). The 
sense of a phenomenon is relational, experiential and event-like, and 
these characteristics are evident in the Kantian account of the 
aesthetic: an aesthetic experience is an encounter between the object and 
the observer.  
 
LUCRETIUS AND THE ORIGINAL DIVERSITY 
Here, in considering the simulacra as the union of heterogeneous 
series, Deleuze evokes the names of Epicurus and Lucretius, whose 
“naturalism” he advocates as the kind of philosophical pluralism 
necessary to counter the Platonistic representationalist tradition within 
philosophy. In the second part of his text “The Simulacrum and 
Ancient Philosophy”, Deleuze gives a brief exposition of some basic 
tenets of his own empiricism by referring to Lucretius’ poem De rerum 
natura.326 Lucretius, though widely regarded as “merely” advocating an 
earlier Epicureanism, is praised by Henri Bergson and George 
Santayana for developing some originally less-than-coherent ideas of 
Democritus and Epicurus into an impressively intuitive system of 
philosophical materialism.327 For Deleuze, Lucretius is a figure worth 
praising for his commitment to naturalism, contrary to the mythic or 
supernatural framework of pre-philosophical thinking. Lucretius’ 
naturalism makes him a philosophical antidote to Platonism’s recourse 
to transcendent foundations for beings. The lesson of Lucretius is, in 
short, that diversity is essential to the products of Nature. When 
looking around ourselves, we find manifest diversity in the world. 
Lucretius states:  
 
Turn your attention now to a meadow in which there are grazing 
beasts of various kinds, wooly sheep and brave 
war horses and, not at all far from them, horned cattle, 
all of them munching the same grass and drinking the same 
water from the flowing brook, under the same 
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azure sky. Each of them lives its life in its own 
shape and nature, following the pattern of its parents. 
So various is the life the same nourishment fosters 
in the same field and in the brook and pond as well. 
So too are the parts diverse of which each creature is made–  
bones, sinews, organs, guts, the different 
results that have come about from the same beginnings.328 
 
An altogether harder lesson to learn is to think of the diverse as 
diverse, without subsuming it to some kind of unity, oneness or 
wholeness. At this point it must be evident that this has been 
Deleuze’s aim throughout his own œuvre, especially explicit in Difference 
and Repetition. In Lucretius’ conception of Nature we can observe three 
tendencies and, correspondingly, three principles. They can be 
schematised as follows: 
 
NATURAL DIVERSITY  PRINCIPLE  
? Diversity of 
worlds 
1. Diversity of species Specificity 
2. Diversity of individuals 
within species 
Individuality 
3. Diversity of parts within 
individuals 
Heterogeneity 
 
Contrary to Plato or Aristotle, for whom diversity is a degeneration of 
a previous unity, Lucretius’ naturalism starts from the fact that 
everything that exists appears as diverse: “none of the things that 
appear  before  our  eyes  is  made  /  of  only  one  kind  of  element,  but  
rather of different seeds / that have been commingled”.329 The 
principles of specificity, individuality and heterogeneity imply a world 
that  is  composed  of  a  diversity  of  “worlds”,  as  beings  interact  with  
each other, compose or are composed of each other. Every individual 
is distinct from every other and ultimately irreducible to abstract 
generality. Lucretius illustrates this by a moving example: a mother 
cow searches in vain for her calf, which has been taken away to be 
sacrificed to the gods. Even though calves might all look the same to 
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us, she would recognise her own offspring from among any number 
of them.330 
Likewise, no grain of sand or speck of dust is indiscernible, 
given sharp enough powers of observation. This corresponds with 
Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, where an observer has a clear and 
distinct point of view to a part of the world that is, in totality, unclear 
and indistinct. Yet, the observer is still affected by the whole of the 
world. Likewise, one can note a parallel with von Uexküll’s concept of 
Umwelt, which denotes the life world of each animal subject, shaped 
by the particular subject’s powers of observation and action. Umwelt 
forms the clear and distinct zone of observation for every particular 
entity; the outside of this habitual milieu is obscure, as it lies outside 
the formal capacity of the individual. Still, the entity is from the 
beginning caught in a web in inter-milieu relations which can affect 
the individual and in which the individual can act as a pre-individual 
intensity to some other milieu and individual-in-formation.  
Accordingly, when thinking about a grain of sand we can shift 
the perspective and the scale of observation. Instead of a singular 
granule of sand we can speak about its components – molecules, 
atoms and sub-atomic parts. Or we can consider a sandy beach, 
composed of millions of grains of sand. Wherever we turn, we come 
to see that distinctness and heterogeneity occur. Accordingly, states 
Deleuze, nature must be thought of as the principle of the diverse and 
its production. However, one must be careful here not to fathom the 
principle of production as producing a totality or a Whole. Deleuze 
sums up the Epicurean thesis: “Nature as the production of the 
diverse  can  only  be  an  infinite  sum,  that  is,  a  sum  which  does  not  
totalize its own elements”.331  
The principle of diversity cannot, in itself, form a Whole, or 
Being. The notion of wholeness is the idea to resist and Deleuze 
considers Lucretius as having been able to hold his ground against the 
inherent will-to-foundation in philosophical thought. To totalise the 
diversity  of  Nature  under  such  a  concept  as  the  One  is  to  subsume  
everything under One’s judgment, the judgment of God. What one 
does in declaring “To Have Done With the Judgment of God!”332 is to 
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refuse  a  “final”  aim  of  everything,  a  total  unity,  telos, or Absolute. 
Instead, what is noted and affirmed is the diversity and difference 
inherent in nature. The Platonic hierarchy must be overturned since it 
implies that nature is fundamentally an imperfect manifestation of 
some higher – that is, transcendent – principle. There is nothing that 
would gather the plurality of everything that exists under one totality: 
nature is not collective. Rather, nature is distributive. It distributes 
various elements into relations with each other, yet without forming a 
total sum. From this follows that nature is not attributive. Instead of 
expressing itself as attributing a quality to extension, “A is B”, nature 
is conjunctive. Beings connect, oppose and support other beings: “This 
and that … Nature is Harlequin’s cloak”.333 
Nature  as  this  ramshackle  construction,  making  itself  up  as  it  
goes  along,  is  what  is  truly  affirmed  and  what  affirms  itself.  In  
contrast,  what  is  artificial  and  frail  is  the  One.  It  is  merely  an  
abstraction, considered arbitrarily in isolation from the network of 
beings. The tendency to take recourse in a totality provided by a 
mythic foundation is a characteristic Deleuze noted in Plato. 
Lucretius, in turn, is a critic of that which makes man’s soul anxious. 
Unhappiness is caused by the “false infinites” that thinking produces: 
“To the origins of language, the discovery of fire, and the first metals 
royalty, wealth, and property are added, which are mythical in their 
principle; to the conventions of law and justice, the belief in gods; to 
the use of bronze and iron, the development of war; to the inventions 
of  art  and  industry,  luxury  and  frenzy”.334 Happiness is, then, 
produced by the understanding of the diverse as diverse, without 
adding a mythical, transcendent dimension in order to account for it. 
 
APPEARANCES AND THE THREAT OF NIHILISM  
One may easily note similarities with Lucretius and Nietzsche’s 
project of critiquing those tendencies in Western though which 
enslave man under a belief of something higher than the apparent 
world. As Deleuze states, Lucretius and Nietzsche are united in their 
critique of myth and the transcendent: “From Lucretius to Nietzsche, 
the  same  end  is  pursued  and  attained.  Naturalism  makes  of  thought  
and sensibility an affirmation. It directs its attack against the prestige 
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of the negative; it deprives the negative of all its power; it refuses to 
the spirit of the negative the right to speak in the name of 
philosophy”.335 Instead of elevating the transcendent as the hidden 
principle and secret of this apparent world, both Lucretius and 
Nietzsche seek to affirm appearance as appearance. To be more exact, 
the term “appearance” already leads us to posit a difference between 
that which appears and that onto which this appearance is founded. 
Hence Deleuze’s adoption of the term simulacrum. As there can be 
no  hierarchy  in  a  system  of  thought  “tainted”  by  the  idea  of  a  
groundless image, thinking reaches the “power of the false” 
(pseudos).336 The sophist obscures and obfuscates the Platonic 
hierarchy of claimants and leads us to a point where there can be no 
distinction between true claimants and false pretenders.  
In his text “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” 
Nietzsche sketches a “history of an error”, meaning the history of the 
notion of a true, transcendent reality. The history of the transcendent 
is presented as six stages, all  of which illustrate a case of relating the 
true world with the illusory one, the one “we” inhabit. The first three 
stages are, in succession, Platonism, Christianity and Kantianism and 
the  status  of  true  being  is  ascribed  to  the  Ideas,  God  and  the  
noumenal world, respectively. The true world in the first Platonic 
version is attainable by the wise man. Then, in Christian thought, the 
true being is postponed: it is promised in the future for the one who 
believes and repents. Moving ahead, Kantian thought takes a leap 
further and establishes truth as forever unattainable, but still providing 
a kind of consolation and imperative for mortals. According to the 
solar model of truth, we proceed from the light of the Ideas into the 
Northern fog of Königsberg, with “the old sun” seen only through 
mist, pale and elusive.337 
The latter three stages present a movement further away from 
the thought of a true world and towards Nietzsche’s own thinking.338 
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The fourth stage lays the foundation for the acceptance of the fact 
that we cannot attain nor know the true world. From this follows a 
question: how can something that is unknown radiate an influence on 
us? The fifth stage is the one where the idea of a true world becomes 
the so-called “true” world when we recognise that the idea of truth has 
become  superfluous.  The  last  and  sixth  stage  does  away  with  the  
thought of a true world altogether. Nietzsche states: “The true world 
– we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one 
perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent 
one”.339 We find the simulacrum-effect at work: once we deny the 
primacy of the model, we end up denying the secondary status of the 
copy as well. Therefore, the dichotomy between the two is abolished. 
In the light of the Deleuzean story of overturning Platonism, this 
stage means its completion, “twilight of the idols”.  
What is notable is that the very idea of overturning is found 
within the thinking of Plato himself. As Walter Pater comments, the 
“disintegrating Heraclitean fire” takes hold of men’s customs and 
concepts once the figure of the sophist is introduced.340 Thus, even 
though Plato wanted to suppress the dangerous notion of the 
simulacrum, he had formulated the thought already and made possible 
the ungrounding of the hierarchy of knowledge and truth. Against the 
dichotomy of essences and appearances, with its establishing of re-
presentations as the repetition of the same, it is possible to posit 
simulacra or apparitions as the repetition of difference. Simulacra are 
no longer “false” in the sense of being opposed to truth, as, following 
Nietzsche, the notion of a true world must be done away with 
altogether. A true world of models and copies would be ruled by the 
self-identity of the highest principle, organising the world of 
appearances according to the resemblance between phenomena and 
this superior principle. The “false” Nietzschean world is, by contrast, 
subject to constant reinvention of itself as the repetition of difference. 
This is how Deleuze reads Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return. It 
is not to be thought of as the eternal return of the same, but of the 
perpetual production and distribution of differences. This denotes 
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world as synthesis, a becoming. Yes, an eternal return, but as the 
return of difference, of continual variation or creation.341   
Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal return is mainly posed 
against the danger of nihilism inherent in the abolishment of the 
transcendental foundation of thought and knowledge.342 If we accept 
the claim that nothing is true we run into the risk of short-circuiting 
thinking altogether. The claim “nothing is true” in effect breaks down 
thought because even this claim cannot then be held as truth. Here 
the correlation between truth and belief disappears. Nihilism is 
defined by Nietzsche in his notes as follows: “A nihilist is a man who 
judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as 
it ought to be that it does not exist”.343 An intellectual stance like this 
cannot grant any meaning to the world anymore. This state is 
described by Nietzsche as the “great nausea” of nihilism.344 The 
devaluation of the values on which man has previously based his 
measure of the worth of the world evokes this feeling of sickness.  
Yet, this nausea is not the final word on the matter. As 
Nietzsche delineates in his six-stage “history of error” mentioned 
above, the phase of nihilism shall be overcome. From the aporia of 
“nothing is true” must be fashioned an unconditional affirmation of 
the world as it is. This happens via the idea of the eternal return. This 
means that man has to present himself the question of the possibility 
of accepting an eternal or perpetual recurrence of all events.345 This is 
the challenge separating passive nihilists from the active ones who are 
able to affirm life, for there are two kinds of nihilism: passive, which 
denotes the decline of the power to affirm, and active, which in turn 
stands for the increasing of the power of the spirit.346 The active 
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nihilist is able to rise to the challenge of the eternal return and will it 
unconditionally.  
 
NIETZSCHE’S AFFIRMATION OF THE APPARENT  
Affirming the thought of eternal return or eternal recurrence means 
affirming existence as it is, without meaning or final aim. As Deleuze 
emphasises in his reading of Nietzsche, eternal return does not 
concern the notion that everything will return in a manner that is 
exactly  the  same  as  it  has  been,  and  that  this  will  happen  time  and  
time again. Rather, “the eternal return is linked, not to a repetition of 
the same, but on the contrary, to a transmutation”.347 What recurs is  
not the same but rather the “meaningless” variation; the world is a 
becoming, constantly re-arranging itself. “Nothing is true” is here 
affirmed by turning transience and contingency into absolute values. 
The two dead-ends of nihilism – disorientation and despair348 –  are  
overcome. Disorientation, the perceived lack of “true” values, is swept 
aside by the acceptance of being as becoming. This means that the 
world  as  becoming  “must  appear  justified  at  every  moment  (or  
incapable of being evaluated; which amounts to the same thing)”349; 
we cannot appeal to any ultimate or final aims (future) or foundations 
(past) to evaluate the present. This is obviously the inspiration, 
alongside Lucretius, for Deleuze’s notion of the world as becoming 
under the principle of diversity: the world as an infinite sum of 
elements without a totality. As Nietzsche confirms: “The total value of 
the world cannot be evaluated”.350 To replace disorientation of the lack of 
values, an entirely new kind of valuation is introduced in the thought 
of eternal return. In a world conceived as eternity and its perpetual 
recurrence there cannot be any finality. Therefore, everything is 
valueless and yet of a wholly novel value. Every moment of existence, 
disentangled from the dependence on a final goal, is valued absolutely 
as such. Every moment is transitory, but that does not take away from 
its value as it cannot be evaluated against some transcendent eternity. 
This does away with the second aspect of nihilism, despair over the 
truth that is unattainable. There is no more need to lay the foundation 
of existence on the ground of “true” being and, accordingly, 
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everything is affirmed in its “falsehood”: the contingency and locality 
of being. Here “the false” has to be understood in the meaning of 
“the apparent” in its positive connotations. What appears is an 
apparition: it is affirmed as such and not as an illusion covering up 
some more fundamental reality. When the notion of the “real” world 
was abolished in the crisis of nihilism, the connotation of the “merely 
false” world lost its negative value.  
As Nietzsche states, art is the privileged site of production of 
such  falsehood.  It  is  clear  that  works  of  art  do  not  fall  into  a  
dichotomy  of  true  and  false  and,  likewise,  do  not  comply  with  a  
correspondence theory of truth. Who can say that one artwork is truer 
than the other? Or that a certain interpretation of an artwork holds 
the truth of its existence? Art’s truth must be judged in every case, in 
the work’s being-here-and-now. This is precisely what disturbs Plato 
as regards art. Art displays itself as apparition; it “treats illusion as 
illusion;  therefore it  does not wish to deceive;  it  is  true”.351 Art  does 
not take recourse in myth, in the transcendent, but rather displays 
itself as artifice. In the practice of art we can observe the power of the 
simulacra to affirm difference and divergence. Deleuze’s term is that 
the simulacrum-as-work-of-art “complicates” within itself 
heterogeneous series of meaning or affectivity. This is evident in the 
light  of  Kant’s  aesthetics.  A work of art  must  be encountered – and 
judged  –  as  a  unique  presence,  a  singularity.  Or  rather,  as  a  set  of  
singularities:  a  work  of  art  is  an  assemblage (agencement).352 Deleuze’s 
original French term contains the meanings of putting together, 
joining of different parts, making a mise-en-scène, fitting, assembling. In 
a sense bricolage, an assemblage is something that keeps heterogeneous 
elements together, and, crucially, makes them work together. Consistency 
is the key word here, coupled with immanence. The consistency of an 
assemblage  –  an  identity,  in  other  words  –  does  not  rely  on  a  
supposed resemblance to a transcendent form which would act as the 
foundation for the entity. Rather, according to the model of eternal 
                                               
351 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” in Nietzsche, Philosophy and 
Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks from the early 1870’s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale 
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 84. 
352 In fact Deleuze, when beginning his collaboration with Guattari, abandons the term 
”simulacrum” in favour of “assemblage” (agencement). The reason for this may partially lie in 
the fact that Deleuze tends to reassemble his terminology on a case-by-case basis, depending 
on the focus and aim of the text at hand. Nevertheless, there is a manifest continuity between 
these two terms and this is discussed further in chapter five of this study.  
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return, the world is affirmed in its immanence. This means that the 
universe is closed upon itself; there is no “higher” reality of 
organization. Ontologically speaking, the world is flat. Phenomena are 
assemblages composed of relations of pre-individual singularities. 
That the phenomena “return” eternally denotes the idea that their 
being must be thought from the perspective of their constitutive 
differences and the ongoing process of this genesis. In comparison to 
eternal return, identity is an effect. 
Simulacra as assemblages of the heterogeneous are what 
Deleuze defines as “signs” in Proust and Signs. As was stated in chapter 
two of the present study, signs implicate and they must be explicated. 
Signs as problematic instances are found already in Plato. There are 
objects of recognition and representation, says Socrates, and then 
there are objects which cause us to do a double take. What is that? The 
mind wonders and is forced to think, discovering the fundamental 
discord of its faculties. As the simulacrum implies an unlimited 
identity, with its sense proceeding towards nonsense, it appears as a 
problem. In the conscious mind the simulacrum’s problematic status 
is due to its obscurity; within the pre-conscious passive syntheses the 
problem is the virtual “overdetermination” or “supersaturation” of a 
being-in-formation. The simulacrum as a sign, as an assemblage of 
singularites, registers as intensity, not identity. There, in the moment 
of encounter that defies recognition, the passage from the virtual to 
the actual takes place. Furthermore, in the intensity that the actual, 
empirical consciousness registers, one can glimpse the counter-
actualising force of the virtual and recognise the potential points for 
the transformation of the situation at hand. The next chapter of this 
study addresses the concept of the assemblage in terms of 
individuation and counter-individuating force of intensity. Then, in 
concordance with the notion of the simulacrum, the question of the 
work  of  art  as  assemblage  is  explored.  If  art  is  the  principal  
manifestation  of  the  order  of  the  simulacra,  can  the  same  status  be  
applied  to  assemblages  as  well?  Is  a  work  of  art  a  special  kind  of  
assemblage? Does not the material repetition inherent in art effect a 
one-way actualisation with no counter-actualising tendencies 
remaining  in  the  artwork?  Or,  rather,  is  it  not  the  repetition  of  
material itself that opens up the work of art as an encounter with the 
virtual? 
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5. The Assemblage of Art 
 
In the preceding chapter I discussed Deleuze’s portraiture of 
phenomena as simulacra. Deleuze fathoms the world as a network of 
“problematic” signs. These signs refer not to an ideal form or an 
essence, but instead to an internal dissimilarity and heterogeneity 
within beings. In concordance with this, Deleuze elevates the 
simulacra as possessing a subversive power in the system of thought 
based on a representational hierarchy of things. The realm of 
simulacra obfuscates the essential origins of phenomena and this 
threat of instability within images was recognised already in antiquity 
and resulted in distrust towards artistic methods of mimesis. Foremost 
among the critics of simulacra, Plato found the figure of the Sophist 
to be a problematic one: the Platonic method of division cannot find 
the exact nature of the Sophist because he possesses no true essence. 
This suggests the existence of beings which are without essence – 
simulacra – and this threatens the integrity of the whole system of 
representation. In short, as Platonism constructs a multi-tiered world 
of essences and corresponding instances – ranging from things to 
copies and, finally, to the “bad copies” of the simulacra – Deleuze 
seizes the potential inherent in groundless simulacra and uses them in 
his “overturning” of Platonic thought. By fathoming phenomena as 
simulacra and not as Platonic copies possessing an internal similarity 
to some fixed, eternal essence, identity becomes unlimited. This 
dimension of madness is what Plato wants to avoid and what Deleuze, 
in turn, wants to celebrate. The “nature” of a thing is unfixed; it is not 
contained within a pre-formed identity such as a Platonic essence. 
In its groundlessness the simulacrum affirms the world of 
appearances, the world “as it is”. As the simulacrum denotes here an 
identity which can hold heterogeneous elements together, it cannot be 
gathered under a concept that would provide a foundation for its 
unity. Therefore, one can say that the simulacrum is an immanent 
image as it does not refer to a “higher”, transcendent principle of 
organization, but rather appears in itself. This is not to say that the 
simulacrum would be an unproblematic or uncomplicated entity, but 
that its conditions of being reside ontologically on a same “level” as it 
is  in  itself  and  determine  a  thing  on  a  case  by  case  basis.  There  is  a  
profoundly Lucretian and Nietzschean tone in Deleuze’s writings on 
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the simulacrum, as he defines the concept as wielding a subversive 
power against the Platonism of representational thought. This would 
mean judging the truth of a phenomenon against its degree of 
closeness to its transcendental condition. A thing would then be good 
or bad according to how fully it expresses its essence. Yet, as 
Nietzsche held the falsehood inherent in the images of art as the 
model for every phenomena – they cannot be judged against any 
finality, as such purposefulness is lacking in the world – so does 
Deleuze highlight the power of simulacra to disturb and disintegrate 
representational thought.  
 
FROM SIMULACRA TO ASSEMBLAGES 
Yet, after Deleuze’s two major philosophical works, Difference and 
Repetition and The Logic of Sense in 1968 and 1969 respectively, the 
simulacrum seems to drop out of his vocabulary almost totally. This in 
itself is not unusual, since Deleuze’s terminology tends to be utilised 
in each of his works depending on the context at hand. For each new 
problematic he constructs an appropriate conceptual “toolbox”, often 
to be rearranged in later  texts.  Still,  in the case of  the simulacrum, it  
appears that Deleuze wanted to abandon it for good, as is implied by 
this letter to Jean-Clet Martin: “it seems to me that I have totally 
abandoned the notion of simulacrum, which is all but worthless”.353 
This observation is offered as hindsight, as the letter dates from 1990 
– more than twenty years after Deleuze’s two major philosophical 
tomes of the late 1960s. The reasons for this rather harsh judgment 
on the worth of the concept of simulacrum remain open to 
speculation. One major development of Deleuze’s philosophy after 
the end of the 1960s was the increasing focus on developing a 
“positive” immanent ontology, rather than criticising the tradition of 
philosophy. For what its worth, the simulacrum remains a “critical” 
concept, challenging the thinking based on representation, and thus 
might seem to be tied too closely to the system of thought it criticises. 
Simulacra and simulation no longer hold subversive power once the 
question of representation has been put aside. In short, after having 
                                               
353 Gilles Deleuze, “Letter-Preface to Jean-Clet Martin” in Two Regimes of Madness, p. 362. 
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found the means of “overturning” Platonism, Deleuze could move on 
to other problems.354 
However, I wish to reclaim the concept of the simulacrum for 
it seems that it still retains a force of explication or explanation. This 
is the case especially when analysing the workings of art and our 
encounters with it. For the duration of their existence, theories of art 
have largely approached works of art in terms of the logic of 
representation. A singular work of art has been thought of as either 
representing an object, an essence of some kind, or, at least, an 
abstract category. Even though Deleuze might have considered the 
“problem” of Platonism as solved, it is still worthwhile to consider the 
work  of  art  as  an  instance  of  the  simulacrum,  even  in  an  explicitly  
Deleuzean framework. A principal reason for this is that the practice 
of art concerns presentation and representation. However, it is 
evident in works of art that they transgress the straightforward 
Platonic view of mimesis and thus possess a power to subvert 
representation in a manner akin to simulacra. 
Regarding the status of the simulacrum, Deleuze states that the 
simulacral “modern work of art” is characterised by its ability to 
internalise dissimilarity: “We know … that certain literary procedures 
(the  same  holds  for  other  arts)  permit  several  stories  to  be  told  at  
once”.355 The work of art affirms heterogeneity whereas our 
representational thinking seeks to suppress this and to install a 
hierarchy of identities over the manifold of experience. This 
heterogeneity or unlimited identity is the one possessed by the Sophist 
and it is the threat of this unlimited dimension which Plato wants to 
suppress. Thus, the work of art as a simulacrum appears as a radical 
form of being for Deleuze, since it is able to provide an insight into 
the transcendental conditions of sensibility (see chapter one). As we 
have seen, Deleuze notes that for Plato “the simulacrum implies huge 
dimensions, depths, and distances that the observer cannot master”.356 
The similarity of this to the Kantian sublime is obvious, as well as to 
                                               
354 The adoption of the notion of simulacrum by other theorists, such as Jean Baudrillard, may 
also have had an influence on Deleuze’s rejection of the concept. Especially as Baudrillard’s 
use of the term is in some significant ways opposite to that of Deleuze, as was discussed in 
chapter four. 
355 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 260. 
356 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 258. 
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Deleuze’s own idea of the disharmony of faculties in the third passive 
synthesis of time.  
Still, there are refinements to be made to the conception of the 
work of art, and I wish to devote this final chapter to those issues. 
First, Deleuze follows the concept of the simulacrum with that of the 
assemblage. It has several advantages in comparison to the 
simulacrum, so I shall explicate the notion of the assemblage in 
general, as well as in conjunction with the case of the work of art. To 
that end, I shall utilise both Deleuze – especially his writings in A 
Thousand Plateaus co-authored with Guattari – and, in addition, a later 
developer of “assemblage theory”, philosopher Manuel DeLanda. The 
concept of assemblage has the advantage of retaining the dynamic 
character of individuation, as fathomed by Deleuze on the basis of 
Gilbert Simondon, whereas the simulacrum seems to appear only as a 
destabilising – deterritorializing or counter-actualising – concept. Also, 
as a general theory of individuation, the form of an assemblage can be 
used to consider the way art functions as a destabiliser of our 
tendency for stable hierarchies, based on recognition of pre-given 
identities.  A  work  of  art,  as  an  assemblage  in  the  process  of  its  
deterritorialization, is an encounter with difference instead of 
recognition of the same. 
After considering the assemblage in general, as well as in the 
case of art, I shall raise my third issue, which addresses the question of 
reproduction in art. As has become clear, the task of the work of art is to 
“work against clichés”.357 This means overturning the logic of 
representation. A work is not to be recognised (it is about this), but 
encountered (what is this?) This conception amounts to a basic 
modernist or avant-gardist stance regarding art. Still, art presents 
something like an image, a work, whether visual, auditory, or tactile. 
My question is: how is the subversion of clichés possible in types of 
art working through mediums of representation or reproduction? In 
considering so-called “mass art” of cinema, video art, recorded music 
and other types of art utilising the distribution of recorded media, the 
critical question is whether they amount to something akin to a 
repetition of the same. How is a recording able to inscribe difference? 
Here the previously considered notions of the genesis of subjectivity 
(chapter one), affectivity and territoriality of art (chapter two), the 
                                               
357 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, p. 63. 
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virtual as a dimension of time (chapter three), and the simulacrum as a 
critical force (chapter four) come together. 
 
 
5.1 Assemblage Theory 
 
While devoting a close reading to Plato’s Sophist in  his  quest  to  find  
the means of subverting the Platonic representational hierarchy within 
Plato himself, Deleuze also notes the post-Platonic developments of 
representational thought. To be sure, Plato is indeed the founder of 
“the domain of representation filled with copies-icons … defined not 
by an extrinsic relation to an object, but by an intrinsic relation to the 
model or foundation. The Platonic model is the Same”.358 An intrinsic 
relation to a “higher” identity of foundational Forms thus defines a 
being’s existence. The foundation is pure self-identity and everything 
else is arranged in great chains of being descending from this ground 
of identity. Yet, as was elaborated in the previous chapter, Deleuze 
sees Plato as content to stake out this domain of representation and to 
exclude everything else that might pose a threat to this system: bad 
copies, false pretenders, simulacra and Sophists. However, this gesture 
of exclusion leaves Platonic thought still open to the subversive effect 
issuing from the discarded part of being. Socrates wants to bury the 
simulacra deep in the bottom of the ocean, but he still attests to their 
existence. The madness of the unlimited identity continues to haunt 
Plato. 
In this sense, Deleuze identifies Aristotle instead of Plato as 
the “true” enemy of anti-representationalist or immanent thought. In 
Aristotle’s deployment of the categories in his “taxonomic” model, 
representation is made to cover the entire field of being, “extending 
from the highest genera to the smallest species”.359 According to this 
view, advanced by Christian thought inspired by Aristotle’s teachings, 
the world is organised in a Great Chain of Being, Scala naturae, running 
from most primal beings to the highest principle of God.360 Every 
                                               
358 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 259. 
359 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 259. 
360 The chain-like organisation of being – or arborescent model of being, as Deleuze and 
Guattari phrase it – is evident in conceptions concerning both biological and social 
hierarchies. The king is the ruler of men, subject only to God above. Man rules over the 
animals. The lion is the king of the animal kingdom, et cetera. See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great 
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phenomenon is ultimately explainable by its relation, via hierarchical 
links, to the perfect organising origin. Deleuze sees Aristotle’s positing 
of genus, species and individuals as separate ontological categories as 
a formidable barrier to a conception of the world as an immanent set 
of relations. Aristotle perfects the Socratic method of division by 
creating a three-tiered hierarchy by which every phenomenon can be 
categorised according to its position relative to the taxonomy. This 
classification works by means of necessary differences and essentially 
continues the Platonic method of division introduced in Sophist.  
The Platonic method of division works as follows: in order to 
find a definition of something – say, a dog – one must first locate the 
largest kind of thing under which the dog belongs. After that, division 
must begin by splitting that kind into two parts, and deciding which of 
the two the dog falls into. This parting method will be repeated until 
the proper position of the dog has finally been pinpointed. Aristotle’s 
refinement of the method results in the formulation that a proper 
definition of something should yield the genus (genos) of the thing 
defined. The genus “grounds” the thing and answers to the question 
of its kind. The necessary differences (diaphora) provide a unique 
identification of the thing within its genus. The result of this work of 
definition, summa divisio, is a species (eidos).361 For instance, the human 
(species) in Aristotelian definition is an animal (genus) which has the 
capacity for rationality (necessary difference). What this method 
defines are essences, which belong not to individual beings but to 
species. 
Aristotle’s notion of the chain of being is that of a hierarchy, 
with “lower” beings – worms, bugs and other minuscule creatures, at 
the bottom and man, as the crown of all creation, at the top. Every 
species has its place in the chain, and in fact must occupy  just  that  
place, since there can be no “empty” places in the continuity of being. 
As a result the universe becomes perfect, fixed and non-dynamic, its 
                                                                                                                                             
Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1936) for a thorough exposition of the insistence of scala naturae in Western thought from 
antiquity to the epistemological crisis brought about by Darwin and Einstein, shattering the 
belief in a hierarchical structure of the world. 
361 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, II, 
§13, 96b2–97a4. We can also note the connotation of the term eidos as being in Plato's 
vocabulary for “Form” and here functioning in a similar manner as an essence of a particular 
being. 
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manifest diversity being distributed according to the essential 
definitions of things. 
The problem with such a hierarchy is that it conceives of 
singular instances – individual entities – as something that must be put 
into their “proper” place. An individual is not enough:  it  needs  
taxonomy to act as its support. This means placing the Aristotelian 
hierarchy of being as a transcendental foundation for the world and 
distributing the singular beings of the world into fixed, impenetrable 
categories. This fundamental scission into being proves fatal, since it 
introduces many kinds of ontological divisions, the most obvious 
being the difference between natural and artificial. On one hand, we 
have beings belonging to natural kinds; on the other hand, we have 
artificial aggregates. As Aristotle observes in Physics,  nature  (physis) 
possesses an internal principle of self-modification – change or 
growth. What is artificial is, in contrast, devoid of this natural ability 
to effect change. The internal, active principle is what separates nature 
from artifice (techne). Even though there are many different 
interpretations of this categorical separation between physis and techne, 
the fact remains that it is still presented as a demarcation line between 
two types of being: “Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some 
from other causes”, states Aristotle.362  
As noted in the previous chapter, Deleuze turns to ancient 
Atomists in his search for non-categorical thought. The naturalism of 
Lucretius offers him the notion that diversity is essential to the world. 
Yet, this diversity is hard to conceptualise as such, as thought proceeds 
through relations of analogy and hierarchy and produces the apparent 
                                               
362 Aristotle, Physics, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, II, §1, 
192b9. Stephen David Ross presents a variety of interpretations concerning the Aristotelian 
relation between nature and artifice in his book The Ring of Representation (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1992). It is possible to posit nature – the principle of self-generating movement – as 
separate from artifice, which does not possess this principle. Natural beings, then, belong to 
time, whereas all that is artificial does not exist within time in a similar way. Artifice belongs to 
a temporality which is geared towards ends and the application of that which is artificial. Yet, 
Ross states that is possible to state that the self-originating movement of nature is included 
also in techne; p. 21. Another writer emphasizing the aporetic character of trying to separate 
nature and artifice is Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, who in her Éloge du mixte: matériaux 
nouveaux et philosophie ancienne (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1998) focuses on contemporary 
science of composite materials as illuminating the obscurity of the category of artificial. 
Bensaude-Vincent singles out Aristotle as the first philosopher to be able to posit the paradox 
of mixtures: either the components are erased and a new substance is born, or the 
components remain as a juxtaposition of minute particles. In both cases we are not presented 
with a mixture as such, but a false or perceived mixture. See p. 53. 
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world as a representation of some hidden order. Lucretius’ natural 
diversity includes the diversity of species, individuals and parts 
composing the individuals: in short, diversity of many worlds, of 
worlds-within-worlds. Nature appears then as a principle of the 
diverse and its constant renewing production. This principle of 
production can only produce an infinite sum without totality. As there 
is no Totality or a totalising point of view – such as God’s perspective 
– the whole of existence is composed from an infinite set of 
perceptions, which form an immanent plane. A perception is a certain 
expression of affects, a singular state of relations, so it can be claimed 
that relations constitute the plane of immanence. There are myriads of 
singular worlds – points of perception – within an infinite network of 
perceptions. The majority of them are not human, so what 
transcendental thought must strive to achieve is to grasp the real. This 
denotes a world that is neither categorised by Aristotelian natural 
kinds, nor conditioned by the Kantian rules of possible experience, 
since these constitute the tracing of the real from our human, 
psychological point of view. 
 
THE HETEROGENEOUS IDENTITY 
In order to escape representation and to reach the inhuman363 view of 
the world the identity of beings must be understood as, ultimately, 
non-categorical. As can be recalled from chapters one and two of this 
study, the aim of transcendental empiricism is to give an account not 
of the actual, empirical reality, but of the conditions out of which this 
reality is formed. To understand the individual, we must look into the 
pre-individual and the process of individuation. The term adopted by 
Deleuze  and  Guattari  for  this  kind  of  understanding  of  identity  is  
assemblage. Individuations are not point-like realisations of an 
essence, but of the type of an hour, an afternoon, an event taking 
place: an amalgam of attributes, a haecceity – “thisness”. They state that 
in all things  
 
                                               
363 Reoccurring exhortations for the nonhuman or inhuman perspective in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work, as well as a bestiary of werewolves, vampires and nameless horrors of 
science fiction in A Thousand Plateaus, are not borne out of a taste for the monstrous, but out 
of understanding that the pre-individual field is not reducible to “our” thinking and appears 
thus monstrous from the human point of view. As the now undoubtedly familiar Deleuzean 
maxim goes, the real must not be traced from the empirical. 
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there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; 
but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and 
destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce 
phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, 
of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, 
constitutes an assemblage.364  
 
Here, the question is not of an identity that can be defined in 
extensive terms, with fixed spatio-temporal coordinates, occupying a 
definite place in the chain of being. Rather, identity with its mode of 
assemblage is intensive, composed of relative speeds and slownesses, 
undergoing different rates of change, faster, slower… 
As can be deduced from Simondon’s theory of individuation 
as morphogenesis, every being is an individualisation or an 
incorporation of a set of pre-individual relations. What this Lucretian 
vision of the world as diversity enables is the overcoming of 
ontological boundaries. Everything is natural and artificial; there is no 
distinction between the two. According to Deleuze and Guattari 
natural is artificial:  
 
We oppose epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by 
contagion to sexual reproduction, sexual production. Bands, human 
or animal, proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields and 
catastrophes. … Unnatural participations or nuptials are the true 
Nature spanning the kingdoms [genera and species] of nature. 
Propagation by epidemic, by contagion, has nothing to do with 
filiation by heredity, even if the two intermingle and require each 
other. The vampire does not filiate, it infects. The difference is that 
contagion, epidemic, involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous … 
These combinations are neither genetic nor structural; they are 
interkingdoms, unnatural participations. That is the only way Nature 
operates – against itself.365 
 
Things exist by way of their sub-individual connections and these 
connections are not pre-determined by an individual essence. This is 
the crux of the lengthy quotation above. Deleuze and Guattari 
                                               
364 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 3–4. 
365 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 241–242. 
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highlight the “unnatural” process of nature which proceeds not only 
along the hereditary lines according to the categories of the chains of 
being, but also through non-categorical connections which produce a 
mixture of Aristotelian nature and artifice. The creation of the 
concept of the assemblage is due to the need to resist the tendency to 
think according to essences and in this sense the assemblage follows 
the simulacrum in Deleuze’s thinking. An assemblage, just as the 
simulacrum, gathers together heterogeneous elements and presents an 
identity that contains something that cannot be simply recognised and 
represented. 
What is characteristic of an assemblage is that its actual 
properties may be categorised, but its capacities to interact with other 
assemblages are not determined. This capacity – always left partially 
untapped – is the dimension of the virtual. For instance, in theory we 
can make a list of the properties of a human being, even though going 
through all  of  them would  make  up  quite  a  lengthy  catalogue.  What  
we cannot give complete accounts of are the capacities to affect and 
be affected the said human possesses. This is the principle of the 
exteriority of relations. As the philosopher Manuel DeLanda phrases it, 
an assemblage’s affective capacities make up its “space of possibility” 
–  yet  the  space  is  not  internal  or  essential  to  the  identity  of  the  
assemblage, but rather virtual: it contains potential for novel 
transformations.366 
Here the affective assemblage replaces essence as the 
foundation of an identity. What something is can be observed by the 
way it acts,  by what affects it possesses as a capacity to affect and be 
affected. As Deleuze and Guattari see it, a “racehorse is more 
different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox”. This is 
not taxonomy according to genera and species; it is an answer to the 
question of what a certain body can do. Furthermore, they state: “We 
know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other 
words,  what  its  affects  are,  how  they  can  or  cannot  enter  into  
composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, 
either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange 
actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more 
                                               
366 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity 
(London: Continuum, 2006), p. 14. 
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powerful body”.367 There is no pre-formation, as Simondon says – no 
pre-existent whole or essence to a thing. Instead, identity emerges as the 
result of pre-individual processes, as well as the being’s own 
functioning that is, in turn, affected by its component parts.  
 
THE MECHANISM OF ASSEMBLAGE 
No finality bestows on an assemblage its identity. Rather, an identity 
emerges as an effect out of the workings of the pre-individual parts of a 
being. This emergence is of a statistical or catalytic nature, rather than 
due to strict causality. As DeLanda has observed, assemblages display 
the principle of “redundant causality”, a conception which simply 
denotes that a being’s exact component parts are ultimately redundant 
from the point of view of causality. A number of different “micro-
causes” can have caused an assemblage-level effect, so the 
individuality of specific micro-level agents is not a causally 
determining factor.368 Rather,  it  is  the  effect  that  stands  in  the  focus  
when defining the identity of an assemblage. It is, once again, 
beneficial to recall here the principle of the exteriority of relations 
Deleuze constructs already in his reading of Hume: relations are 
exterior to their terms; that is, the “internal” properties of the 
composing parts do not explain the relations which constitute a 
whole.369  
The principle of exteriority of relations means that an effect 
arises statistically out of the pre-individual singularities and brings 
about a qualitative change in the individual. For instance, we can look 
at a colony of ants and notice that the individual insects are more or 
less replaceable. The assemblage – the colony – cannot be reduced to 
the functioning of its pre-individual parts. In this way, the assemblage 
is both historical and ahistorical. The component parts of an 
assemblage possess a unique history and they each form a unique kind 
of assemblage themselves. Yet, the emergence of a property in the 
“upper level” assemblage appears as an event, a “leap” over the linear 
causality of determination. Putting together a set of ants and 
considering them only on their individual level cannot give an account 
of the emerging properties of the super-individual assemblage, the 
                                               
367 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 257. 
368 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, p. 37. 
369 Deleuze, “Hume” in Desert Islands, p. 163. 
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colony. Or, to take a physico-chemical example, the properties 
displayed by single atoms of hydrogen and oxygen cannot yield an 
account of the properties of the chemical substance water. Likewise, 
the properties displayed by singular drops of water cannot explain all 
the  modes  of  behaviour  of  a  larger  mass  of  water.370 What this 
amounts to is that we will never provide an adequate description of an 
assemblage by focusing on its properties or the properties displayed 
by its component parts alone, in isolation. What we must look for are 
the capacities displayed by the assemblage or its parts, as in the case of 
the workhorse, racehorse and ox. The dimension of capacity – the 
virtual – does not belong to individuals, but the individuals rather 
“carry” it within them or can be said to incorporate it. 
To characterise the mode of being of the assemblage, Deleuze 
and Guattari distinguish two axes in it: material and expressive 
components, and processes that can be either stabilising 
(territorializing) or destabilising (deterritorializing). The material and 
expressive components can be roughly categorised as falling under the 
axis between “machinic assemblage of bodies” (affective materiality) 
and “collective assemblage of enunciation” (language, semiotics, 
“incorporeal transformations”).371 This can be schematised as follows:  
 
ASSEMBLAGE 
Material components (“states of bodies”) 
 
Territorializing processes  Deterritorializing processes 
 
Expressive components (“incorporeal transformations”) 
 
An assemblage is, then, “an intermingling of bodies”, material and 
semiotic, which undergoes processes of strengthening or 
disassembling its current identity.372 An  archetypal  example  of  an  
assemblage would, thus, seem to be a social formation of some kind, 
                                               
370 Stuart Kauffman proposes that there is such an ontological leap between physics and 
biology: properties displayed by biological phenomena cannot be reduced to the terms of 
physics. See Reinventing the Sacred, chapter four. 
371 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 87. 
372 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 87. 
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such  as  a  political  party  or  an  institution  of  state.373 These clearly 
consist of material conditions (workers, material assets, et cetera) and 
expressive components (rules and regulations, statements, 
symbolisations, et cetera) and they undergo phases of stabilisation and 
change.  A  forceful  instance  of  this  is  the  juridical  system.  It  is  
composed of buildings, clerks, officials and judges, as well as semiotic 
components such as laws, conducts and practices. It effects corporeal 
transformations, producing prisoners and enclosing them in special 
quarters and, in addition, incorporeal transformations such as 
declaring people guilty or not guilty. Yet, despite the examples 
traversing  the  social  field,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind that  Deleuze  and  
Guattari nominate every single thing as an assemblage. The world is 
constituted of affects: parts within parts, affecting one another. 
Phenomena-as-assemblages exist as “boxes” within boxes, or a set of 
Russian dolls, qualified according to spatio-temporal scale and 
perspective. There are components great and small, mountains and 
molecules, and likewise assemblages. I am an assemblage of myriads 
of parts: physico-chemical, biological, cultural, technical. The parts I 
consist of are assemblages, too, on their respective levels. The hands 
that I type this text with consist of formations of flesh, sinew, bones, 
nerves, arteries and so forth. They have an individual history as “my” 
hands, and a structural history of the assemblage of human hand 
evolving through generations of ancestors, as the hand is a 
deterritorialized paw. My fingertips, pressing the keys, are made of 
biological cells, which, in turn, consist of molecules which are 
aggregates of atoms. We can continue into the sub-atomic level and 
never encounter the foundational stratum of reality which would act 
as a strictly determining foundation for the “higher” levels.374  
Likewise, there are many assemblages of which I am a part of. 
My family, my university department, my neighbourhood, my 
                                               
373 Social entities such as these are what DeLanda principally discusses in his assemblage 
theory – as he explicitly strives to create a philosophy able to address the social phenomena as 
assemblages. However, one must keep in mind that for DeLanda, as for my purposes here, 
the concept of assemblage is to be applied to “a wide range of wholes constructed from 
heterogeneous parts. Entities ranging from atoms and molecules to biological organisms, species 
and ecosystems may be usefully treated as assemblages and therefore as entities that are 
products of historical processes” (DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, p. 3, my emphasis). 
374 In fact it seems that at the sub-atomic level we encounter a radically indeterminate reality, 
see Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1958). 
 176 
 
nationality, humankind, the whole animal kingdom, planetary organic 
matter, Earth, the stellar system, Milky Way, the local system of 
galaxies and so forth into massive scale cosmic structures. At any level 
of consideration we are dealing with populations,375 not  species,  and  
with relations of parts to a (relative) whole. And, as mentioned above, 
there is also the question of emergence where different entities and 
attributes emerge not causally but statistically out of smaller-scale 
parts, without the larger-scale entities being reducible to their 
constitutive parts, as well as the wider assemblages affecting their 
components. As DeLanda phrases it, the world is composed of 
“nested” sets of individuals of different spatial and temporal scales.376  
The fact that everything is an assemblage does not mean that 
anything can become one: there are some criteria to ascertain that a 
certain assemblage is a real and functioning entity and not merely a 
random aggregate of parts. First, an assemblage has to possess the 
power to affect its constituent parts.377 The ability to do this functions 
as the criterion of the assemblage’s reality. In theory, any two – or 
more – entities can be viewed as belonging to a same assemblage, but 
only those instances of co-existence which bring about a change in 
their parts can be considered as really forming an assemblage. For 
instance, I might concoct a relation between myself, the dark side of 
the moon and every phonograph record released in June 1958. 
Clearly, those parts listed are not affected by any super-individual 
unifying assemblage, however strongly I wished to believe in it. There 
has to be consistency for the assemblage to remain over time as the parts 
are able to reproduce the assemblage in repetition or retention. Then 
again, the assemblage of my university department is very much real, 
according to the effects it can have on me, my colleagues, my office 
furniture, my computer, et cetera.  
The appearance of emergent properties is the second criterion 
for assemblages.378 To continue the example of a university 
department, it can bring forth effects that its constituent parts cannot 
                                               
375 Deleuze and Guattari often use terms such as “pack”, “swarm” or “band” and invoke such 
animals as rats, wolves or bees to denote the non-essential unity or coherence of things. A 
view prioritising evolutionary populations, rather than “natural” species, was discussed in 
chapter two. 
376 Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 85. 
377 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, p. 20. 
378 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society, p. 48. 
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evoke in isolation. Likewise, the department fulfils the third feature of 
an assemblage, that of redundant causation. A university department 
is  not  the  “sum”  of  the  histories  of  its  parts.  In  a  way,  a  significant  
number of its sub-individual parts are interchangeable, and this is the 
reason for the power of its continuity through the years. Professors, 
lecturers, students and administrative staff can come and go, yet the 
department stays. Yet, the Simondonian point of the relationality of 
individuation must be brought up as a reminder: the department can, 
in turn, function as a sub-individual part in another assemblage, such 
as the university faculty or a certain professional sector. 
According to Deleuze, understanding the world as a 
fundamentally diverse, open system of interacting individuals, 
emerging from a pre-individual field and, in turn, acting as pre-
individual components to some other individuations, amounts to 
seeing the world as the production of difference from difference. The 
classical notion of essence produces, in turn, the same from the same, 
and results in knowledge as recognition and representation of this 
relation of similitude. Immanent diversity produces difference from 
difference, and results in knowledge as an encounter with an inhuman 
aspect of the being and a corresponding need to experiment with the 
world. It is from this fundamental strangeness, the manifest novelty of 
the world from which we can see the practice of art arising. In the 
next section, it is time to delve into the mode of the work of art in the 
light of what has been discussed in the previous chapters. 
 
 
5.2 The Assemblage and Diagram of Art  
 
“Art treats illusion as illusion: therefore it does not wish to deceive; it is 
true”, to quote Nietzsche once again.379 Based on the notion of art as 
a simulacrum, one can agree with him. Art is apparition. This is a direct 
opposite to the conception of art as representation. To treat illusion as 
illusion is to affirm it and then end the sentence. Nothing to add to it. 
If we oppose illusion to anything else, we bring in the relation of art’s 
representation of something: art versus its object, art versus 
expression, art versus truth. Illusion must not be understood in its 
evaluative meaning as a lack of something. Art as illusion does not 
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lack essence or truth, since it does not promise them in the first place. 
As Douglas Thomas notes, it is namely because art cannot provide the 
truth – understood as internal resemblance to a Form or an essence – 
it also cannot be judged according to representation and truth-value. 
Art is, then, singular with no resemblance and equivalence.380 
Art, as understood in Nietzschean way as singular, concerns 
sensation. This is what Deleuze and Guattari affirm: “Aesthetic 
figures, and the style that creates them, have nothing to do with 
rhetoric. They are sensations: percepts and affects, landscapes and 
faces, visions and becomings”.381 Art has a privileged position in the 
examination of the conditions of real experience, since art uses 
percepts and affects to create “a being of sensation”. By creating a 
material thing – a “monument” – the artist strives to express the 
nonsubjective elements of a pre-individual world that is understood as 
immanence. The sensations produced by art flow “beyond” the 
subjective sensations of the artist or the spectator; Deleuze and 
Guattari state: “Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are 
independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no 
longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those 
who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose 
validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived”. 382 
There is, then, autonomy to sensation. In subjective experience 
the dimension of sensation is one that precedes cognition, bestowal of 
meaning and representation. Sensation is the domain of the affect, as 
described in chapter two. It is the “micro-perceptive”, vibratory realm 
of “silent” neural activity below the threshold of consciousness. 
Deleuze and Guattari describe it as: “Sensation is excitation itself … 
Sensation contracts the vibrations of the stimulant on a nervous 
surface  or  in  a  cerebral  volume:  what  comes  before  has  not  yet  
disappeared when what follows appears”.383 This description locates 
the birth of sensation in the contractive moment of habit, as discussed 
in chapter one. Sensation can thus be understood as formative in two 
senses: as normative in producing a habitual body, and as mutative in 
expressing the preindividual nature that is becoming. Sensation 
                                               
380 Douglas Thomas, Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), p. 26. 
381 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 177. 
382 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 164. 
383 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 211. 
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operates in the virtual temporal dimension of the past and the future, 
making possible the actualised instances of present.  
 
SENSATION AS MICROPERCEPTION 
In considering sensation as the virtual form of perception, Deleuze 
utilises Leibniz’s theory of perceptivity, as mentioned in chapter one 
of the present work. Deleuze does this in order to give an account to 
the nature of the pre-individual or transcendental field. To distil 
Deleuze’s conception of perception into a single sentence: the 
conditions of real experience are obscure and virtual perceptions 
(sensations). The basis of this notion lies in Leibniz’s concept of the 
monad, according to which every individual expresses the totality of 
the world, yet in an obscure and confused manner: “Every monad … 
expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimly because it is finite 
and the world is infinite”. 384 The individual  is,  in theory,  affected by 
every other individual in the world. Obviously, most of the influence 
of this background noise or the “mass of dancing particles of dust” is 
minute and thus remains obscure.  What is  clear  and distinct  to us is  
but a narrow searchlight in the vast darkness of the night.  
As was discussed in chapter one, according to Deleuze 
perception takes place at the limit of its becoming conscious. This 
limit is the condition for there to be an evolving consciousness at all, 
since if the “insistence” of accumulating microperceptions did not 
force the perception over the threshold of consciousness, there would 
be no need for a new perception of the world. Deleuze notes: 
“minute, obscure, confused perceptions … make up our 
macroperceptions, our conscious, clear, and distinct apperceptions. 
Had it failed to bring together an infinite sum of minute perceptions 
that destabilize the preceding macroperception while preparing the 
following one, a conscious perception would never happen”.385 Thus, 
perception amounts to a collapse – constantly tipping over the edge of 
a catastrophe of the faculties. 
The minuscule “neural” perceptions constitute both conscious 
perception as well as the passage from one perception to another. 
This is the assemblage-like nature of experience. The passage from 
                                               
384 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 86. 
385 Deleuze, The Fold, p. 86, my emphasis. 
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one moment to another is due to the metastable or supersaturated 
condition of the microperceptions. Deleuze queries: “How could a 
feeling of hunger follow one of satisfaction if a thousand tiny, 
elementary forms of hunger (for salts, for sugar, butter, etc.) were not 
released at diverse and indiscernible rhythms? And inversely, if 
satisfaction follows hunger, it is through the sating of all these 
particular and imperceptible hungers”.386 
From the point of view of consciousness, microperceptions 
are unthinkable. They are the invisible, inaudible, untouchable forces 
of the world. Yet, when considered from the point of view of 
individuation-as-assemblage, the microperceptive level of sensation 
provides component parts for the macroassemblage of a perceiving 
subject. Every perceived phenomenon is akin to the roar of the sea: a 
whole composed of minute parts, synthesised to an object-form by 
the consciousness. Another wording for this notion is to state it in 
terms of the actualisation of virtual singularities, manifested in the 
intensities accumulating and pressing themselves “into” perception. 
Conscious perception is the actualisation of virtual microperceptions.  
As  was  discussed  earlier  regarding  the  formation  of  an  
assemblage, the manifest properties displayed by the individual-as-
assemblage do not accumulate from the “lower” level of components 
to the “higher” level of (relative) whole in a causal and determinate 
way. As was shown by Deleuze in his reading of Kant’s theory of the 
synthesis of consciousness and the eventual disharmony of the 
faculties, the genetic condition for experience resides in radical 
difference. Likewise, in his reading of Leibniz, Deleuze opposes the 
simple “from parts to whole” linearity in the formation of perception. 
This would be a simple accumulation of sub-representative 
perceptions over time until the moment that the threshold of 
consciousness is crossed and perception is thus produced. Rather, the 
genetic process of a perception is differential, not causal. Subjectivity – 
or being-individual – is subtractive. We express the whole of the 
world, the plane of immanence, but only obscurely; the conscious 
perception, such as that of the sea, is in turn clear but confused. The 
conscious perception is a subtraction, and thus confusion, of the 
microperceptions which constitute it. We do not fathom the roar of 
the sea as an aggregate of individual waves, let alone of single drops of 
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water. Perception is given to us by the way of variations of intensities: 
relational aggregates which point towards sensation rather that 
perception. 
The  work  of  art  is  “a  bloc  of  sensations”,  write  Deleuze  and  
Guattari.387 Art  utilises  the  material  dimension  in  order  to  draw  
expressive qualities out of it. Art addresses the problem of the genesis 
of perception, experience and meaning and, as such, functions as a 
destabilizing  force  in  an  assemblage.  The  actual  work  of  art,  
understood as an assemblage, consists of variable components 
according to its type, genre, historical situation and cultural function. 
As Deleuze and Guattari state, art takes place in heterogeneous forms: 
“In no way do we believe in a fine-arts system; we believe in very 
diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts”.388 
Each art, each genre and each work of art posits itself as an 
exploration of a particular problematic concerning the genesis of 
experience. If there are unifying factors in all the different works of 
art, they are that of the medium of sensation and the milieu of the plane 
of composition. As Elizabeth Grosz interprets it, by the plane of 
composition Deleuze and Guattari refer to the assemblage of art 
which includes all works of art, traditions, styles, methods, techniques 
and such as its component parts. They are heterogeneous parts, and 
thus the only thing they may share is their functioning as components 
in the actual assemblage of art.389  
 
OUTSIDE THE LIVED :  THE AUTONOMY OF ART 
As art concerns sensation, there may be a tendency to see it in vitalist 
terms  as  life’s  self-actualisation.  The  artist  would  stand  in  as  the  
mouthpiece of this, recounting the “lived” through his or her 
works.390 This  would,  however,  go  against  the  grain  of  Deleuze’s  
Lucretian lesson which states that the diversity of the world does not 
produce  a  totality.  The  work  of  art  as  the  expression  of  the  lived  
would already presuppose the boundaries of life and bestow upon 
itself a kind of organicism or “fleshism”, as Deleuze’s critique of the 
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phenomenological focus on the lived body is phrased.391 To conceive 
art as addressing not the lived, but the undifferentiated life, one must 
attest to the autonomy of sensation. The affects and percepts of art 
“belong” neither to the observer, nor to the artists but instead arise 
from the “unlived,” indeterminate life, a life. 
This indeterminacy requires that the assemblage model of the 
work of art must be supplied with another axis, in addition to the 
dimensions of content-expression and territorialization-
deterritorialization. This axis is of the line of flight (vanishing point, ligne 
de fuite) and it leads to the “diagrammatic” part of the assemblage. The 
work of art as assemblage can be fathomed to consist of both matters 
of content and expression: art happens when matter becomes 
expressive. Recall the territorial beginnings of art in animality: a bird 
arranging – composing –  the  elements  of  its  milieu  and  effecting  the  
emergence of expressive qualities out of the material components of 
its arrangement. As Deleuze and Guattari phrase it in musical terms, 
the composition of (material) milieu components forms (an 
expressive) territory as the refrain,  as  discussed in chapter  two of this  
study. Even though the refrain is a musical concept, my view is that it 
can be utilised to approach the diagrammatic dimension of all kinds of 
art-assemblages. 
Deleuze and Guattari provide a three-part exposition of the 
formation of the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. First, we encounter a 
child afraid in the dark, singing to himself under his breath to keep the 
fear  at  bay.  This  act  gives  the  surrounding  darkness  a  human  face,  
organises a point of stability into the unknown terrain. It is the first 
step of the refrain: a leap from chaos to the beginnings of order. 
Secondly, the refrain constitutes a dimension as it organises not only a 
point, but also a space: the space of home. This can be observed in 
the comforting sounds of the radio or television while we are at home 
or the rhythms of an animal patrolling its territory. Thirdly, the 
territory is opened to other territories: someone goes outside his or 
her usual patterns, honks the horn of the car when leaving for a road 
trip or hollers greetings while entering someone else’s yard. Thus, the 
refrain – a rhythmic pattern which delineates a territory – possesses 
three aspects: a point of stability, a space of property and an opening 
to the outside. Correspondingly, three types of assemblages can be 
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categorised: infra-assemblage with directional components, going 
from chaos to the threshold of territority; intra-assemblage with 
dimensional components, organising the emergent territorial 
assemblage, and interassemblage with components of passage, 
opening the territorial assemblage to outside.392 
The territory is an expression of a certain set of spatio-
temporal coordinates possessed, or rather expressed, by a given 
individual. However, the refrain (movement from content to 
expression) is, in turn, nothing but the “material” content of music or 
other form of art. There must be another assemblage able to 
deterritorialize the refrain and make it the content of a “higher” level 
of expression. This second-tier assemblage Deleuze and Guattari call a 
diagram or the abstract machine.393 In terms of the ontological planes, the 
refrain still occupies the plane of organisation of Forms and 
Substances, as it is composed of the spatio-temporal rhythms of an 
individual being and functions as the maintaining dynamic of this 
being. The territory holds on to the rhythm of the refrain. The 
deterritorialization of the refrain-assemblage is only relative, since it 
introduces a reterritorialization, a re-settlement, of the assemblage. 
The refrain is the voice, producing meaning, recognition and identity. 
The diagrammatic line of flight traversing the refrain-assemblage is the 
noise,  a  scrambling  of  the  familiar  code  and  an  introduction  of  the  
heterogeneous element. We move from the Kantian aesthetic 
comprehension of rhythm into the sublime catastrophe of the 
disjunction  of  the  faculties.  To  make  art  out  of  the  refrain  is  to  
confront this catastrophe.  
I propose that Elizabeth Grosz’s fine example of the 
difference between natural and sexual selection illustrates the 
difference between relative and absolute deterritorialization in the 
refrain. According to her, the rhythmic patterns of interacting animal 
milieus  form  the  refrain  as  the  dimensionality  proper  to  a  certain  
individual. These homely terrains are constituted of, and in turn 
constitute, the relations a certain animal enters into and likewise make 
up the animal’s functioning in natural selection. In short, the territory 
functions as the graph of the possible. It is only when we enter the 
properly aesthetic domain of the expressive that we break up the 
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boundaries of the natural and gain access to the “excessive” 
dimension of the sexual. Art is excess, in a sense that reminds one of 
Georges Bataille. Excess as the force that traverses life, but does not 
reduce life into self-realisation: the force that exceeds the boundaries 
of life, puts it at risk, creates something for its own sake.394 
The abstract machine can be understood as, literally, the 
diagram of a given assemblage. It lays out the space of possibility for a 
given assemblage and, as a virtual process, is not reducible to the 
content-expression axis of assemblages. Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
An abstract machine in itself [in contrast to assemblages] is not 
physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic; it is diagrammatic 
(it knows nothing of the distinction between the artificial and 
natural either). It operates by matter, not by substance; by function, 
not by form. Substances and forms are of expression ‘or’ of content. 
But functions are not yet ‘semiotically’ formed, and matters are not 
yet ‘physically’ formed. The abstract matter is pure Matter-Function 
– a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions 
and contents it will distribute.395  
 
Diagram thus denotes the construction of the real “yet to come”, the 
virtual potentiality for the qualitative change of a certain assemblage. 
As the quotation above suggests the diagram does not conform to 
identity bestowed by substance or form, but instead addresses the 
dynamics  of  matter.  In  art  this  “diagrammatism”  appears  as  the  
problematisation of the work of art’s own medium or “support”. The 
diagram is the movement from accepting a certain arrangement of 
elements as it usually is perceived to seeing the assemblage in an 
entirely new perspective. A major part of Deleuze’s work has been the 
analysis of different types of artistic practises and the location of their 
respective diagrams. Cinema, images and the dismantling of the 
sensory-motor schema; music, refrain and its deterritorialization; 
painting, figures and nonrepresentative diagrams; literature, language 
and its stuttering… All these diagrammatic functions open up the 
perception of the work of art into a sensation and offer glimpses of 
the  world  outside  the  lived  existence  of  a  subject.  In  what  follows  I  
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wish  to  address  one  instance  of  diagrammatism  in  the  practice  of  
music – and especially in the field of music I term phonographic.  
 
 
5.3 The Repetition and Difference of Recording 
 
So far, I have elaborated a conception of the work of art, the artist 
and  art  itself  in  terms  that  can  bring  to  mind  an  almost  mythical  
practice of becoming-other, where both the artist and the audience is 
swept away in a line of flight of nonpersonal affects and inhuman 
forces.  What  this  notion  lacks,  at  least  on  the  level  of  rhetoric,  is  a  
certain emphasis on those concrete artistic practices which constitute 
the assemblage of art. After all, with Deleuze we are dealing with 
empiricism, however transcendental its operational object is. To remind: 
“In no way do we believe in a fine-arts system”, state Deleuze and 
Guattari, but rather: “we believe in very diverse problems whose 
solutions are found in heterogeneous arts”.396 
It  is  my  belief  that  one  crucial  feature  to  keep  in  mind vis-à-vis 
Deleuze’s writings on art is the very heterogeneity of the practice of 
arts. Deleuze’s own repertoire ranges from pure ontological systems 
to  very  concrete  readings  of  singular  works  of  art.  As  he  can  be  
characterised, perhaps ultimately, as a thinker trying to provide an 
account for immanence that is not unity or totality, a similar principle 
is beneficial in discussing the function of art in Deleuze’s thought. 
Here, the concept of the assemblage is of great value, as it provides a 
way of addressing complex systems as continuing processes of 
individuations. Likewise, the aspect of the simulacrum – originally 
bestowed upon art by Deleuze, and later on discarded – is very useful 
in thinking of art’s practical existence fathomed as possessing both 
representative and anti-representative features. 
Art-as-assemblage situates the practice of art among other 
(human) activity, accounts for the heterogeneity of those practices and 
affirms the historicity of the components of the work of art. Also, the 
dynamism of the assemblage model allows for understanding art – the 
practice of it, production, distribution and reception – both in terms 
of  the  virtual  and  the  actual.  However  justified  on  the  basis  of  
Deleuze’s metaphysics, Deleuzean accounts of the arts tend to focus 
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on the deterritorializing force of the sensation and thus discard the 
particularities  of  singular  works  of  art.  These  are,  after  all,  as  much  
objects as they are lines of flight. It is the actual, present-at-hand world 
that  is  immersed  in  the  virtual,  as  Deleuze  notes  already  in  Difference 
and Repetition: “Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of 
the real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the 
virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective 
dimension”.397  
With this understanding in mind, it can be stated that art entails 
the production of objects which always takes place in a certain 
historical and social situation. These objects, as assemblages, have 
their actual side (content and expression) and their virtual side (the 
diagram, sensation, the line of flight) and can undergo themselves and 
effect on others processes of stabilisation and destabilisation. The 
virtual is, according to Deleuze, the transcendental condition of the 
object, but it is useful to comprehend the virtual as an ontological 
category or  mode  of  being,  not  as  a  lofty,  removed  realm  of  
disembodied forces and sensations. The virtual resides within things; it 
is the “relational” dimension of things which enables us to understand 
the relationship between discrete things and superindividual 
structures. The elaborations of the dynamism of the assemblage are 
worked out in A Thousand Plateaus, and that work is the main reference 
for the Deleuzean assemblage theory of art. The lasting interest in and 
fascination with a successful piece of art, understood as assemblage, 
subsists because it renews itself via internal and external activity, 
conceptualisable via the axis of de- and reterritorialization. The work 
of art both deterritorializes and reterritorializes. Art is the freedom to 
experiment: to question the present actual state and expose its 
constitution, to create novelty, but also to give “something” to “us”, 
that is, not to annihilate the object or the subject completely via 
absolute deterritorialization. Still, something new is produced in a 
successful  work  of  art,  a  new  sensation,  and  it  is  the  task  of  
empiricism account for this: “the aim is not to discover the eternal or 
the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new 
is produced (creativeness)”.398 
                                               
397 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 208–209. 
398 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. vii. 
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To find the conditions – relating to both the actual and the 
virtual – under which something new is produced in the practice of 
art,  I  wish  to  devote  the  rest  of  this  final  chapter  to  a  few concrete  
examples of certain works. To emphasise the relevance of the 
problematic of the dynamism between de- and restabilising features in 
processes of individuation in analysing works of art, my view will be 
on repetition in art. To avoid generalisation and to highlight the 
necessity of addressing particular aggregates of works of art when 
studying the functioning of art, I will specifically focus on the 
question of material repetition in music; that is to say, on the question 
of phonography in music. In the phonographic assemblage we will find a 
complex composite of parts, relation to time, as well as both internal 
and external processes of de- and reterritorializations of the refrain. 
 
THE PHONOGRAPHIC ASSEMBLAGE 
 
I am sitting in a room different from the one you are in now. I am recording the 
sound of my speaking voice and I am going to play it back into the room again 
and again until the resonant frequencies of the room reinforce themselves so that 
any semblance of my speech, with perhaps the exception of rhythm, is destroyed. 
What you will hear, then, are the natural resonant frequencies of the room 
articulated by speech. I regard this activity not so much as a demonstration of a 
physical fact, but, more as a way to smooth out any irregularities my speech 
might have. 
 
I Am Sitting in a Room, Alvin Lucier’s 1970 composition for voice and 
electromagnetic tape, features the composer speaking the text quoted 
above and recording the speech, playing the recording back and 
recording this in turn, repeating this procedure for a number of times. 
The aural effect is described in the text: the resonant frequencies of 
the room where the recording and re-recording is made are 
highlighted with each subsequent playback. As the re-recordings are 
compiled in the final work one after the other, we hear the spoken 
paragraph  first  as  a  very  “natural”  sounding  recording,  and  then,  as  
the  1st,  2nd,  3rd,  4th… generation re-recordings follow each other, the 
voice gradually loses its linguistic primacy and becomes a catalyst of 
the room’s resonance. Each successive repetition of the playback 
accumulates the potential resonances inherent in the material 
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properties of the acoustic space. Words become unintelligible, and the 
qualities of human voice are also erased, leaving a rhythmic, “metallic” 
sounding resonant noise.  
This process of the erasure of linguistic dimension of the voice 
by subsequent re-recordings can be illustrated by the following 
diagram where the innermost circle represents the first recording and 
the concentric circles the subsequent re-recordings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gradually, with each repetition, Lucier’s voice becomes noise. With I 
Am Sitting in a Room we are at the heart of the recording technology’s 
subversive, anti-representative potential: with repetition comes difference. 
Yet,  at  first  hand,  one  could  consider  the  recorded  media  as  the  
paradigm of re-presentation: the capture of an original event into 
material medium ready for redeployment. Push the play-button and 
reproduce the same as before. If representation is the repetition of the 
same, the force that introduces difference in the recorded medium 
must work by another means of repetition and here we must turn to 
Deleuze’s conception of difference-in-itself. 
It  is  clear  that  there  exists  an  ideal  of  transparency  in  the  
reproductive capacity of recorded media: what else has the impulse 
for technological advance in that field produced other than successive 
generations of higher and higher definition within media platforms? 
Clearer, louder – what is high fidelity if not fidelity to the “truth” of the 
world and an aspiration of its faithful reproduction? This aspiration 
has resulted in a veritable history of recording technologies, and the 
promise of transparency in representation seems to be closer and 
closer at hand.399 Still, the “fidelity” in high fidelity remains to be 
questioned.  What is  the nature that  the artifice of  its  reproduction is  
                                               
399 See, for example, David Morton, Sound Recording: The Life Story of a Technology (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 131. Morton claims that the earliest proponents of the ideal 
of high fidelity sound reproduction were sound engineers and technicians, concerned with the 
task of clear and “lifelike” transmission. 
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supposed to represent? The very idea of a recording contains a 
reference to some originary moment from which the recording is 
more or less successful reproduction. A Popular Science advertisement 
for Edison phonographs proclaims the aim of high fidelity: “the 
phonograph serves but one purpose – to Re-Create voice or 
instrument with human reality. When a phonograph does this, 
nothing more can be asked – it has reached perfection”.400 
Therefore, there is a foundational Platonism within the idea of 
phonography – the art of reproduction of auditory phenomena – as 
the model of original and copy haunts the act of recording. To be 
sure, a similar Platonism persists in every form of reproduction, but 
its influence is perhaps most notable within the domain of the audible. 
This is due to the perceived “natural” quality of audio recordings: 
even though, due to the years of photographic reproduction, we have 
come to face visual images within a certain scepticism or awareness of 
the possibility of manipulation, auditory information is still often 
received “as it is”. We cannot “see” the manipulations that a sound 
reproduction may contain. This is due to differences of perception 
between the visual and the auditory phenomena: whereas the visual 
field is very much definable in terms of space populated by various 
distinctive objects, the auditory sphere presents a difficult question 
about the object-like status of its units. What we hear are sounds, but 
not sounds as distinct sound-objects comparable to visually perceived 
phenomena. Rather, sounds unfold in time, and strike us as results or 
indications of various processes. Sound is vibration in a carrier 
medium. As such, sound is movement: without vibration there would 
be no sound.  
In this way, the aural world comes to be understood as much, or 
even  more,  in  terms  of  time  and  movement  as  in  terms  of  objects  
inhabiting a given space. Sound is immersive: a soundscape within 
which we as listeners are immersed, with sounds co-existing and 
influencing each other in a reciprocal process. This quality of the 
auditory makes it much more akin to the intense duration of time than 
the spatial type of temporality, as discussed in chapter three. 
Therefore the example of sound recording might hold a special 
interest from a Deleuzean point of view. A sound recording is,  then, 
much more “in tune” with our unmediated experience of auditory 
                                               
400 “The New Edison Phonograph” in Popular Science, April 1927, p. 67. 
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phenomena. The eye makes distinctions more acutely: the highest 
definition visual reproduction is revealed as an image to our senses. 
But for sound, the source – whether mediated or unmediated – is not 
necessarily so apparent. Hence the perceived naturalness of sound 
recordings, with a “live” capture of an event-like performance as its 
paradigm. Press record, then press play.  
Yet, this naturalness makes us deaf to the complex process of 
sound recording and the product-like nature of presentation, which is 
perhaps more obvious in visual media reproductions. As media 
theorist Friedrich Kittler states, the cut has been present in visual media 
from the beginning: no recording surface can ever capture as such the 
frequency of electromagnetic radiation within the spectrum of visual 
light. Every visual experience is fragmented, with the 24-frames-per-
second standard of cinema projection as an excellent instance of this, 
and every depiction of an action is comprised of distinct segments. 
Sound, on the contrary, takes place on much lower wavelengths of 
approximately  20–20000  hertz  and  is  recordable  onto  a  surface  as  a  
graph of the sound wave. For Kittler, this difference in the 
frequencies of the respective mediums results in the fact that cuts – 
audio manipulations – have entered sound production and 
reproduction at a relatively late stage of technological progress of 
recording methods.401 
So, it is my claim that we have a more “uncomplicated” attitude 
towards sound reproduction than to visual media of representation, 
and this natural attitude corresponds with the notion of sensory-
motor schema, as developed by Deleuze in his Cinema books. We 
schematise the hearing of a sound recording as a reception of an 
“organic” whole. Yet, this perception of organicism is an abstraction, 
as Deleuze states: 
 
The sensory-motor image effectively retains from the thing only 
what interests us … Its richness is thus superficial and comes from 
the fact that it associates with the thing [portrayed] many different 
things that resemble it on the same plane, in so far as they provoke 
all the same movements: it is grass in general that interests the 
                                               
401 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and 
Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 117–118. 
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herbivore. It is in this sense that the sensory-motor schema is an 
agent of abstraction.402 
 
By extension, every listening experience of a “natural” whole issuing 
from the loudspeakers is a similar abstraction. Every interference by 
the recording medium itself in this natural schema of listening is 
perceived as destabilising the experience and, accordingly, as 
unwanted “noise”. Therefore the “outside” of naturalised, sensory-
motoric auditory reception lies specifically within these interruptions 
of the high fidelity ideal. If something is to deterritorialize the 
representational schema of the record as the mediation of an original 
identity that is transcendent to this relay, it is namely the interruption 
in  this  system:  a  scratch,  a  glitch  in  the  process,  a  sudden  swell  of  
feedback. 
There is a comparison to be made with Deleuze’s extended 
discussion of the stages of that other recorded form of art, cinema. 
Whereas cinema reached its maturity, or its own character, with the 
time-image, recorded music can be argued to have achieved the same 
when it took the leap of de-naturalising the transparency of its own 
medium. To return to I Am Sitting in a Room: the process of successive 
recording of the previous re-recordings slowly shifts the machinic 
assemblage of the recording into an expressive dimension. Certain 
resonances surface through repetition, which intensifies the potential 
acoustic features of the space in which the recording happens, as well 
as the peculiarities of the speaking voice which is relayed in the room. 
Here the assemblage-like nature of the work of art must be recalled: 
out of the level of content emerges expression. Yet, this emergence 
cannot  be  determined  or  calculated  in  advance,  as  it  is  due  to  the  
virtual potential of the assemblage: the effect of a work cannot be 
predetermined on the basis of its material components, as affects are 
real  but  virtual  and  can  be  actualised  in  various  ways.  Still,  the  
affective dimension of the work depends upon the material 
components, as they provide the stratum through which the 
assemblage’s expressive capacity can be fulfilled.  
 
 
 
                                               
402 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 43. 
 192 
 
THE CONTENT AND EXPRESSION OF A WORK OF ART 
I Am Sitting in a Room as an assemblage incorporates many virtual 
tendencies within its components. Within the axis of content and 
expression in an assemblage, the material conditions of a certain 
voice, room, recording and playback equipment form the side of the 
content. Expression then emerges out of the assembly of these 
components, but not out of any assembly whatsoever. As Deleuze 
and Guattari write about Franz Kafka’s literary method: “Expression 
must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings”.403 If the 
assemblage would proceed from content to expression in a 
predictable manner, there would be no expression, strictly speaking. 
In the case of I Am Sitting in a Room, this would amount to halting the 
process of recording the speech to only the first layer and then playing 
it back as a finished piece, essentially repeating the recording as the 
Same of the original speech event. Arguably, it is only when the work 
breaks this pre-given form of the recording-as-relay that it achieves a 
level of novel expression: the voice deterritorializes from the “I” that 
is sitting in a room; the “room” is itself deterritorialized in a 
kaleidoscopic manner into a hall of mirrors, as the re-recordings 
multiply the virtual capacities of the acoustic space. A new kind of 
affect emerges, independent of the speaking voice, of the room and of 
the recording equipment alone. 
The process inherent in the form of the work in I Am Sitting in a 
Room expresses the virtual potential of recording in general: starting 
with a “natural” depiction of speaking voice and then progressively 
denaturalising it with each successive repetition of recording, the piece 
brings out the awareness that there is no natural recording – and no 
natural experience. Every phenomenon is a result of synthesis of 
elements prior to experience and therefore like a simulacrum, as these 
elements may be heterogeneous and not deducible from the form of 
the complete, already-formed perception. The unique character of a 
work of art is that it does not try to hide its essence as a simulacrum, 
unlike other phenomena which are encountered within the framework 
of consensual appropriation. As we remember, Deleuze proclaims 
that the task of the work of art is to “fight against clichés”, denoting 
                                               
403 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 28. 
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that the counter-actualising power of artistic presentations is quickly 
harnessed into the domain of common sense and recognition.  
To fight against clichés is to overturn the logic of 
representation. A work of art, if it is to function as art, must provoke 
an encounter with the senses rather than recognition of a common 
form. Then, the work of art functions as a sign, as Deleuze nominates 
it  in  considering  Marcel  Proust’s  work,  as  was  discussed  in  chapter  
two.  Here  the  sign  must  be  understood in  terms  of  sensation  rather  
than significance and it is rightly the encounter of thought with its 
outside which forces us to think – either in concepts or, in accordance 
with the methodology of art, in sensations (affects and percepts). In 
everyday terms, sensation is the visceral reaction provoked by a work, 
experienced prior to any meaning or representation. It is therefore 
plausible  to  claim  that  music  as  an  art  form  is  geared  towards  
sensation rather than understanding, or that, at least, in the reception 
of music the autonomous, affective bodily reaction is as important as 
an intellectual appreciation. Music thus would seem to contain an 
exceedingly rich reservoir of difference: in reception, it “makes 
difference” as it has the potential to provide us with a novel sensation.  
 
MUSIC,  REPRODUCTION AND ACOUSMATIC LISTENING 
Yet, what about repetition? Most of the music consumed today is 
encountered via recordings on a variety of platforms: digital audio 
files on MP3 players, computers and cell phones, DVDs and CDs, 
vinyl  LPs  and  cassette  tapes,  to  name but  the  obvious.  How are  the  
shock of the new and the subversion of clichés demanded of art even 
possible in the midst of media which base their functioning on 
repetition?  Play  a  song  time  and  time  again  and  you  feel  its  impact  
lessening as familiarity sets in. Does not the repeatability of a 
recording make it into a territorial, over-coding assemblage, ready to 
return the deterritorializing force of music into the region of the 
similar and the familiar? Moreover, does not the unit-like nature of a 
recording make it but a commodity, easily bought and sold, subject to 
global trade of goods? Evidently, yes – but even though recording 
technology facilitates the perpetual “bad” repetition of the same, it 
still holds its own potential of subversion. The concept of frequency, 
according to Kittler, brought about by recording technology, allows 
music to break with the Old European tradition of Pythagorean 
 194 
 
harmony and notation as the preserver of clear and pure sounds (in 
opposition to the chaotic noise of the world). This would mean a way 
of thinking in accordance with representational thinking: musical 
harmony reflects some kind of pre-existing harmony in the world, and 
disharmony deviates from this pre-given identity. One can ascribe the 
function of preserving this eternal harmony to musical notation. Yet, 
since the 19th Century sound has been recordable, vibrations in a 
carrying medium transferable to a recording surface. What is more, 
the recording surface functions not as a subject but as a machine: as 
Kittler states “[t]he phonograph does not hear as our ears that have 
been trained immediately to filter voices, words and sounds out of 
noise; it registers acoustic events as such”.404 The phonograph hears 
and records auditory events acousmatically, without reference to the 
origin of a sound.  
The term acousmatique, “acousmatic”, was first used in relation to 
music by the French avant-garde composer Pierre Schaeffer. It 
denotes the effect on music brought about by technology allowing the 
recording and reproduction of music without apparent reference to 
the original production of the recorded sounds. In acousmatic music 
– such as Schaeffer’s musique concrete – one focuses on the “texture” of 
the sounds, not on their origins.405 In  Schaeffer’s  case  this  was  
supposed to reduce the context of musical appreciation to sound and 
hearing alone and thus to break the gestural “sensory-motor schema” 
of listening. For Kittler, the “machinic” hearing enabled by 
reproduction makes possible for the first time in history “writing 
without a subject”.406 
What the subject filters out, the phonograph records. Given 
Deleuze’s conception of the formation of the subject in three-stage 
synthesis, as discussed in chapter one, we can state that the 
phonographic mode of recording corresponds with the first stage of 
the synthesis. Whereas the score as musical mnemotechnics works  as  a  
language, preserving and distributing music via symbolic means, the 
phonograph effects a material transduction of sonic intensities. As 
Robin Mackay has noted: “where the score represents, phonography 
                                               
404 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 23. 
405 See Pierre Schaeffer, “Acousmatics”, trans. Daniel W. Smith, in Audio Culture: Readings in 
Modern Music, eds. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 76–81.   
406 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 44. 
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simply transduces”.407 On the recording surface there are waveforms 
and frequencies, not notes. Thus within a representational apparatus 
we find an anti-representational materiality of a uniquely aural 
medium.  However,  it  is  clear  that  most  of  the  music  produced  and  
distributed within phonographical means falls within the 
representational model, whether in its form (musical expression, 
programmatic music, the lyrical content) or in its reception (regarding 
the recording as a substitute for the real event of live performance). 
Yet, paralleling Deleuze’s understanding of the evolution of cinema, 
the advances made in recording technology have ushered in a type of 
music made with and for “phonographic consciousness”, encouraging 
the  acousmatic  mode  of  listening.  As  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state  
regarding musical Modernism: “Certain modern musicians oppose the 
transcendental plan(e) of organization, which is said to have 
dominated all of Western classical music, to the immanent sound 
plane,  which  is  always  given  along  with  that  to  which  it  gives  rise,  
brings the imperceptible to perception, and carries only differential 
speeds and slownesses in a kind of molecular lapping: the work of art 
must mark seconds, tenths and hundredths of seconds”.408 These 
fractions of seconds are musical time in its materiality: not time as the 
space between notes but time as the texture and sonority of sounds 
themselves, gathered together to form an assemblage on the 
recording.  
In what I nominate as “phonographic music” the material 
transduction of sonic intensities is thematised and researched.409 As a 
medium of acousmatic listening, the recording makes possible the 
immanent sound plane, as it detaches the aural material from the 
representative submission to the symbolic order of the score or from 
the expressive gesture of the performer. The record as a material 
                                               
407 Robin Mackay, “Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Wildstyle in Full Effect” in Deleuze and 
Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 250. 
I have also discussed the materiality of the phonographic medium in the context of 
contemporary electronic dance music (Janne Vanhanen, “Loving the Ghost in the Machine: 
Aesthetics of Interruption” in Life in the Wires: The CTheory Reader, eds. Arthur Kroker and 
Marilouise Kroker [Victoria, Canada: NWP Books, 2004), and regarding the novel 
problematic of digital sound manipulation (Vanhanen, “Virtual Sound: Examining Glitch and 
Production”, Contemporary Music Review, vol. 22, no. 4 [2003]). 
408 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 267. 
409 This takes place both in academic and popular music settings, usually in the experimental 
interzone of both milieus. Examples include electroacoustic music, the studio experiments of 
the Beatles in late 1960s, electronic music both academic and popular et cetera.   
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medium refers not to the past (the act of recording) but to the future 
(its reception); it is potentially the point when sound is 
deterritorialized into sonic matter, detached from the pre-given 
images – instruments, established musical forms, the “real time” of 
performance – bestowed upon music. Phonographic music is 
characterised by its nature as a pseudo-event: there is necessarily no 
original event which the recording represents. This is because the 
phonograph hears acousmatically, without reference to the origins of 
a given sound, as discussed above. Phonography deterritorializes 
sound, flattens the score's transcendental plane of organization into a 
smooth plane of sound. On a computer's hard disk sound data is 
distributed rhizomatically: any given byte can be de- and reconnected 
with others, given temporary stability in various arrangements.  
Any given recording is a “full body”, lacking nothing, without 
reference to any exterior symbolic order: sound data without a subject. 
The  fact  that  we  hear,  say,  a  recording  of  a  classical  work  any  
differently than a location recording of the soundscape of a city is 
partly due to our reception history and various cultural assemblages. 
From a machinic point of view (or hearing) there is essentially no 
difference between those two recordings. Phonography thus makes 
possible the re-evaluation of the relation between representation and 
“empty”, non-representative sounds. Recording technology is 
essentially referential machinery, and yet makes non-referential, 
acousmatic, sound possible in the first place. What you hear is what you 
get. The sound coming out of the loudspeakers does not have a 
representational relation to its origin, which would act as its 
transcendent essence in a representative system. The phonographic 
sound exemplifies the “radical” relationality of assemblages: if being is 
in germinal relations and their production of reality, as discussed in 
chapter two, and not in essences and their accidental relations to one 
another, then the ontological status of a recording is not of a lesser 
“scale” in a Platonic hierarchy of forms, manifestations, copies and 
simulacra. This is the apotheosis of simulacra: the question of the 
content of a recording does not concern its identity or its meaning, 
but its effect; how it functions as an assemblage among other 
assemblages. 
Deleuze describes the methodology of art breaking with the 
representational schema in cinema and painting. In cinema the time-
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image functions as a “shock” to the audience, breaking with a 
narrative structure, forcing the viewer to extrapolate possible senses to 
the montage of images and thus to think of the essentially temporal 
medium of film itself. In the case of painting, Deleuze considers the 
art of the Modernist painter Francis Bacon and discovers a certain 
type of painterly diagrammatism as  a  way  to  fight  against  the  pictorial  
clichés. The diagrammatic components in painting are various non-
representative and asignifying visual elements, such as colour fields, 
lines, markings and scratchings. The concept of the diagram can be 
extended to  other  fields  of  art  as  well.  As  was  discussed  concerning  
the assemblage, the diagram is a genetic or germinal element, but also 
a catastrophic event: it disrupts and extends the space of possibility of 
a given assemblage.  
In  the  case  of  music  Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  concept  of  the  
refrain was discussed above. The refrain is the expression that rises 
out of the material components of a certain assemblage (milieu) and 
turns it into an expressive arrangement, territory. However, the refrain 
also works in a contrary fashion, binding the deterritorialized 
components into a new stable territory. This dynamism of 
actualisation and counter-actualisation characterises the 
morphogenetic process of nature. In every assemblage or territory 
there can be identified both territorializing and deterritorializing 
elements. In phonographic music the deterritorializing or 
diagrammatic elements are those that I propose to be virtual sounds, 
that is, aural elements that work in themselves as counter-stabilising 
forces to the “natural” arrangement of production–reproduction 
schema. Thus, the diagrammatic elements of phonographic music can 
be recognised by answering the question: what constitutes a 
disruption of the ideal of high fidelity? The answer is noise.  
 
VOICE VERSUS NOISE 
The phonographic assemblage pertains to a more general tendency in 
Western  musical  tradition  which  Jacques  Attali  defines  as  the  co-
existence of music and society. In his book Noise Attali states that 
music’s organization mirrors that of the society: music represents the 
social order, it is our collective memory. He notes: “Music runs 
parallel  to  human  society,  is  structured  like  it,  and  changes  when  it  
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does”.410 Attali sees a fundamental parallel between the development 
of societal and musical forms: in pre-capitalist societies music was a 
form of ritual violence. Thus, society is an assemblage of sublimating 
physical violence into rituals, while music is an assemblage of 
sublimating the violence of noise into music. As Attali nominates 
them, noise is the “simulacrum of murder” and music the 
“simulacrum of sacrifice”.411 
In Attali’s view music emerges as an assemblage devised to 
suppress noise and to represent the orderly organised society, 
providing the mirror-image of harmony to society’s organic 
consistency. Thus, there is an analogical relation between societal and 
musical order, similar to the relationship between society and 
economy. Attali states: “The entire history of tonal music, like that of 
classical political economy, amounts to an attempt to make people 
believe in a consensual representation of the world”.412 Attali proceeds 
to  compare  the  history  of  Western  classical  music  to  political  and  
economic factors of its time, but what can be highlighted here is the 
crux of Attali’s argument: music is a representation of society. This 
corresponds well with Deleuze’s view on representational thinking, 
which evaluates phenomena and bestows on them identity according 
to  their  relation  to  a  pre-given  totality.  In  such  a  schema,  music  
amounts to a certain set of acceptable tones and forms, with 
everything else delimited as interfering noise. According to this type 
of dispensation, noise can be defined in signal processing terms as 
unwanted data without meaning. According to Attali, noise – as the 
simulacrum of originary societal violence that has been sublimated – 
appears  as  a  source  of  unease  and  pain  as  it  erupts  in  the  midst  of  
                                               
410 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 10.  
411 Attali, Noise, pp. 27–28. Approaching the question of mimeticism in terms of human 
society, the French philosopher René Girard has offered an anthropologically tinged 
observation that social formations are primarily constituted on the basis of originary mimetic 
violence. In a community desire is mimetic: one desires the object of another’s desire. As this 
mutual desire escalates into a conflict of antagonists, the object of rivalry ceases to be the 
object of desire, but rather the antagonism itself. A mutual enemy or scapegoat emerges. The 
destruction of scapegoat, now the sacred object of sacrifice, appeases the desire for violence 
and restores social order. In Attali’s theory music can be seen as the sublimated form of this 
sacrificial violence. See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1988).   
412 Attali, Noise, p. 46. 
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consensual reality.413 Noise intrudes on the voice of reason, since it 
disrupts the relaying of society-perpetuating messages.  
This charges the age of phonography with subversive potential. 
One the one hand, the method of recording sound feeds into the 
societal relay-machinery and enhances the dissemination of 
consensual representations. Any type of recording has been deployed 
as a method of social control, from census to criminal records. Attali 
states: “Stockpiling memory, retaining history or time, distributing 
speech, and manipulating information has always been an attribute of 
civil and priestly power”.414 On the other hand, recording technology 
has enabled the detachment of sound matter from the confines of 
notation and musical traditions of mastery in composition and 
performance. This has effected a shift in the ontological status of 
sound: the dualism of tone and noise has been replaced by a 
continuum running from silence to noise. From this point of view we 
can see that the immanent sound plane is noise, not a transcendent 
harmony. Noise does not disrupt a pre-given meaning, but rather 
forms the genetic condition for the emergence of representative 
systems of harmony, tone and musical form.  
Corresponding with the development of recording and sound 
production techniques, many musical forms have emerged which can 
be nominated as foundationally phonographical. These include 
movements  both  in  academic  avant-garde  music,  as  well  as  in  the  
context of popular music. Within the avant-garde, composers such as 
Edgar Varèse, Karlheinz Stockhausen and Iannis Xenakis have 
incorporated atonal and dissonant elements, often produced with 
non-traditional instruments, into their compositions. Pioneering 
composers of electro-acoustic music, musique concrète, such as Pierre 
Schaeffer, Pierre Henry and Luc Ferrari, utilised compositional 
material derived from recordings of non-instrumental sounds. 
Minimalists such as John Cage or Steve Reich devised various chance 
techniques to introduce indeterminacy to the compositional process, 
ultimately in order to reduce the control of the composer over the 
emerging processual work. Within popular music, from the 1960s 
onward the studio has increasingly played a much more pivotal role in 
producing the then-emergent medium of album-as-artform. The 
                                               
413 Attali, Noise, p. 26. 
414 Attali, Noise, p. 87. 
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upheaval of the punk movement at the end of the 1970s disseminated 
the idea that the artists themselves could take initiative in producing, 
manufacturing and distributing their work. This, in turn, effectuated a 
new kind of do-it-yourself culture in both academic and popular 
music methodology and resulted in the diminishing of previous 
cultural boundaries as a hip hop DJ in Brooklyn could be considered 
as a collage artist and sound producer in a similar way as a Modernist 
composer in Darmstadt. Finally, with the advent of affordable 
computers and digital music software, the demarcation line between 
“art music” and popular music formulated in terms of the conditions 
of production has been all but torn down.  
 
THE ENGINEER AND THE SYNTHESISER  
What emerges as the figure of the sonic experimenter, whether 
working at home and running a small scale record label, or funded by 
academic  institutions  and  working  at  IRCAM,  is  the  figure  of  the  
engineer. This term can encompass factual recording engineers, but also 
producers, musicians, managers and advisors, sound artists, film audio 
designers et cetera. What is important is the function that the engineer 
realises within the sound recording assemblage and this is comparable 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s figure of the artisan. Music, they say, is akin 
to metallurgy in the sense that both domains concern going beyond 
the hylomorphic division between matter and form. Instead, both 
music and metallurgy achieve a continuous variation of matter and 
development of form in the common sphere of dynamism within 
materiality.  
What this amounts to is that music – or various other practices 
of art – and metallurgy take as their concern the implicit “non-
organic” life within their respective materials. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
imperative to the artisan is: follow the flow of matter. This entails 
both the implicit forms distributed in matter as singularities, as well as 
the intensive affects as traits of expression, as discussed in chapter 
two.  For  the  former  they  offer  the  example  of  various  undulations  
and torsions as singularities within wood, which the plane maker has 
to take into account when planning to split a piece of wood. For the 
latter, they offer intensities of more or less elasticity or porosity within 
the wood, which define the parameters of the wood’s ability to absorb 
and distribute force. For the woodworker, both singularities and 
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intensities are factors which one has to take into account when 
working the material. Therefore, the question can no longer be of 
imposing a pre-given form upon previously passive matter, but of 
mutual interaction of wood and the worker.415  
What  the  metallurgist  does,  for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  is  to  
utilise intuition in action in following the flow of matter (material 
phylum), or various second-order flows, such as markets. What sets the 
metallurgist apart from other types of craftsmen is that metalwork 
does not conform to the model of the mold and the clay, that is, to 
the model of form-to-be-imposed and matter-to-be-formed. Working 
the material cannot be fathomed as metal incarnating a form, or 
achieving its ultimate form through a succession of point-like 
intermediary forms. Rather, metalwork is a continuous process of 
formation and deformation: adaptative transformation and 
development. It is just this “widened chromaticism” that marks the 
point in common between metallurgy and music.416 
Music  and  metallurgy  thus  both  stand  as  emblems  for  the  
artisan’s (musician-engineer’s or metallurgist’s) approach to matter as 
mutual becoming which recognises the virtual aspect of material as a 
dynamic, pre-individual field of potentials that need to be worked out, 
not imposed in advance. Deleuze and Guattari nominate a name for 
the  abstract  machine  or  space  of  possibility  for  such  a  musical  
endeavour: the synthesiser, as it “places all of the parameters [of sound-
matter] in continuous variation”. 417 The synthesiser, as a general 
nomination for a “sound machine”, is the ultimate producer of 
simulacra. In my view, to make “fundamentally heterogeneous 
elements end up turning into each other in some way” is to produce 
simulacral identities able to hold together heterogeneity. 
The synthesiser is an abstract machine of producing material 
variation within the assemblage of music, whether this happens via 
the concrete material means of the human voice, musical synthesisers 
and other electronic instruments, recording and playback devices or 
acoustic instruments. I propose that phonography is a special category 
for this abstract machine, as it enables the metallurgical working of 
sound-matter in a sustained way and that the phonograph should be 
                                               
415 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 408. 
416 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 411. 
417 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 109. 
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evaluated in the same conceptual category as the synthesiser. Within 
the phonographic abstract machine a certain set of virtual or “critical” 
sounds can be identified. They are diagrams in relation to the musical 
assemblage; meta-sounds which are critical in the sense that they 
explore and expose the conditions of their own production. Such 
methods of the musician-engineer are, for example, distortion, feedback, 
the scratch and its digital equivalent, the glitch. 
By turning a machine intended for sound reproduction into a 
machine addressing the question of its own conditions, these critical 
sounds imply a virtual field of metastability within the assemblage. 
They  can  be  assigned  proper  names  and  dates:  in  1958  Link  Wray  
punctures the speaker cone of his guitar amplifier and produces a 
distortion to the tone of the guitar, he expands the tonal character of 
the guitar–amplifier circuit. In 1969 Jimi Hendrix plays Star Spangled 
Banner at the Woodstock festival, turning the representation of 
national identity into a feedback-washed lament of the disappearance 
of  1960s  ideals  in  the  face  of  the  Vietnam  War.  In  1977  DJ  Grand  
Wizard Theodore first takes hold of the record he is playing and starts 
to scratch it against the stylus, producing a whole new kind of variable 
meta-sound out of the graphs of sound within the vinyl grooves. Or 
in 1985 Yasunao Tone sticks office tape onto the reading surface of a 
CD and disables the error-correction mechanism of a Compact Disc 
player, allowing the machine to produce its own variations from the 
scrambled contact between the player and the vandalised disc. One 
can come up with various examples, but the crux of the matter is that 
here are unearthed the diagrams of the phonographic assemblage. They 
are deployed in order to locate the singularities or points of intensity 
within the assemblage to effect a qualitative change in the arrangement, 
and thus deterritorialize the assemblage into something new – to 
enable novel sonic thinking. What once was a standard public address 
system is now a feedback machine for new kind of piercing sonorities 
issuing from the circuit of microphone and amplifier. The spiral 
grooves of a vinyl LP are deformed into Baroque flourishes by the 
hand  that  breaks  the  flow  of  record-time  and  starts  to  sculpt  it  by  
scratching the record. It is also apparent that these new affects are not 
the property of the artist, for she is not their creator but rather a 
finder – like the metallurgist, digging deep to uncover the veins of ore.  
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It seems that like there is music proper to birds, there is music 
proper to synthesisers, sequencers and record players. Music is not an 
exclusively human phenomenon; as Kodwo Eshun writes, humans 
can be considered the sex organs of synthesisers, making possible the 
continuing variation of sound-matter, but not possessing it.418 Sound 
frequencies belong to the universe: everything that happens emits 
sound, given a carrier medium for the vibrations of that happening. 
Affect and expression are not limited to humans, not even to animals, 
but concern the non-organic life of matter itself. That is to say that 
works of art function as a conduit for a world that is not created for 
human needs. Art works are the opening up of our Umwelt into new 
affects taking hold of them. Art concerns the milieu which is 
determined by the affects of a certain individual; the territory which 
springs into existence by the emergence of expressive components 
within the milieu; and, crucially, the deterritorialization of that 
territory, opening the territorial assemblage into its outside and 
changing its consistency. This process, the art-function,  results  in  a  
novel phenomenon which is aesthetic in the Kantian way: it does not 
fall into the grip of an a priori judgment but must rather be evaluated 
there-and-then. As art operates in intensities, or affects, it addresses 
the faculty of sensibility first and foremost: representations of the 
mind, extension and quality, formed by the faculty of reason, follow 
only after the shock of sensation. In this way art opens eyes and ears 
to inhuman worlds, engenders new thought, creates novelty in the 
world and effects an encounter with the virtual.  
 
 
                                               
418 Kodwo Eshun, More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction (London: Quartet 
Books, 1998), pp. 86–87. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
What the discussion above has hopefully shown is that art understood 
as assemblage makes possible the location of art in the art-function. 
This function denotes a process of thinking through material means 
and locating those points of intensity within matter which can effect a 
qualitative change in a given material assemblage. As it is a function, it 
can take place in various strata (material, biological and cultural) and 
in different circumstances. Art-function can emerge on various levels 
of assemblages. For instance, a singular product of, say, popular 
culture might be considered uninteresting, mundane or even artless 
and yet can contribute to the production of aesthetic sensations as a 
component part of a wider, "upper-level" assemblage. The question is 
of scale. The sense of a phenomenon is an emergent thing, appearing 
in a "fuzzy" manner when moving "up" the scale of complexity. Yet, 
art-function is what sweeps up and gathers together the molecular 
parts  of  a  particular  array  and  endows  them  with  expressivity.419 
Therefore, when considering the power of artistic creation, one 
should not adhere to historical, already-established practices of art 
only. What is more, one should not remain too faithful to the 
examples of art Deleuze – both alone and along with Guattari – takes 
up  from  a  decidedly  Modernist  point  of  view.  It  is  true,  as  Claire  
Colebrook has observed, that the high modern ideal of a radically 
autonomous work of art provides Deleuze the point of departure for 
thinking the whole of art as the site of affect which stands alone, 
independent of the artist, the art work and the spectator.420 
Modernism’s separation of art from other facets of life provides it 
with a critical force to question the conditions of “our” world. As 
Theodor Adorno states, the modern work of art must discard the idea 
of representing reality as constitutive of common form. For Adorno, 
art must instead “turn its back on conventional surface coherence, the 
                                               
419 This becoming-expressive can be schematised, in reference to the chapters of this study: 
via sensations that are desubjectified (chapter one), understood as deterritorializing impulses 
from outside a pre-given milieu (chapter two), producing qualitative multiplicities (chapter 
three) and appearing as simulacral entities (chapter four). These factors all contribute to the 
assemblage-like nature of art (chapter five). 
420 Colebrook, Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 95. 
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appearance of harmony, the order corroborated merely by 
replication”.421 
The problem with the Modernist notion of art’s autonomy is, 
for Deleuze, not its decidedly critical position vis-à-vis the rest  of  the 
society or human condition in general. The problem is rather the 
relation between critical art and the “human” condition: such a stance 
implies that there is some originary humanity, to which critical art 
could return us from our modern alienation. The Modernist artwork 
purports to expose the life enslaved by technology, conventions and 
commodification and to present the liberation of such a shackled life 
in the form of the autonomous work. Indeed, Adorno proclaims, such 
a work discards surface coherence and the appearance of harmony in 
fulfilling its critical function, but it still appeals to a unity beyond the 
forced consensus of modern life. It brings us from alienation to 
authenticity. This is why Deleuze and Guattari declare that the form-
shattering works of William Burroughs, James Joyce or even 
Nietzsche fall back into a supplementary dimension which transcends 
the fragmentary nature of their works. They note: “the most resolutely 
fragmented work can also be presented as the Total Work or Magnum 
Opus”.422 The  Modernist  work  sees  the  world  as  shattered,  but  
elevates the subjective observation and expression of this 
fragmentation  as  a  new  kind  of  unity.  Deleuze  and  Guattari  state:  
“unity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a 
new type of unity triumphs in the subject. … The world has become 
chaos, but the book or the artwork remains the image of the 
world”.423 Here the artist’s gesture erects a new totality of authenticity 
as The Work against chaos, which is secretly an original harmony that 
has been lost. 
This is the danger inherent in locating the authenticity of art 
within the artwork. The work becomes a carrier of the unity within 
the artist’s “lived” experience and its expression in the masterly 
gesture. Essentially, we return to the One: one life, one unifying 
principle, one expression. But Deleuze insists on the multiple. There 
is no one primordial life that we all share, and that would provide the 
bedrock to “our” shared existence as human beings. Rather, life is 
                                               
421 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott 
(London: Verso, 2005), p. 218. 
422 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 6. 
423 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 6. 
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difference, the untotalisable sum of the relations of “to-affect” and 
“to-be-affected” and it thus exceeds our boundaries. There is the life 
of  humans,  organic  life,  but  also  the  vast  field  of  non-organic  life  
which constitutes the becoming of the world. Even when art is 
building upon the notion of the lived and the expression of that lived, 
we must remember that each life-experience is only an Umwelt, a 
limited world closed upon itself. Yet, this Umwelt is constantly 
bombarded  by  the  outside;  it  is  affected  and  affecting  others,  and  
therefore transforming and transcending its previous boundaries. 
Accordingly, the “world” that a work of art presents is likewise a 
perspective that is permeated by affects. These affects do not belong 
to the artist, or to the spectator, but cut through them both. They are 
of the order of the real. Affect is the intensity which presses upon us 
from outside our sensory-motor schema, within which phenomena 
appear to us as if they were for us. It is for this radical relationality of 
the affect that sensation cannot be located in the artwork, but rather 
the work offers it a way of actualisation within perception. 
Yet, as the emergent properties of an assemblage, affects or 
points of intensity are not totally independent of the component parts 
the assemblage consists of. They appear to us because of the existence 
of the particular assemblage; there and then, within that particular 
configuration. Otherwise they would remain virtual, potential 
perceptions. One way to understand the affect is to approach it as that 
which deterritorializes the assemblage, effects a qualitative 
transformation within it. To locate the art-function – that is, the 
emergence of expressive properties and their deterritorializing force – 
one must observe the functioning of specific assemblages. As the 
coda of my study I have chosen to briefly analyse the case of 
phonography, or recording technology, in relation to the novel 
musical forms it enables. At first, the question of deterritorialization 
might seem far off from the repetitive medium of recordings. How 
could an apparatus of control – as Jacques Attali identifies the means 
of recording – carry in itself the art-function? At first, what would 
seem to be a central characteristic of a recording is its instrumental 
function: the recording apparatus is a machine for capturing, relaying 
and distributing meanings. Yet, as Friedrich Kittler notes, the 
recording surface – and, for Kittler, namely the audio recording surface 
– captures much more than the relayed symbolic order of commonly 
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shared meanings. The gramophonic edifice captures the real sound 
wave, and thus preserves the undifferentiated materiality of sound 
matter.424  
What Kittler locates as the real in his use of the Lacanian triad 
of the Real (phonograph), the Imaginary (film) and the Symbolic 
(typewriter), can be translated as the affect in Deleuzean terms, and it 
spills over the boundaries of the work of art. The instrumentalism 
inherent in the recorded media helps thus to deconstruct the 
Modernist work as a total gesture of the artist, but it does not relocate 
the impact of art into the sphere of mere sociology, as in the concept 
of the art world425 or theories of taste and distinction.426 There  is  
something real within the recording, something that has the potential 
to inscribe a difference into the replay experience. This aspect makes 
the  concept  of  the  assemblage,  as  well  as  of  the  simulacrum,  so  
suitable to considering works of art in their mediated forms. In the 
phonographic assemblage the question of its affect is not localisable 
into one point-like spot of the musical content, of the artist or the 
listener. Rather, the expressive quality and its virtual charge to 
deterritorialize the assemblage altogether reside in the multiplicity 
formed by the whole conjunction of elements. From that assemblage 
arises the art-function. 
   To reach this conclusion I have discussed Deleuze’s ontology 
of difference and his understanding of the process of subjectification 
in the first three chapters of my study. As has become evident, the 
philosophical aim of Deleuze is to build up an ontology that is able to 
place difference as the fundamental term. Difference would thus be 
the  substance  that  every  being  partakes  in.  If  something  exists,  it  is  
due to difference. The genesis of being(s) is what constantly concerns 
Deleuze: what acts as the “motor” of the constant self-differentiation 
that is evident in the diversity of the world? Further, how to conceive 
this  primal  differentiator  in  a  way  that  does  not  fix  it  into  an  
unchanging identity? This necessity is due to the fact that establishing 
an identity to difference would derive it from the selfsame difference. 
                                               
424 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 86. 
425 See Arthur C. Danto, “The Artworld”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 19 (1964), pp. 
571–584; George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (New York: Pegasus, 1971), p. 101. 
426 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice 
(London: Routledge, 1984). 
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Difference-in-itself is thus Deleuze’s problem throughout his œuvre, 
most manifest in his work Difference and Repetition.  
The evident problem of thinking of difference-in-itself is that 
one is constantly in danger of addressing difference in terms of 
identity. Difference derived from identity occurs when something 
differs from something else. For instance, I have two books on my 
desk and they differ from each other. Even if I had two copies of the 
same book they would differ, since they are not the same, they do not 
occupy the same space on the table. One is to the left of the other. 
The books cannot be superimposed.427 Yet, this difference is but the 
manifest differing between two identities, claims Deleuze. By 
following the line of thought centred on difference between X and Y we 
do not get to the bottom of “pure” difference which comes before 
identity. Instead we must try to think of the difference “beneath” the 
manifest difference. This challenge constitutes a major strand in 
Deleuze’s thought. 
To return to the example: what is unique in each of the books 
lying on the desk? Them being just there and nowhere else, just the 
way they are, occupying a unique point in space and time. Still, could 
not even a singular presence of a book in space and time be put in 
comparison to a more fundamental matrix, that of the space-time? 
Yes, if we approach difference again as a comparative term: the book 
is there now in the present moment, situated 13 centimetres from the 
bottom edge  and  45  centimetres  from the  right  edge  of  the  desk.  It  
can be pinpointed within the co-ordinates of divisible space and time, 
but only as an abstract, static entity of frozen time and halted 
movement. But if we turn the comparison the other way around we 
get  closer  to  affirming  difference  as  it  is  in  itself:  what  if  space  and  
time become existent because of entities “occupying” them? The 
“pure” difference is pure affirmation: there is. Or this is. Its existence 
“makes a difference”.428 
This is, as pure affirmation of a being’s being just-what-it-is, 
makes it an ontological foundation for the “latter” manifest, 
                                               
427 This constitutes an example for Immanuel Kant’s claim of the a priori nature of absolute 
space. The relations between distinct entities are consequences of their positioning in space. 
This is contrary to Gottfried Leibniz’s claim that the determination of space follows from the 
relations of matter. See Peter Woelert, “Kant’s hands, spatial orientation and the Copernican 
Turn”, Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (2007), pp. 141–142. 
428 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 292. 
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comparative difference between beings. However, at this point one 
further clarification must be made. It concerns the pure difference as 
becoming rather than being. If the pure difference is understood as the 
power of self-differentiation inherent in being, and not as a difference 
between two beings, it follows that this differentiation concerns the 
temporality of beings. Difference, when manifested, not only 
concerns space but also time. According to Gilbert Simondon, 
discussed in chapter two of this work, fully formed individuals should 
not be considered as ontologically primary. Rather, individuals or 
beings are processes of individuation or becoming. Individualisation 
takes place when an individual forms itself out of a pre-individual 
milieu.  The  emergent  individual  can,  in  turn,  act  as  a  part  of  a  pre-
individual milieu to some other individual. This is the ontogenetic 
view of ontology. Correspondingly, the affirmation this is could be 
developed into this happens. Individuals individuate themselves and are 
individuated by other individuals out of pre-individual field. What is 
notable is that individuation is a question of perspective.  What  is  an  
individual from one perspective functions as a pre-individual 
singularity for another individual. This is the lesson Deleuze takes 
from Lucretius: there is diversity, every being is composed of parts 
and participates in composing other beings.429 
An individual may be a grain of sand, composed of molecules, 
which themselves are composed of atoms et cetera. Yet, one might 
want to consider a stretch of white sandy beach as an individual. Then 
the perspective would shift to include the grain of sand as only a 
minor building block of the beach. Going further, by including a 
dimension of temporality it is easy to see that the beach is actually a 
process. It is affected by the properties of its components – the 
relative  granular  size  of  its  sand  –  and  its  milieu,  for  example  the  
weather  conditions  typical  to  the  area  the  beach  is  in.  If  the  sand  is  
very fine and the weather windy, the whole beach may gradually be 
swept away by the wind, despite the movement of waves building up 
more sand in replacement. Or consider a mountain, a being that 
appears as immobile and unchanging from our human perspective. 
Still,  as  understood  in  a  geological  scale  of  time,  the  mountain  is  a  
fluid folding of matter, ever changing its shape. The light of a 
fluorescent  lamp  appears  as  a  smooth  emission  to  us,  and  yet  a  fly  
                                               
429 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 266–268. 
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sees the light as flickering as its visual receptive capability is much 
faster than what we possess. The macro and micro scales, unattainable 
to us in perception, are also part of a being. Our existence as human 
beings is shaped by our sensory-motor schema; the particular sensory, 
physical, mental and cultural capacities we have. Yet, the world is not 
“made to our measure”, and Deleuze adopts an anti-correlationist and 
realist view as regards Kant’s epistemology. For Kant the form of 
transcendental subjectivity dictates the structure of the apparent 
world. Everything that appears must appear within certain a priori 
parameters. What is outside of the conditions of possible experience – 
the noumenal or the Real – we cannot perceive and bring into 
representation. Deleuze agrees to a point, but insists on the vital force 
of the Real as the pressure of the Outside upon our world of 
representations, breaking up pre-given forms and identities and thus 
introducing the genitive element of difference.  
When Deleuze talks about thought outside representation and 
about pre-individual difference-in-itself, he means the fathoming of 
things as flux, as “non-organic” life. To go “beyond” the milieu of the 
organism is to deny the Judgment of God, the organization and 
hierarchy of being. Instead, in this “flat” ontology of immanence there 
are no hylomorphic distinctions of form and matter, but rather 
“complex relation[s] between differential velocities”.430 These 
relations, derived from the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, are 
nominated  as  affects.  Every  body  is  constituted  by  its  capacity  to  
affect others and, in turn, its susceptibility to be affected by others. 
On the plane of immanence, within the virtual, all that can be said of 
individual beings is that there are encounters. There is no 
transcendence. Everything that is can, in theory, be affected by 
everything else. Thus, everything has its conditions. This does not 
mean that every being is causally determined, but that there is an 
infinite set of conditions for everything – everything has a reason, 
though not a necessary but a sufficient one. Here we come to the 
notions of autopoiesis and emergency. The emergence of a distinct 
being – individuation – is a question of relations. Individuals “occur” 
in a milieu of causes and the emerging individual functions as (a part 
of) a milieu to some other emerging individual. What guarantees the 
                                               
430 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), p. 123. 
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“flatness” of the ontology of emergence is Simondon and Deleuze’s 
insistence on the non-existence of pre-formation. To be sure, every 
individual is preceded by pre-individual factors which constitute the 
milieu for emergence, but these factors are themselves the result of a 
process of emergence and not some transcendent structures 
independent of the process of individuation. 
The co-existence of entities on a plane of ontological non-
hierarchy means that conditions or mediations travel “transversally” 
between different modes of beings. Any given individual is a complex 
situation composed of interactions on different levels of causation 
ranging from subatomic to cosmic, from biological to social. This 
means, in effect, the death of God. There can be no original unity or 
totality, a thing that would be beyond conditioning. This immanent 
view requires also the discarding of the representationalist form of 
thought that is based on essences and their instantiations. In chapter 
four I consider the representational way of thinking which discerns 
the entities we encounter as re-presentations of some transcendent 
reality and categorises these entities according to their pre-given 
identities as instantiations of some original principle of distribution in 
the world. In an autopoietic model of the world essences have to be 
replaced with units that are immanent to the material plane. There is 
no transcendent ground for identity. Instead of essence–instantiation 
relationship based on resemblance, we have the simulacra-like relation 
of morphogenesis between virtual “multiplicities” and their 
actualisations – the pre-individual field and actual individuals. 
Understanding individuals as simulacra, the Platonic category of 
“false”, deceitful images which fail to represent their original essence 
since they lack one, Deleuze devises the concept of the assemblage as 
explicating the dynamic nature of identity. As discussed in chapter 
five, an assemblage is identity understood as a compound of parts: the 
interaction of different elements that produces certain effects. Every 
individuation that subsists is an assemblage; it possesses capacity to 
change its environment and absorb impulses coming from outside its 
boundaries.  As  Deleuze  says  of  the  simulacra,  they  are  able  to  
engender heterogeneity or “internalize a dissimilarity” within their 
identity.431 As  such  the  simulacra  function  as  the  reverse  of  Platonic  
identity: they do not subordinate difference to the same, but rather 
                                               
431 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 258. 
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expose themselves as dissimilar entities and at the same time suggest 
the simulacral nature of every entity. Therefore the way to approach 
assemblages-as-simulacra is to experiment rather than interpret. 
Whereas interpretation posits an original meaning behind the 
appearance of an entity, the simulacral assemblage is an apparition – 
its presence does not lack any original foundation. Rather, to 
understand it is to discover the ways of its being: how it works, what 
its  affective  capacities  are,  what  its  internal  structure  is.  This  type  of  
analysis of an identity brings us to a fundamental relationality within 
entities. Nothing is singular: everything is connected. And yet, 
everything is singular as every phenomenon appears right there-and-
then, within a particular configuration of affects. In this sense 
existence is aesthetic: a phenomenon must be evaluated according to a 
particular set of circumstances. A phenomenon expresses its genetic 
conditions – it is an individual “solution” to a pre-individual 
“problem”. The world consists of these expressions; there is no 
higher totality of which phenomena would be expressions. Such a 
totality would distribute individuals as possibilities waiting only for 
their realization. Rather, we must understand existence via the modes 
of virtuality and actuality. The virtual is not a reservoir of identities 
lacking actuality: it is fully real, but pre-individual. It exists in every 
thing as the entity’s relational capacity to change, to unfold in a 
different manner. Experience is, then, subjection to this dimension 
which exceeds the experiencing subject and the object experienced. 
Something in the world forces us to think: experience is an encounter 
with the virtual. 
The experience of art is of special importance for Deleuze, as it 
concerns the aesthetic which cannot, according to Kant, be 
subjugated under a pre-given conceptual framework. The aesthetic is 
the singular: here and now, appearing for me, at the very moment. 
Yet,  it  cannot  be  contained  within  a  particular,  actualised  entity  –  
whether the expression of the “lived” of an artist or the spectator, or 
the material configuration of a work of art. The affect is the relational: 
a displacement of a particular quality from its context. Here we arrive 
at the point of conclusion of this work. The affect, the experience of 
art means being exposed to the art-function of a certain assemblage. 
Art is not merely the work as a unique gesture of the artist’s intention, 
whether conscious or unconscious. Not the work as autonomous 
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critique of an alienated world. Not the self-generating meaning of an 
art world. And not the subjective experience of the audience. Rather, 
the art-function is in the diagrammatic power of an assemblage to 
change its consistency and kind: to become something new.  
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